FYI @brunoomartins.bsky.social

It is plural in French and Spanish, les États-Unis and los Estados Unidos. It’s not a union of principalities as per the OPs definition.

I was very briefly characterising some of the arguments used against gun control and official ID. I don’t believe in either argument, and I agree that current events in the us are a good example of how an armed citizenry won’t prevent autocracy.

Official ID for Brits is like gun control in the US. Something that is normal in stable European democracies but will pave the way for tyranny at home.

The frothing about ID cards from people who think of themselves as progressive is another sad reminder that in many ways Britain really isn't a mainstream European country.

Yes, having lived in the rest of Europe for 25 years I agree with all of this. I'll add that not having a standardized official ID places marginalized people in a more difficult position as they can't easily establish their identity. Collecting gas bills etc isn't easy for some people.

You are of course correct. But this was lost long before either of were born. Back in 1944 Orwell noted that “the word ‘fascism’ has now no meaning except in so far as it signifies ‘something not desirable’”. When I was growing up in the 70s and 80s teachers were fascists for expecting homework.

Yes, the decisive role of a conventional weapon may be limited to those cases where the enemy is unable to adapt (in time). Otherwise its different varieties of attrition.

Similar here in Norway. Its reasonable to expect to be able to order a meal in your own language. But many are international students doing MAs, and if they need to work too then they don't have much time to attend language classes. Probably leave before they are able to hold a conversation.

Thanks. Doing detailed systemic research on something that large and complex is certainly a daunting prospect. But I think it may be possible.

Thanks!

Link to an open access copy of the article: www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....

May interest:
‪@danielfiott.bsky.social @aphclarkson.bsky.social @rikefranke.bsky.social ‬‪@jcaverley.bsky.social ‪ @laurachappell.bsky.social @salisbot.bsky.social @justin-br0nk.bsky.social @ncrenic.bsky.social @josephhdempsey.bsky.social @shashj.bsky.social

Contestation is the defining feature of the political economy of European defence, with positive and negative implications. When managing the network European leaders need to balance EU and NATO roles, integrate Ukraine, decide how much to import from the US, and mobilize sustainable financing.

The European Iron Network’s strength lies in its resilience: flexibility, multiple forms of capacity, and the ability to rapidly reconfigure. But it also has vulnerabilities: fragmented supply chains, EU/NATO rivalry, duplication of effort and reliance on US technology.

We argue this new reality is best understood as a European Iron Network, which is a web of states, EU institutions, NATO, and defence firms. Unlike the largely static US 'Iron Triangle', Europe’s network is dynamic, contested, and constantly renegotiated.