Niall Hughes
@niallehughes.bsky.social
Economist at King's Business School. niallehughes.com
We're a smallish (30 or so) but growing department. Just this year we hired Kfir Eliaz, Felipe González, Michael Amior and Nilesh Fernando.
For info on the dept check out www.kcl.ac.uk/political-ec... 2/2
For info on the dept check out www.kcl.ac.uk/political-ec... 2/2
Economics at Kings | Department of Political Economy | King’s College London
www.kcl.ac.uk
November 11, 2025 at 12:56 PM
We're a smallish (30 or so) but growing department. Just this year we hired Kfir Eliaz, Felipe González, Michael Amior and Nilesh Fernando.
For info on the dept check out www.kcl.ac.uk/political-ec... 2/2
For info on the dept check out www.kcl.ac.uk/political-ec... 2/2
The overall message: Legislative elections outperform single-district elections in a world with multiple dimensions of policy.
Read the full paper, here tinyurl.com/2nsnj438 #EconSky #Elections 14/14
Read the full paper, here tinyurl.com/2nsnj438 #EconSky #Elections 14/14
September 25, 2025 at 11:22 AM
The overall message: Legislative elections outperform single-district elections in a world with multiple dimensions of policy.
Read the full paper, here tinyurl.com/2nsnj438 #EconSky #Elections 14/14
Read the full paper, here tinyurl.com/2nsnj438 #EconSky #Elections 14/14
On (ii), I show that increased polarisation does not affect outcomes in legislative elections (policies remain optimal), but it can change outcomes (for better or worse) in single-district elections. 13/14
September 25, 2025 at 11:22 AM
On (ii), I show that increased polarisation does not affect outcomes in legislative elections (policies remain optimal), but it can change outcomes (for better or worse) in single-district elections. 13/14
On (i), I show that parliamentary systems typically result in higher utility for median voters than presidential systems. 12/14
September 25, 2025 at 11:22 AM
On (i), I show that parliamentary systems typically result in higher utility for median voters than presidential systems. 12/14
There's much more in the paper (& appendix). I apply the model to two key political debates:
(i) Which system of government is more representative: parliamentary or presidential?
(ii) What is the effect of voter polarisation on outcomes? 11/14
(i) Which system of government is more representative: parliamentary or presidential?
(ii) What is the effect of voter polarisation on outcomes? 11/14
September 25, 2025 at 11:22 AM
There's much more in the paper (& appendix). I apply the model to two key political debates:
(i) Which system of government is more representative: parliamentary or presidential?
(ii) What is the effect of voter polarisation on outcomes? 11/14
(i) Which system of government is more representative: parliamentary or presidential?
(ii) What is the effect of voter polarisation on outcomes? 11/14
The result? The implemented policy is the one preferred by a majority of districts on each dimension.
3) There's a welfare windfall: Condorcet winner policies are guaranteed to be implemented in legislative elections, but not in single-district ones. 🏆 10/14
3) There's a welfare windfall: Condorcet winner policies are guaranteed to be implemented in legislative elections, but not in single-district ones. 🏆 10/14
September 25, 2025 at 11:22 AM
The result? The implemented policy is the one preferred by a majority of districts on each dimension.
3) There's a welfare windfall: Condorcet winner policies are guaranteed to be implemented in legislative elections, but not in single-district ones. 🏆 10/14
3) There's a welfare windfall: Condorcet winner policies are guaranteed to be implemented in legislative elections, but not in single-district ones. 🏆 10/14
2) Policy Outcomes are *more representative*.
In single-district elections, candidates take party loyalists for granted. But in a legislative election, every type of voter is a swing voter. This forces one candidate to offer a platform with majority support on both issues. 9/14
In single-district elections, candidates take party loyalists for granted. But in a legislative election, every type of voter is a swing voter. This forces one candidate to offer a platform with majority support on both issues. 9/14
September 25, 2025 at 11:22 AM
2) Policy Outcomes are *more representative*.
In single-district elections, candidates take party loyalists for granted. But in a legislative election, every type of voter is a swing voter. This forces one candidate to offer a platform with majority support on both issues. 9/14
In single-district elections, candidates take party loyalists for granted. But in a legislative election, every type of voter is a swing voter. This forces one candidate to offer a platform with majority support on both issues. 9/14
1) Outcomes are *more predictable*.
In legislative elections, candidate platforms and the final policy are uniquely pinned down by voter preferences. In single-district elections, candidates often use mixed strategies, meaning platforms and final policy can be random. 8/14
In legislative elections, candidate platforms and the final policy are uniquely pinned down by voter preferences. In single-district elections, candidates often use mixed strategies, meaning platforms and final policy can be random. 8/14
September 25, 2025 at 11:22 AM
1) Outcomes are *more predictable*.
In legislative elections, candidate platforms and the final policy are uniquely pinned down by voter preferences. In single-district elections, candidates often use mixed strategies, meaning platforms and final policy can be random. 8/14
In legislative elections, candidate platforms and the final policy are uniquely pinned down by voter preferences. In single-district elections, candidates often use mixed strategies, meaning platforms and final policy can be random. 8/14
OK, but does this different voter behaviour have any meaningful effects?
Yes. I show that the behaviour of conflicted voters has substantial effects on the platforms that candidates choose and on the final implemented policy.
Here are three key ways. 👇 7/14
Yes. I show that the behaviour of conflicted voters has substantial effects on the platforms that candidates choose and on the final implemented policy.
Here are three key ways. 👇 7/14
September 25, 2025 at 11:22 AM
OK, but does this different voter behaviour have any meaningful effects?
Yes. I show that the behaviour of conflicted voters has substantial effects on the platforms that candidates choose and on the final implemented policy.
Here are three key ways. 👇 7/14
Yes. I show that the behaviour of conflicted voters has substantial effects on the platforms that candidates choose and on the final implemented policy.
Here are three key ways. 👇 7/14
I show that in large elections, voters should focus exclusively on the issue where they are most likely to be pivotal.
Preference intensity is irrelevant! 🤯 It doesn't matter how much you care about one issue over the other; only where your vote has the most impact. 6/14
Preference intensity is irrelevant! 🤯 It doesn't matter how much you care about one issue over the other; only where your vote has the most impact. 6/14
September 25, 2025 at 11:22 AM
I show that in large elections, voters should focus exclusively on the issue where they are most likely to be pivotal.
Preference intensity is irrelevant! 🤯 It doesn't matter how much you care about one issue over the other; only where your vote has the most impact. 6/14
Preference intensity is irrelevant! 🤯 It doesn't matter how much you care about one issue over the other; only where your vote has the most impact. 6/14
But in a *legislative* election (for Congress or Parliament), the logic differs. A strategic voter needs to ask:
"What is the relative likelihood that my district swings the legislative majority on one issue versus the other?" 5/14
"What is the relative likelihood that my district swings the legislative majority on one issue versus the other?" 5/14
September 25, 2025 at 11:22 AM
But in a *legislative* election (for Congress or Parliament), the logic differs. A strategic voter needs to ask:
"What is the relative likelihood that my district swings the legislative majority on one issue versus the other?" 5/14
"What is the relative likelihood that my district swings the legislative majority on one issue versus the other?" 5/14
In a *single-district* election (like for a President or Mayor), the answer is simple. You should vote for the candidate whose overall policy "bundle" you prefer.
In this case, your preference intensity matters. You weigh the issues and pick the lesser of two evils. 4/14
In this case, your preference intensity matters. You weigh the issues and pick the lesser of two evils. 4/14
September 25, 2025 at 11:22 AM
In a *single-district* election (like for a President or Mayor), the answer is simple. You should vote for the candidate whose overall policy "bundle" you prefer.
In this case, your preference intensity matters. You weigh the issues and pick the lesser of two evils. 4/14
In this case, your preference intensity matters. You weigh the issues and pick the lesser of two evils. 4/14
This raises the question: how should you vote if you’re conflicted, liking Candidate A on one issue but Candidate B on the other?
Does the correct choice depend on the type of election you’re voting in? (Spoiler, I show it does). 3/14
Does the correct choice depend on the type of election you’re voting in? (Spoiler, I show it does). 3/14
September 25, 2025 at 11:22 AM
This raises the question: how should you vote if you’re conflicted, liking Candidate A on one issue but Candidate B on the other?
Does the correct choice depend on the type of election you’re voting in? (Spoiler, I show it does). 3/14
Does the correct choice depend on the type of election you’re voting in? (Spoiler, I show it does). 3/14
Voters often face a choice between candidates who differ on more than the traditional left/right party split; they may have different platforms on some other issue (e.g. social issues, foreign wars, globalisation, immigration...) 2/14
September 25, 2025 at 11:22 AM
Voters often face a choice between candidates who differ on more than the traditional left/right party split; they may have different platforms on some other issue (e.g. social issues, foreign wars, globalisation, immigration...) 2/14
great stuff Benjamin
September 17, 2025 at 5:13 PM
great stuff Benjamin
Looking forward to great talks from Vera Troeger, @edogrillo.bsky.social, Yongping Bao, Margherita Negri, @cubel.bsky.social, Margherita Negri, @phildent80.bsky.social , Jeannette Brosig-Koch, and Gerald Eisenkopf.
September 17, 2025 at 4:16 PM
Looking forward to great talks from Vera Troeger, @edogrillo.bsky.social, Yongping Bao, Margherita Negri, @cubel.bsky.social, Margherita Negri, @phildent80.bsky.social , Jeannette Brosig-Koch, and Gerald Eisenkopf.
Organised by @sfehrler.bsky.social, Torben Klarl, Olexandr Nikolaychuk, Maik Schneider, @markustepe.bsky.social and me. With thanks to DIFIS, @sfb1342.bsky.social, @unibremen.bsky.social, @uni-graz.at , @kingsbschool.bsky.social.
September 17, 2025 at 4:16 PM
Organised by @sfehrler.bsky.social, Torben Klarl, Olexandr Nikolaychuk, Maik Schneider, @markustepe.bsky.social and me. With thanks to DIFIS, @sfb1342.bsky.social, @unibremen.bsky.social, @uni-graz.at , @kingsbschool.bsky.social.
A great read - thanks
February 18, 2025 at 10:11 PM
A great read - thanks
Great list. Thanks for sharing
January 8, 2025 at 11:24 AM
Great list. Thanks for sharing