Nadeem Elias Khan
@neaskhan.bsky.social
Consultant on Sunni Jihadism || PhD candidate Medieval History || Lecturer || Tweets do not represent employers, clients, partners || contact.neaskhan@gmail.com
My thanks to @cja-news.bsky.social and everyone involved!
July 2, 2025 at 6:33 AM
My thanks to @cja-news.bsky.social and everyone involved!
Hm, I feel the process is different outside of rigorous Salafi-Jihadism. Within that sub-trend the mechanisms actually are comparable to this historical precedent.
July 1, 2025 at 9:07 PM
Hm, I feel the process is different outside of rigorous Salafi-Jihadism. Within that sub-trend the mechanisms actually are comparable to this historical precedent.
Thread on the second paper "The Major Corporal Punishments of Islamic State". You can read it here: cja.org/wp-content/u... bsky.app/profile/neas...
July 1, 2025 at 9:05 PM
Thread on the second paper "The Major Corporal Punishments of Islamic State". You can read it here: cja.org/wp-content/u... bsky.app/profile/neas...
Even more interestingly, Islamic State only identifies alleged offenders by showing their face and giving their full name if they are accused of state-threatening behaviour – an obviouly fitting term developed by @mararevkin.bsky.social (2016). www.brookings.edu/wp-content/u...
www.brookings.edu
July 1, 2025 at 9:04 PM
Even more interestingly, Islamic State only identifies alleged offenders by showing their face and giving their full name if they are accused of state-threatening behaviour – an obviouly fitting term developed by @mararevkin.bsky.social (2016). www.brookings.edu/wp-content/u...
On the propaganda side, there are further notable findings. In legal contexts, Islamic State is concerned about its image and censors harsh corporal punishments, only showing executions by bullet-shot.
July 1, 2025 at 9:02 PM
On the propaganda side, there are further notable findings. In legal contexts, Islamic State is concerned about its image and censors harsh corporal punishments, only showing executions by bullet-shot.
When looking at relevant videos from the territorial caliphate, it becomes clear that there are minor divergences from theory that might relate to judges of different background or adjustment to local expectations. Over the years, there is obvious bureaucratization from individuals to institutions.
July 1, 2025 at 9:02 PM
When looking at relevant videos from the territorial caliphate, it becomes clear that there are minor divergences from theory that might relate to judges of different background or adjustment to local expectations. Over the years, there is obvious bureaucratization from individuals to institutions.
Compared to classical discourse, Islamic State opted for maximalist positions mostly found in Maliki tradition to mete out the harshest corporal punishments possible by either lowering the burden of proof or giving greater leeway to judges, the caliph, and his deputies.
July 1, 2025 at 9:00 PM
Compared to classical discourse, Islamic State opted for maximalist positions mostly found in Maliki tradition to mete out the harshest corporal punishments possible by either lowering the burden of proof or giving greater leeway to judges, the caliph, and his deputies.
Implementing hudud punishments mentioned in the Quran therefore was not simply a way to govern and establish order but rather a raison d’être. I found that Islamic State's legal canon underwent an evolution shaped by the Office for Research and Study and decision makers in the group's leadership.
July 1, 2025 at 8:59 PM
Implementing hudud punishments mentioned in the Quran therefore was not simply a way to govern and establish order but rather a raison d’être. I found that Islamic State's legal canon underwent an evolution shaped by the Office for Research and Study and decision makers in the group's leadership.
Unlike other Islamists, Islamic State raised the actual execution of these punishments to an essentiality for confirming to the concept of tawhid al-hakimiyya or monotheism in judgement. The rejection of positive law is a cornerstone of Islamic State ideology that reserves judgement to God alone.
July 1, 2025 at 8:57 PM
Unlike other Islamists, Islamic State raised the actual execution of these punishments to an essentiality for confirming to the concept of tawhid al-hakimiyya or monotheism in judgement. The rejection of positive law is a cornerstone of Islamic State ideology that reserves judgement to God alone.
Islamic State referred to the pre-modern legal thought of shari'a when governing its caliphate state in both Iraq and Syria. The rules Islamic State adopted (and adapted) include harsh corporal punishments known as qisas and hudud punishments.
July 1, 2025 at 8:56 PM
Islamic State referred to the pre-modern legal thought of shari'a when governing its caliphate state in both Iraq and Syria. The rules Islamic State adopted (and adapted) include harsh corporal punishments known as qisas and hudud punishments.
It also analyses the actual practice of major corporal punishments as shown in officially released videos with a view to understanding the surrounding propaganda.
July 1, 2025 at 8:55 PM
It also analyses the actual practice of major corporal punishments as shown in officially released videos with a view to understanding the surrounding propaganda.
Thread on the first paper "From Allies to Foes: The Relationship between the Islamic State Movement and other Sunni Islamist Insurgents". You can read it here: cja.org/wp-content/u... bsky.app/profile/did:...
June 30, 2025 at 6:01 PM
Thread on the first paper "From Allies to Foes: The Relationship between the Islamic State Movement and other Sunni Islamist Insurgents". You can read it here: cja.org/wp-content/u... bsky.app/profile/did:...
If you are more interested in the Iraqi side of things, do check out our article in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism: www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....
State Accompli: The Political Consolidation of the Islamic State Prior to the Caliphate
This study examines the successful consolidation of the Islamic State movement within the Sunni insurgency in Iraq from 2003 to 2014. We rely on insurgent media releases, captured documents, and a ...
www.tandfonline.com
June 30, 2025 at 5:58 PM
If you are more interested in the Iraqi side of things, do check out our article in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism: www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....
This is evident in the case of Jaysh Khalid bin al-Walid and is still worth discussing with regard to the yet unclear status of groups like the Syrian Saraya Ansar al-Sunna and the 'Lakurawa' in North-Western Nigeria. Read the full piece here: cja.org/wp-content/u...
cja.org
June 30, 2025 at 5:57 PM
This is evident in the case of Jaysh Khalid bin al-Walid and is still worth discussing with regard to the yet unclear status of groups like the Syrian Saraya Ansar al-Sunna and the 'Lakurawa' in North-Western Nigeria. Read the full piece here: cja.org/wp-content/u...
Secretly pledged leaders and factions allow the movement to influence wider insurgent discourse, lie low in case of danger, and further propaganda of expansion once making the pledge public. While our research focused on the 2011-2014 period, the tactic continued during the territorial caliphate.
June 30, 2025 at 5:56 PM
Secretly pledged leaders and factions allow the movement to influence wider insurgent discourse, lie low in case of danger, and further propaganda of expansion once making the pledge public. While our research focused on the 2011-2014 period, the tactic continued during the territorial caliphate.
A key aspect of the playbook is the use of front groups and secret pledges by leadership figures or factions in allied and rival groups. They allow the movement to perpetrate extreme actions of violence without carrying the blame or to embed itself where its real identity would lead to backlash.
June 30, 2025 at 5:53 PM
A key aspect of the playbook is the use of front groups and secret pledges by leadership figures or factions in allied and rival groups. They allow the movement to perpetrate extreme actions of violence without carrying the blame or to embed itself where its real identity would lead to backlash.
During all stages, the movement practiced a gradual implementation of its policies, coercing ideologically distant insurgents first, then using similar tactics on ideologically closer Political Salafists and eventually even on other Salafi-Jihadists.
June 30, 2025 at 5:50 PM
During all stages, the movement practiced a gradual implementation of its policies, coercing ideologically distant insurgents first, then using similar tactics on ideologically closer Political Salafists and eventually even on other Salafi-Jihadists.
In the competitive phase, the movement withdrew from shared governance and began covertly assassinating Sunni insurgent and societal leaders. Success in this stage saw the group advance to a coercive mode of political consolidation, using assassinations and ultra-violence against Sunni rivals.
June 30, 2025 at 5:49 PM
In the competitive phase, the movement withdrew from shared governance and began covertly assassinating Sunni insurgent and societal leaders. Success in this stage saw the group advance to a coercive mode of political consolidation, using assassinations and ultra-violence against Sunni rivals.
We also find that this process was gradual and based on ideological proximity to other Sunni Islamists. The movement cooperated with all other Islamist groups on the battlefield and in governance when weak. To advance its political agenda, it sought opportunities by turning to competition.
June 30, 2025 at 5:47 PM
We also find that this process was gradual and based on ideological proximity to other Sunni Islamists. The movement cooperated with all other Islamist groups on the battlefield and in governance when weak. To advance its political agenda, it sought opportunities by turning to competition.
Based on our previous research on the movement in Iraq, we identify how the group applied a strategic playbook to the Syrian context. Grounded in work by Hafez et al. (2024), we identify that the group moved through phases of cooperation, competition, and coercion.
June 30, 2025 at 5:45 PM
Based on our previous research on the movement in Iraq, we identify how the group applied a strategic playbook to the Syrian context. Grounded in work by Hafez et al. (2024), we identify that the group moved through phases of cooperation, competition, and coercion.
Reposted by Nadeem Elias Khan
Finally, @neaskhan.bsky.social introduced his examination of IS’s penal code and judicial proceedings relating to corporal punishment: cja.org/wp-content/u...
cja.org
June 27, 2025 at 6:06 PM
Finally, @neaskhan.bsky.social introduced his examination of IS’s penal code and judicial proceedings relating to corporal punishment: cja.org/wp-content/u...
Reposted by Nadeem Elias Khan
@neaskhan.bsky.social presented his and Craig Whiteside’s paper tracing how ISIL relations with other Sunni Islamist insurgents shifted from cooperation through competition to coercion: cja.org/wp-content/u...
June 27, 2025 at 6:06 PM
@neaskhan.bsky.social presented his and Craig Whiteside’s paper tracing how ISIL relations with other Sunni Islamist insurgents shifted from cooperation through competition to coercion: cja.org/wp-content/u...