An apt US intelligence analysis of Zaire, March 1979.

It also reflects the seemingly high popularity enjoyed by the junta, and especially Assimi Goïta, at least in urban areas. Junta narratives of military success, Kidal's recapture, the unpopularity of civilian politicians, and relative urban security may help explain this.

And is consistent with the years following the 2021 coup, although we do see a slight decline:

This is true across all regions, including the far north and the areas most affected by jihadist violence:

I'm finally digging into some of the results of the
@fesonline.bsky.social's2025 "Mali Mètre" survey published in May. The results are striking. Eg a large majority see the overall situation of the country as improving:

Wouldn't be Easter without a castle visit.

To add to the lack of clarity, here is the US acting chief of mission, Richard Dwyer's account:

But when Chadian army units launched their attack on Tombalbaye's presidential palace on April 13 1975, the French contingent in N'Djamena, over 1,500 troops, was explicitly ordered to stand down.

50 years ago yesterday Chadian President François/N’Garta Tombalbaye was overthrown (and killed) in a military coup. The coup would kick-off a series of events that would eventually lead to state-collapse 4-years later. A longstanding question that remains unanswered is the alleged French role.

Any other dads out there who have gotten really into the War of the Spanish Succession?

Cue breathless reporting about abandoning Africa etc...AFRICOM's net impact on African security can charitably be described as zero.

Escapism for these dark times.

Napoleon in the mist

Check out the next installment in my series on historical US intelligence coverage of Africa: Paul Biya's early months in power. nathanielkpowell.substack.com/p/paul-biyas...