Your response got my inner radio playing this incessantly: www.youtube.com/watch?v=XTNG...

It is SUPPOSED to, but I think that's an inevitably relevant issue to raise! Do you think it works? Other issues might include: epistemic permissivism, the objectivity of deep disagreements, first-person attitudes and their peculiarities...

The original question: if you and I are in a state of maximal doxastic/belief agreement (and we're ideally rational), could we nonetheless fail to be in a maximal state of non-doxastic/desire agreement? [e.g. I want to have a beer but you "disagree", i.e. you don't want me to drink tonight]

Hey! Suppose I desire a beer (surely that's not actually true!). There's two ways for you to "share my desire". (1) You also desire a beer. (2) You desire that I have a beer. I'm interested in (2) cause it lends itself to a more robust concept of non-doxastic agreement.