🎗 Moshe Hazan
@moshehazan.bsky.social
Professor of Economics at Monash University. Research Fellow at CEPR, Associate Editor of JPopEcon, and former member of the Monetary Committee at the Bank of Israel.
Personal note: I worked in Israel for ~20 years. My defaults were Europe or the US—I hadn’t considered Australia. Melbourne has been a fantastic surprise: strong research environment + great quality of life. If you haven’t already, put AUS on your radar.
October 17, 2025 at 12:59 AM
Personal note: I worked in Israel for ~20 years. My defaults were Europe or the US—I hadn’t considered Australia. Melbourne has been a fantastic surprise: strong research environment + great quality of life. If you haven’t already, put AUS on your radar.
The paper is available here:
www.moshehazan.net/_files/ugd/f...
www.moshehazan.net/_files/ugd/f...
www.moshehazan.net
September 10, 2025 at 2:57 AM
The paper is available here:
www.moshehazan.net/_files/ugd/f...
www.moshehazan.net/_files/ugd/f...
8/
Takeaway. Intra-household distribution of resources is pivotal for fertility outcomes. Policies that ignore payee identity risk missing the key margin.
Takeaway. Intra-household distribution of resources is pivotal for fertility outcomes. Policies that ignore payee identity risk missing the key margin.
September 10, 2025 at 2:57 AM
8/
Takeaway. Intra-household distribution of resources is pivotal for fertility outcomes. Policies that ignore payee identity risk missing the key margin.
Takeaway. Intra-household distribution of resources is pivotal for fertility outcomes. Policies that ignore payee identity risk missing the key margin.
7/
Policy. Eligibility and payments were individual (not hh-level), akin to UBI debates. Results indicate that who receives the transfer matters for fertility, highlighting a potential tension between UBI-style transfers and pronatalist policy if the goal is to increase births.
Policy. Eligibility and payments were individual (not hh-level), akin to UBI debates. Results indicate that who receives the transfer matters for fertility, highlighting a potential tension between UBI-style transfers and pronatalist policy if the goal is to increase births.
September 10, 2025 at 2:57 AM
7/
Policy. Eligibility and payments were individual (not hh-level), akin to UBI debates. Results indicate that who receives the transfer matters for fertility, highlighting a potential tension between UBI-style transfers and pronatalist policy if the goal is to increase births.
Policy. Eligibility and payments were individual (not hh-level), akin to UBI debates. Results indicate that who receives the transfer matters for fertility, highlighting a potential tension between UBI-style transfers and pronatalist policy if the goal is to increase births.
6/
Why ‘young’? Wartime and immediate postwar displacement often delayed marriage into the late 1940s. Women already of childbearing age during the war faced atypical constraints; younger cohorts were less directly affected—making the early–late contrast more informative for them
Why ‘young’? Wartime and immediate postwar displacement often delayed marriage into the late 1940s. Women already of childbearing age during the war faced atypical constraints; younger cohorts were less directly affected—making the early–late contrast more informative for them
September 10, 2025 at 2:57 AM
6/
Why ‘young’? Wartime and immediate postwar displacement often delayed marriage into the late 1940s. Women already of childbearing age during the war faced atypical constraints; younger cohorts were less directly affected—making the early–late contrast more informative for them
Why ‘young’? Wartime and immediate postwar displacement often delayed marriage into the late 1940s. Women already of childbearing age during the war faced atypical constraints; younger cohorts were less directly affected—making the early–late contrast more informative for them
5/
Main result. When the recipient is a young woman—first eligible in the 1950s while still in childbearing years—completed fertility is lower by ~0.25–0.40 children relative to the corresponding gender-by-timing comparisons.
Main result. When the recipient is a young woman—first eligible in the 1950s while still in childbearing years—completed fertility is lower by ~0.25–0.40 children relative to the corresponding gender-by-timing comparisons.
September 10, 2025 at 2:57 AM
5/
Main result. When the recipient is a young woman—first eligible in the 1950s while still in childbearing years—completed fertility is lower by ~0.25–0.40 children relative to the corresponding gender-by-timing comparisons.
Main result. When the recipient is a young woman—first eligible in the 1950s while still in childbearing years—completed fertility is lower by ~0.25–0.40 children relative to the corresponding gender-by-timing comparisons.
Event study: For treated young women, pre-eligibility trends in cumulative children are comparable; after first eligibility, the treated path lies below late-eligible comparisons.
September 10, 2025 at 2:57 AM
Event study: For treated young women, pre-eligibility trends in cumulative children are comparable; after first eligibility, the treated path lies below late-eligible comparisons.
3/
Design. Triple-difference across: (1) women vs. men; (2) early-eligible (1950s) vs. late-eligible (1990s); (3) pre vs. post first eligibility. We allow heterogeneity by age at eligibility. Outcome: cumulative number of children (completed fertility).
Design. Triple-difference across: (1) women vs. men; (2) early-eligible (1950s) vs. late-eligible (1990s); (3) pre vs. post first eligibility. We allow heterogeneity by age at eligibility. Outcome: cumulative number of children (completed fertility).
September 10, 2025 at 2:57 AM
3/
Design. Triple-difference across: (1) women vs. men; (2) early-eligible (1950s) vs. late-eligible (1990s); (3) pre vs. post first eligibility. We allow heterogeneity by age at eligibility. Outcome: cumulative number of children (completed fertility).
Design. Triple-difference across: (1) women vs. men; (2) early-eligible (1950s) vs. late-eligible (1990s); (3) pre vs. post first eligibility. We allow heterogeneity by age at eligibility. Outcome: cumulative number of children (completed fertility).
2/
Context. Some survivors qualified for large, lifelong reparations in the 1950s; others only in the 1990s, after fertility choices were largely complete. The groups had similar WWII experience. This yields an early–late contrast relative to the reproductive window.
Context. Some survivors qualified for large, lifelong reparations in the 1950s; others only in the 1990s, after fertility choices were largely complete. The groups had similar WWII experience. This yields an early–late contrast relative to the reproductive window.
September 10, 2025 at 2:57 AM
2/
Context. Some survivors qualified for large, lifelong reparations in the 1950s; others only in the 1990s, after fertility choices were largely complete. The groups had similar WWII experience. This yields an early–late contrast relative to the reproductive window.
Context. Some survivors qualified for large, lifelong reparations in the 1950s; others only in the 1990s, after fertility choices were largely complete. The groups had similar WWII experience. This yields an early–late contrast relative to the reproductive window.
Congrats Sascha 👏
August 23, 2025 at 10:45 AM
Congrats Sascha 👏
We miss you Down Under ❤️
June 7, 2025 at 11:45 PM
We miss you Down Under ❤️
Reposted by 🎗 Moshe Hazan
I can confirm that this is being reviewed by appropriate Monash authorities. I saw the dean of the Monash Business School report this matter to the university on the same afternoon this thread was posted (24.2.2025 AEST).
March 3, 2025 at 3:00 AM
I can confirm that this is being reviewed by appropriate Monash authorities. I saw the dean of the Monash Business School report this matter to the university on the same afternoon this thread was posted (24.2.2025 AEST).