Looking forward to the discoveries Algorithmic Contract Design will bring in 2025! 💫

Section9️⃣focuses on ambiguous contracts, where the principal deliberately introduces ambiguity to gain utility.

Applications for social good are in Section🔟, and scoring rules/no-money delegation/information design appear in Section 11.
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Sections 7️⃣and 8️⃣are about machine learning and contracts:
Section 7 is about ML for contracts: learning contracts from samples.
Section 8 is about contracts for ML: connecting strategic classification and contract design, and ML task delegation (e.g., data collection).
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In Section 6️⃣, we consider a model generalizing both contract and auction design: contracts with typed agents. 👇

In Section 5️⃣, we explore all (known) ways contract design becomes combinatorial and computationally complex: a single principal-agent pair with a combinatorial action/outcome space, multiple agents forming a team, or multiple principals sharing an agent.
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It starts out with the principal-agent problem setting (Section 2️⃣) and LP formulation (Section 3️⃣).

Section 4️⃣ is dedicated to the beloved class of linear contracts - their approximation guarantees relative to optimal contracts, and their max-min optimality.
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Just wrapped up this project: 2+ years in the making!

Why so long? Rapid advances in Algorithmic Contract Design made it hard to stop adding material!

Huge thanks to the amazing researchers whose feedback took this to the next level.

So, what's in the survey?👇