Mazel!

From his post — minimal epistemic and moral commitments necessary for legitimate participation in politics? Turns out we have a concept that covers this …

A more complete evaluation of appeasement as a judicial strategy, whether by one or more justices, needs to take a broader view of the costs (and the audiences). But at least we’re now asking these sorts of questions, which is a good reason to be discussing @jodikantor.bsky.social's article. /end

— this analysis doesn’t account for all the costs, esp. those stemming from signals sent to the majority. As we argued in our paper, appeasement classically mistakes the benefits of making concessions, invites further aggression, and moves the goalposts in terms of political/legal legitimacy. /4

The case for conciliation is framed in rhetorical and reputational terms. Concessions are said to be attractive to liberal institutionalists. But setting aside the speculative nature of this claim — eg, which “liberal institutionalists” were enthused about Kagan’s vote in Masterpiece Cakeshop? … /3

In this post, @richardre.bsky.social argues that strategies of conciliation/dissent are not either/or. Even with a minority of 3, the liberal justices can specialize and, through division of labor, do both. But the argument against a unified strategy doesn't specify all the costs of appeasement. /2

Mazel!

Here's the text of the law: www.kslegislature.gov/li_2021s/b20.... /end.

That's also what's happening here: employers must grant exemptions even if employees make fraudulent claims, and no matter how costly the exemption is for the employer. If Caldor is good law (a big if under this Court), this law goes too far and should be tested under the Establishment Clause. /3

This looks like a violation of the Establishment Clause under Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, which invalidated an exemption that gave "unyielding weight[] in favor of" religion over all other interests. www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt... /2

This looks like a violation of the Establishment Clause under Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, which invalidated an exemption that gave "unyielding weight[] in favor of" religion over all other interests. /2 www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt...

Pretty sure I got blocked on Twitter for asking a version of this question — back when it was still Twitter.