Mercer
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mercer-gh.bsky.social
Mercer
@mercer-gh.bsky.social
Pseudonymous writer at GameHazards.
Writes about game tech, hardware, and industry problems that most websites ignore.
Link - gamehazards.com
After spending hours on two long-form articles on this, I don’t think this ends well.
A 33% drop to €4.36 reflects deeper issues: canceled projects, restructuring chaos, debt pressure, and an overreliance on open-world and AI?. This is what loss of confidence looks like.
January 22, 2026 at 4:52 PM
The timing lines up closely with a covenant breach and emergency debt repayment, not just a creative reset.
January 22, 2026 at 8:58 AM
“In-person collaboration” isn’t what fixes productivity when the company breached debt covenants, had to restate €258.7M of EBITDA, and used Tencent money to stabilize lenders.

This looks less like creativity policy and more like cost control and leverage during restructuring.
January 22, 2026 at 7:20 AM
15/
Sources: Ubisoft H1 FY26 earnings (Nov 21), Bloomberg, Reuters, Game File, Insider Gaming.
The breach is documented fact. The timeline is documented fact.

Everything else follows from the math.
January 22, 2026 at 7:14 AM
14/
Bottom line:
The covenant breach explains the urgency, the timing, and the severity of Ubisoft’s actions.

This wasn’t sudden. It was delayed disclosure meeting financial reality.
January 22, 2026 at 7:14 AM
13/
Governance matters here.
Ubisoft has had the same CEO for 37 years, presided over an 85% stock decline, a harassment scandal, mounting debt, and now a covenant breach.

The Tencent deal preserved family control while diluting shareholders.
January 22, 2026 at 7:14 AM
12/
Employees reportedly learned about cancellations and closures via media, not internally.
Layoffs were pre-announced weeks in advance with no details.

This may be legal. It’s still a management choice.
January 22, 2026 at 7:14 AM
11/
The Halifax studio closed 20 days after unionizing.
Ubisoft was asked to show the closure decision predated the union vote.
They declined to provide documentation.

That refusal matters, regardless of legal outcome.
January 22, 2026 at 7:14 AM
10/
Prince of Persia was restarted twice over five years before being canceled.
If quality alone were the issue, it could have been killed years earlier.

The financial context explains why it died now.
January 22, 2026 at 7:14 AM
9/
This reframes Jan 21.
It wasn’t just “portfolio optimization.”
It was cost-cutting under covenant pressure while emergency capital cleared.

Projects without near-term revenue were the first to go.
January 22, 2026 at 7:14 AM
8/
Here’s the timing most people missed:

• Sept 30: covenant breached
• Nov 13: trading halt before earnings
• Nov 21: restated earnings + breach disclosed
• Dec–Jan: “portfolio review”
• Jan 21: game cancellations, closures, layoffs announced
January 22, 2026 at 7:14 AM
7/
Bloomberg and Reuters confirmed Ubisoft would use Tencent’s €1.16B investment to repay that debt early.

The Tencent deal didn’t fund growth first.
It stabilized lenders.
January 22, 2026 at 7:14 AM
6/
Once the covenant was breached, lenders could have demanded immediate repayment.
About €286M in loans (Term Loan + Schuldschein) were exposed.

This is standard covenant math. No drama. Just contract
January 22, 2026 at 7:14 AM
5/
Why the restatement?
New auditors (hired July 2025) forced Ubisoft to reclassify partnership revenue under IFRS 15—recognizing it over time instead of upfront.

Ubisoft hasn’t disclosed which partnerships were affected.
January 22, 2026 at 7:14 AM
4/
What changed wasn’t debt. It was earnings.
EBITDA was restated from €910.4M to €651.7M (–€258.7M).
Equity also fell ~€85M.
The EBITDA hit alone was enough to break the covenant.
January 22, 2026 at 7:14 AM
3/
Before an IFRS restatement, Ubisoft reported:
Net Debt / EBITDA: 1.30 (limit 1.50) → compliant
After restatement:
Net Debt / EBITDA: 1.81 → breach

That’s ~20% over the limit. A default trigger.
January 22, 2026 at 7:14 AM