Yup, just drop me an email!

12. In summary, the same UI change can have diff. effects on the unemp. rates of older workers under diff. retirement institutions.  The same likely goes for other inst’s, as well, like different UI or welfare benefits.  We hope this helps inform when to expect differences and how large they can be.

11. This matters:  Based on estimates for younger workers or more recent workers, we wouldn’t have expected historical PBD extensions to explain the distinctive 10pp rise in the unemp rate of older workers in the 90s. Instead, due to ret. policies, they explain over 50% of the rise.

10. We use the model to show that, in 2014, the effect of increasing PBD by 1 year on the unemp. rates of those 56-59 is a 0.87pp increase, whereas had retirement institutions remained at their historically more generous levels, this same PBD extension would have increased unemp. by  2.85pp

9. Our model fits the key patterns in the data as well as the key trends in the unemployment rate for workers aged 52-55 and 56-59.

8. In order to make statements about the total effect of PBD extensions for older workers in varying contexts, we take a structural approach and specify a dynamic model that allows workers to transition between Emp., UI, and being out of the labor force.

7. Where we can, we also estimate RDs at older ages at which PBDs are discontinuously extended that yield the effects of an additional month of PBD conditional on UI entry.  These are similar to younger workers, perhaps a little larger.

6. These inflow responses are large: At certain points in time, between 10 and 25% of the ENTIRE (sampled) birth-year cohort was receiving UI at age 59. In the mid 1990s over 50% of total UI payments in any given month accrued to workers aged 55+.