Fittingly, this paper is part of the special issue of contributions to the GWP.2022 conference, and comes out just as the current #GWP conference starts in Erlangen, which I am also attending!

5) This is of course still contentious, but the distinction is important in understanding what the argument is actually supposed to show. Generally, philosophers tend to preempt simple rejoinders when making and defending arguments.

4) But he argues that these laws could be different, which shows that there are distinct mental properties and physical properties bridged by such laws. And the fact that we can coherently conceive of zombies is what shows this to be the case.

3) Crucially, the philosophical zombies argument concerns metaphysical possibility, not nomological possibility. Chalmers would agree that if all the natural laws (including psychophysical laws) remain the same, then there cannot be zombies.

2) In your analogy, it is nomologically impossible to have a large ball of uranium without reaching critical mass. But if the laws of radioactive decay were different enough, then you could have a large ball of uranium without it blowing up. So it is a metaphysical possibility.

1) Because that would be beside the point. You need the distinction between "nomological possibility" and "metaphysical possibility". Nomological possibility concerns what is possible given the laws of nature as they are in the actual world. Metaphysical possibility allows different natural laws.

It's not exactly by choice. We have to publish in good journals. Publishers ask for upwards of 2000 EUR for open access. That's almost my whole paycheck as a philosophy academic. Unless my university has a special deal, under the paywall it goes...

I read Neal Stephenson's Anathem while taking a philosophy class in high school. Then when it came time to choose between history and philosophy, I wrote a personal statement for philosophy and was too lazy to try doing one for history too. So, philosophy it was.

Normally, it is thought that physics is not restricted, because the existence of non-physical objects/properties is controversial (often straight-up rejected). In practice, the term "special sciences" ends up just meaning any empirical science that isn't physics.

Whether special sciences are reducible to physics, and if so, then in what sense, is a point of considerable debate.

The special sciences are just sciences whose domain is restricted in some way. For example, psychology's domain is restricted to things which exhibit intelligent behaviour (sub in your preferred definition).

Yeah, if you could not foist that guy on us (philosophers of science), that would be great. Thanks!