Interessant hypotese. Ut fra de empiriske analysene i denne artikkelen kan jeg ikke si noe spesifikt om det, men mener det er rimelig å tenke at mer økonomisk ulikhet også skaper mer politisk ulikhet i en eller annen form. Det er gjerne ikke "vanlige folk" som donerer penger til partier f.eks

In other words: Although companies are the “donating unit”, the owners and directors are the political actors.

5. Based on the above point, I argue that we cannot only investigate political activity among let’s say the top 500 companies but follow the individuals in the capitalist class and assess their political activity – through whichever companies they might direct or own.

4. When wealthy owners are included, we can account for about 73% of all corporate donations to political parties. The donations often do not come from the big companies they owe their wealth to, but often smaller holding companies outside of the inner circle.

3. I challenge the often implicit assumption that economic power is concentrated only in the hands of corporate managers and directors. While wealthy owners are invisible in institutionalized policymaking, the inner circle and wealthy owners converge in support towards rightwing political parties.

2. Based on the above finding, I argue that we might have to reconsider the types of conclusions we can draw regarding the political consequences of the ‘fracturing of corporate networks’.

1. The inner circle is more likely than other corporate officers to engage in all forms of political activity measured. I find this increased likelihood of political activity for the inner circle despite a sparsely connected network.

For those interested, we have a website as well: worldelitedatabase.org