Returning from vacation and looking for a late summer read? @ivobantel.bsky.social and I got you covered!

In our new @wepsocial.bsky.social paper, we assess how mainstream parties rhetorically create an affect-based "common front" against the radical right.

www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....

Furthermore, @antvalentim.bsky.social and I are discussing/chairing a panel on "how to build climate coalitions" featuring really cool papers by @dianebolet.bsky.social, @claudiazwar.bsky.social, @palomabril.bsky.social & Luis Azores! Definitely worth getting up early for!

And on Friday, a new solo-authored project on the role of moral re-framing in increasing support for climate action among conservatives!

🕐: Friday, 11:20am
🚪: 0A.10

Looking forward to this year's #EPSA2025! I will be presenting two new projects.

Today, joint work with @anselmhager.bsky.social & @heikekluever.bsky.social on the potential of correcting group-based grievances in countering radical right success.

🕐: 11:20am
🚪: 0A.05 "Class and electoral politics"

One possibility to address this skepticism? Emphasizing the co-benefits of further integration, like its ability to reduce economic dependencies and strengthen international competitiveness.

We find that voters are not opposed to multidimensional climate policies per se. Investments in disadvantaged regions, and the (re-)training of workers make green policies more popular.

But: Policies that contain EU-level redistribution are seen skeptically.

What drives support for the 'European Green Deal'? And how did that play out in the 2024 EU elections?

We answer this question in our new @jeppjournal.bsky.social paper.

w/ @jannikjansen.bsky.social @tabouchadi.bsky.social @nilsredeker.bsky.social

doi.org/10.1080/1350...

3) This is not true for respondents with strong populist attitudes though. Among this subset, there is no penalty for adopting populist rhetoric -- but still no (or very little) premium!

2) We find that the average effects of populist rhetoric on a candidate's appeal are *negative*! Most voters do not approve of populist arguments and penalize candidates for adopting populist rhetoric.

1) We find that voters are persuaded by populist messages when they come from candidates they already like.

We develop a set of expectations for how populist rhetoric *could* work building upon classic theories from the framing and persuasion literature.

We test these expectations in a novel vignette experiment averaging across 9 different issues on a large sample of voters in the UK.

Is that because respondents do not recognize populist rhetoric as such? Turns out, no! When being asked about their perceptions, respondents recognize populist rhetoric as attempts to sound like the populist radical right. 👂📢

I find that respondents react to positional accommodation (i.e., mainstream parties "moving to the right") ✅
But not to rhetorical accommodation (i.e., mainstream parties talking populist) ❌
They behave mostly as spatial models would suggest.

In the paper, I argue that mainstream parties increasingly mimic the populist rhetoric of their challengers - a strategy I call "rhetorical accommodation". I argue that this communication strategy is different from copying the challenger's positions - "positional accommodation".

Does Mainstream Populism Work❓

I answer this question in a new paper officially out at @psrm.bsky.social❗

Check out the paper here: doi.org/10.1017/psrm...

Key take-aways in the thread below 🧵⬇️:

3️⃣: Eine Pro-Klimaschutz-Erzählung, die konservative Werte wie Sicherheit, Ordnung und Souveränität mit Klimaschutzmaßnahmen verbindet, kann die Unterstützung für Klimaschutzmaßnahmen erhöhen. Insbesondere, wenn sie von Parteien rechts der Mitte getragen wird.

2️⃣: Das heißt nicht, dass konservativen Wählern das Thema egal ist. Im Gegenteil: Wähler rechts der Mitte äußern sich sehr besorgt zu Themen wie "Energiesicherheit" und "Energiepreisen". Aber auch Aspekten wie "Naturschutz" und "Extremwetter" messen sie eine überraschend hohe Wichtigkeit zu.

1️⃣: Die Unterstützung für weitere Klimaschutzmaßnahmen ist rückläufig, insbesondere unter Anhängern von Parteien rechts der Mitte. 📉 Nur noch 37% der Unions- und FDP-Anhänger unterstützen weiteren Klimaschutz. Das liegt sicher auch an den Kampagnen gegen Grüne und Klimabewegung im vergangenen Jahr.