Appreciate your data on Pinon's Vouvrays. We popped open a '22 Les Déronnières, you called it right. That said, our bottle was 13.5% alc. The one you tasted was a whole percent less. What gives? Is the output a standard deviation where buyers must be careful e. g. to avoid hot wines--caveat emptor?

@ 17:25: L'objectif d'Ernest Chausson était-il de se "de-wagneriser" la musique du 19e siècle?

re Chinon: Read yr take on Couly-Duteil, also for me in 90s intro to appellation. C-D also had a grand tasting room near Gare du Nord. No more. C-D cld be exhibit A on wine-biz evolution--product differentiation aside, maybe today too many single cuvées, some as you identify having less quality.

Maybe decant this and re-taste: by dinnertime 24 hrs later, recorked half approached softer trad Anjou reds, w/o losing contour, so it improved. 600 km from Haute-Loire to Fiefs Vendéen, w/every bottle you learn more & more; your notes are helpful, also in this case.

As Nicole's good thread I believe implied, there is a reasonable probability that Iran's post-12-day-war timeline is neither 'never' nor is it 'months'

Yes, what does noncompliance inspire? NPT includes reporting procedure, but no enforcement mechanism for noncompliance. That's ad-hoc. Absent common int'l resolve odds favor savvy, determined violator: 25 years and 80 board meetings of Iranian rope-a-dope with the IAEA board.

The NYT article is consistent with what I know. The IAEA's information pointing to this conclusion is of a quantitative and measurable nature. It isn't about wishful thinking.

Well, it won't happen on the basis of today's IAEA board meeting.

The "Iran may be working away at it" answer may get more attention--or less--depending on what the IAEA board requests from the Secretariat & Iran, and how Iran may respond.

3/n Even in the case that UNSC would back an eventual IAEA board resolution calling for the IAEA to re-verify Iran's uranium inventory, after the attacks this project would be extremely resource intensive, and require a lot of time, political will, and patience by all parties concerned.

2/n Results of an eventual re-verification will be confidential between Iran & IAEA. IAEA cannot voluntarily disclose where nuclear material is located; it would be expected to report to board whether all declared material is accounted for. Undeclared material? Back to square one.

Answering these questions is the obligation of the IAEA and Iran enabled by Iran's NPT safeguards agreement. IAEA board can urge what is in effect a re-verification of Iran's inventory. It won't happen without a ceasefire/end of conflict.

IAEA board/member states & DG Grossi on Monday will be sorely challenged by internal differences. Hardly feasible that the board at this stage could prompt a critical re-verification by Secretariat of Iran's nuclear material inventory.