Key elements of the Green Deal are just branded as "red tape", in a discursive alliance between the "centrist" European People's Party, the (far) right and parts of the corporate sector. This is possible in the broader context of dismantling of the European Green Deal that we discussed in our paper

The changes and delays to legislation are introduced while transposition into national law was already happening, and while companies were adapting to the rules, thereby creating uncertainty and potentially higher costs for companies to which (new) rules will continue to apply.

Most of the expected EUR 6.3 billion cuts in administrative costs come from exempting at least 75% of companies (those with less than 1,000 employees) from reporting under the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive.

A good article that helps understand why the Omnibus package passed by the European Parliament does not "simplify" much, but merely limits the scope of application, delays timelines and softens enforcement of key European Green Deal regulations.

www.intereconomics.eu/contents/yea...

@verfassungsblog.de

- Yet very few of the structural issues affecting the country (lack of innovation, poor demographics, plight of major industrial sectors like the automotive) have been addressed in the 2020s.

👉 If interested, 50 free downloads are available here www.tandfonline.com/eprint/38XGD...

- Within the EU, Italy may sometimes look like 'it is doing sort of ok' in comparative terms, due to the political infighting or sustained economic/structural issues in other member states, including larger ones such as France and Germany.

- Meloni's subservience to Trump has not shielded Italy from tariffs and other unfriendly measures. Contrary to some Western observers, it appears that Trump understands that Meloni is a minor player, and there is no particular reason why he should discuss issues with her or make concessions to her.

- with very limited funds and no sustained foreign policy backing, Meloni's Mattei Plan for Africa amounts to a few projects and a lot of domestic talk;

- Meloni's persistent alignment with Israel and inaction before its criminal war in Gaza has weakened the Mediterranean vector of Italy's middlepowerness, particularly relations with the Arab world - and this is compounded by the anti-Islam and anti-migration stances of her government;

- due to the West's simultaneous confrontation with an aggressive Russia and pressure to derisk/decouple from China, Italy has lost or is losing two economically significant non-Western vectors of its middlepowerness;

- in the EU, the Meloni government was relegated to a marginal role in 'top job' appointments in 2024; it is living off the huge allocation of RRF funds obtained by earlier governments, but they will end in 2026;

I make several arguments in the article, including:

- due to protracted domestic stagnation and political choices, Italy has lost independent room for manoeuvre and influence, both within the Western alliance and in the international arena more broadly;