If the EU delivers on substantial and effective funding for independent media and civil society, this could be a meaningful step – though much will depend on whether those funds survive the MFF negotiations which is highly uncertain at the moment. 13/13

Overall, the Democracy Shield carries high expectations. Focusing on effective cooperation between Member States against foreign interference could make sense if it goes beyond duplicating existing systems and offers a platform for better coordination on hybrid threats generally. 12/

Funding is an important issue for CSOs, especially after USAid and OSF have withdrawn much of their support from Europe. Whereas the previous MFF allocated ~1,56bn Euros (not adjusted for inflation), ~3,6bn are currently proposed for CERV+ in the next MFF which could be a meaningful boost. 11/

On the 3rd strand: How COM wants to foster citizens’ participation remains vague, we just know that they are looking for *innovative* tools. The Civil Society Strategy is set to include an exchange platform between COM and civil society actors, modelled on the Fundamental Rights Platform. 10/

The previous MFF allocated ~1,47 bn Euros for Media (under Creative Europe)(not adjusted for inflation). A jump to ~3,2bn for Media+ as proposed for the next MFF would be significant. What matters most here is *how* the money is spent to support a resilient, independent media sector. 9/

On the 2nd strand: Supporting independent, quality journalism with substantial funding could be a meaningful step given the media’s role for healthy democracy and the sector’s generally meager financial outlook. 8/

Also noteworthy: there appear to be no reform plans for EU institutions themselves, even though Brussels attracts plenty of foreign attention. 7/

If it is just a loose structure to facilitate exchange between national units such as France's Viginum, its impact might hinge largely on how much Member States invest in their own agencies. 6/

Regarding the proposed “European Centre for Democratic Resilience”, I would be interested to see some evidence or explanation in the Commission’s communication on what added value this Centre would provide, and how it is different from existing structures such as the Rapid Alert System. 5/

On the 1st strand: The Commission continues its focus on Foreign Information Manipulation & Interference (FIMI) and disinformation. This could come at the expense of addressing internal threats but also other foreign interference aspects like illicit financial flows or sabotage. 4/

There is no new EU legislation planned. Instead, the focus appears to be on improving cooperation and coordination between Member States. I think this is a sensible choice after a lot of new laws (DSA, EMFA, TTPA) just entered into force. It makes sense to wait and see how effective they are. 3/

As visualised, the Democracy Shield will likely rest on three pillars: 1) foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) & disinformation, 2) elections & media 3) citizens’ engagement and societal resilience. 2/

Proceedings against both TikTok and Meta on the protection of minors (Art. 28) and systemic risks (Art. 34, 35) are ongoing.

This week's decision appears to be on access to public data under Art. 40(12) DSA for TikTok and Meta, and on breaches of notice and action mechanisms and content moderation appeals under Art. 16, 17 and 20 DSA for Meta.

There are several ongoing proceedings against TikTok and Meta. The Commission does not always provide case numbers or what articles an enforcement action is about, which makes it a bit difficult to keep track of all the proceedings.

VLOPs can always agree to commitments to resolve the preliminary findings and end the proceedings.

Otherwise, the next step for the Commission is to issue a non-compliance decision which can include fines of up to 6 percent of the global annual turnover.