Lucas Guttenberg
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lucasguttenberg.bsky.social
Lucas Guttenberg
@lucasguttenberg.bsky.social
Director 🇪🇺, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Berlin

Ex-BMWK, Jacques Delors Centre, ECB
Excellent and honestly shameful example of the shadow of plausible deniability: Member states (and of course France among them) gave the Commission clear directions and are now running away from the results, blaming the Commission instead. At least own it collectively, it makes us look less stupid.
July 28, 2025 at 1:03 PM
In den letzten fünf Jahren (für die es detaillierte Schätzdaten gibt) hat das BMF im Frühjahr vor dem Beginn des Haushaltsjahrs in jedem einzelnen Jahr die Beiträge deutlich überschätzt. Ein Schelm, wer böses dabei denkt - und entsprechend vorsichtig würde ich BMF-Zahlen auch jetzt genießen.
July 21, 2025 at 3:41 PM
Dadurch sind die Zahlungen aus dem EU-Haushalt - und damit auch die dafür notwendigen Beiträge der Mitgliedstaaten - sehr zyklisch. Das sieht man, wenn man sich den Verlauf des deutschen Beitrags über die letzten sieben Jahre anschaut: Er steigt zum Ende und in den ersten Jahren des neuen MFR.
July 21, 2025 at 3:41 PM
Much more sweeping is the change that the COM has just proposed a massive shift in the shares in the budget away from regional and agricultural policy towards common spending on things like decarbonisation or innovation. This is an important step to match the EU budget and proclaimed EU priorities.
July 16, 2025 at 3:24 PM
The Commission proposal for the next long-term EU budget aka MFF just dropped. Its overall volume increases very moderately, but the proposal contains sweeping changes to the way the EU spends money and to budget's priorities.

Here is my first quick take:
July 16, 2025 at 3:24 PM
It seems that the Commission will indeed propose one big fund to cover all existing structural funds and the CAP and to organise the payout from this fund via a single national plan That would mean a huge departure from how the EU budget and the MFF negotiations have worked so far.

Here is why:
July 14, 2025 at 3:51 PM
The pretty concise position paper of the new German government on the next long term EU budget aka MFF just dropped. It lends clear support to the Commission's bold reform ideas on the MFF architecture while unsurprisingly also remaining German in a few crucial areas.

Here are the main elements:
June 13, 2025 at 10:52 AM
16 member states want to use the national escape clause to get more space for defense spending under the 🇪🇺 fiscal rules. Notably absent: the 3 largest economies after 🇩🇪, namely 🇫🇷🇮🇹🇪🇸. From a fiscal point of view, probably a good sign as these countries have very little fiscal space. 1/3
June 5, 2025 at 8:56 AM
Es war erklärtes Ziel des kommenden Kanzlers, in Zukunft deutsche Sprachlosigkeit in Brüssel zu verhindern. Dem Anspruch wird der Koalitionsvertrag nicht gerecht: Man kann sich versprechen, dass man diesmal nun wirklich eng zusammenarbeiten wird - das bringt nur nichts, wenn daraus nichts folgt.
April 9, 2025 at 3:46 PM
Die Ergebnisse der AG Europa der Koalitionsverhandlungen sind da. Liest sich in finanzpolitischen Fragen ausgewogen und konstruktiv. Zum EU-Haushalt keine roten Linien, sondern klare Reformorientierung und Positivagenda weg vom Status Quo. Bei den Fiskalregeln Bereitschaft zur Regeländerung. Gut so.
March 27, 2025 at 9:43 PM
Third, the Commission claims that during the activation of the NEC for some fairly twisted reason both the deficit safeguard and the deficit safeguard retroactively stop applying, which will create additional space for those countries where these safeguards have been binding on their plans.
March 19, 2025 at 3:04 PM
Second, the NEC is to be activated for all countries completely regardless of their fiscal situation - they all essentially get 1.5% of their GDP in additional fiscal space for defense (or for other things if they already increased their defense spending since 2021).
March 19, 2025 at 3:04 PM
That means that in practice, the NEC de facto apply to all spending. This fact is aggravated by three other features of today's communication: First, the COM plans to activate the clause for four years - but if countries enter into contracts that go beyond that, they will also get more space later.
March 19, 2025 at 3:04 PM
That is in blatant contradiction to the legal text that clearly says that the control account stops recording once the NEC is activated. And that matters: It is very hard to see the COM taking any enforcement steps against a country on the basis of a control account that is legally clearly muted.
March 19, 2025 at 3:04 PM
The COM seems to be well aware of this mismatch: It claims that it can activate the NEC only for defense spending. In particular, it claims that the control account that tracks deviations from expenditure paths will continue recording deviations that are not due to defense spending increases.
March 19, 2025 at 3:04 PM
Because it fears a change of the EU fiscal rules, the Commission is resorting to a very far-reaching interpretation of the rules to make room for much more defense spending. This is a shortsighted mistake because it risks accidentally killing the rules altogether at the worst moment.

Here is why:
March 19, 2025 at 3:04 PM
Naturally, that only makes sense for member states with higher funding costs than the EU. As can be seen in the graphs, there are some that have higher funding costs. But the spreads over EU debt are really not large and hence the actual financial benefit will be limited for most member states.
March 4, 2025 at 9:07 AM
Very important detail (h/t @table.media): Orban and Fico block the EuCo conclusions on Ukraine, but do *not* block the conclusions on EU defense, including on spending more together and on more fiscal space. This is an important data point for the viability of fiscal solutions in the EU framework.
March 3, 2025 at 5:07 PM
In a new twist, @table.media reports that Macron and Merz have discussed a large "defense fund" akin to the ESM that should have a bank license to hand out loans to finance defense projects.

I remain sceptical because there is a fundamental misunderstanding here what "to finance" means.

Thread:
February 28, 2025 at 11:28 AM
The German elections have produced a clear result: Friedrich Merz will govern with a majority of CDU, CSU and SPD. The not-so-grand coalition plus the Greens are 7 seats short of a 2/3 majority to change the debt brake in the constitution or to add a new special purpose vehible.

So what now?
February 24, 2025 at 9:47 AM
But importantly, both escape clauses are not confined to specific expenditures. And here it gets technical: As long as countries are not in an excessive deficit procedure - so as long as they are in the preventive arm of the rules - activating an escape clause mutes the so-called control account.
February 14, 2025 at 3:51 PM
More plausible is the activation of so-called national escape clauses. Here, the condition is the existence of "exceptional circumstances outside the control of the Member State have a major impact on the public finances". Not hard to construct a case that this now applies for many member states.
February 14, 2025 at 3:51 PM
VdL mentioned that in the past, e.g. in the pandemic, the rules were suspended to creat more space for member states to react to crises. But the condition to suspend the rules entirely ("general escape clause") is a severe economic downturn in the euro area or EU. Clearly not happening right now.
February 14, 2025 at 3:51 PM
Die EU-Kommission hat heute ihre erste Mitteilung zum neuen Mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen (MFR) veröffentlicht. Er wird bestimmen, wofür die EU ab 2028 bis weit ins nächste Jahrzehnt Geld ausgeben darf und wieviel.
Hier sind die wesentlichen Elemente - und was die neue Bundesregierung damit tun könnte:
February 12, 2025 at 12:14 PM
Feine Ironie, dass der Economist Merz in Stromberg getroffen hat.
February 11, 2025 at 11:30 AM