But the EU can do more. By mobilising more funding from across its budget and from the EIB; by leading a a concerted effort to tackle administrative barriers; and by embedding mobility considerations across different policy areas to help secure buy-in from private sector stakeholders

The EU has also become increasingly involved in military mobility, by mapping gaps and providing funding. The EU has also sought to harmonise procedures and ease regulatory obstacles to moving troops and equipment across Europe.

NATO is a key actor in ensure the swift and secure movement of troops and equipment across Europe. And bilateral and small-group cooperation - for example the DE-DL-PL ‘Enablement and Sustainment Corridor’ play a crucial role in strengthening infrastructure and cutting administrative barriers.

To do all this, Europeans will need to work through a range of frameworks. Efforts to improve military mobility are primarily national. But military mobility also requires extensive international coordination: on cross-border infrastructure, border crossings and transport capabilities.

European efforts to tackle military mobility have lacked urgency and a step change is now needed. The immediate priority should be tackling bureaucratic hurdles
so that transit procedures are as seamless as possible, and filling the most urgent capability and infrastructure gaps.

🔟 Finally there is a question of attention. The Roadmap is the latest of a long series of EU defence documents, which are quickly forgotten. The priority should be tangible progress on readiness

9️⃣ Then there is a question on funding. The provisional agreement on EDIP is good news but this is only about €1.5 billion until the next MFF. The Roadmap refers to plans for more defence spending in the next MFF, but does not in itself announce new funding sources

8️⃣ A third question is about non-EU allies. The proposed process does not account for the contribution of non-EU allies, especially Norway and the UK. Capability gaps will look bigger without their contribution. I doubt an EU process can work well without a mechanism to involve them somehow

7️⃣ A second question is whether the governance of EU projects is appealing to Member States. The decision over whether to place an existing capability coalition under an EU framework will be driven by the balance between the funding on offer by the EU and the level of added administrative complexity

6️⃣ One question is the degree to which MS will take the new planning process seriously and provide the necessary data. Strengthening EU planning would also mean allocating more human resources at the national level, as well as strengthening EUMS and EDA

5️⃣ Finally, the Roadmap tries to track progress. There are milestones to assess progress in all these efforts, with many targets in 2026. There will also be an annual stocktaking process feeding directly into the October European Council with a Defence Readiness Report

4️⃣ In parallel to coalitions filling gaps, EU funding will also focus on 4+ broader Flagships (Drone Defence Initiative etc). The key difference with the capability coalitions is that these are more diffuse projects, not purely about ‘hard’ defence

3️⃣ To fill identified gaps jointly and efficiently, coalitions of Member States will take the lead in individual capability areas and benefit from EU funding. Coalitions should be open to countries that want to join later. The EDA will facilitate the formation and operation of coalitions