Léo Fitouchi
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lfitouchi.bsky.social
Léo Fitouchi
@lfitouchi.bsky.social
Cognitive & evolutionary social scientist. Studying morality, religion, punishment, institutions.

Research fellow at @iastoulouse.bsky.social @tse-fr.eu. PhD ENS Paris.

Website: https://sites.google.com/view/leofitouchi/home
Actually, we checked for halo effect by also measuring perceptions of warmth. In many conditions, people do not expect lower warmth to follow—only lower self-control or cooperativeness. So, as far as we can tell, it doesn't look like a halo effect.
June 16, 2025 at 6:17 PM
4. We tried to disentangle signalling beliefs (that indulgence *reveals* low self-control) from erosion beliefs (that indulgence *causally reduces* self-control).

We asked participants to predict the outcome of an experiment manipulating indulgence. Results were similar—suggesting a causal belief.
May 6, 2025 at 9:46 AM
3. The perception that bodily pleasures reduce self-control and cooperativeness predicts puritanical moral judgments.
The more people see indulgence as decreasing self-control & coop—and restraint as increasing them—the more they morally condemn bodily pleasures.
May 6, 2025 at 9:46 AM
2. The perceived effect of harmless bodily pleasures on trustworthiness was largely—or fully—mediated by their perceived effect on self-control.

(⚠️Note: The mediator wasn’t manipulated experimentally: these results are correlational!)
May 6, 2025 at 9:46 AM
1. People perceived indulging targets as becoming more likely to cheat, less trustworthy (moral character), and less self-controlled. Weaker or null effects on warmth suggest that the effect is specific to self-control and cooperativeness—not a halo effect or demand characteristic.
May 6, 2025 at 9:45 AM
But in a recent BBS paper, I and others suggested that these judgments may, in fact, be reducible to reciprocity-based mechanisms.

Harmless bodily pleasures may be moralized because they’re seen as impairing self-control—a capacity needed to refrain from cheating.
May 6, 2025 at 9:45 AM
A core debate in moral psych: “monist” vs. “pluralist” theories.

Monists argue that all moral judgments, despite their diverse content (e.g. purity, fairness), are produced by a single calculator in the mind (e.g. reciprocity).

Pluralists disagree: we need distinct mechanisms beyond reciprocity.
May 6, 2025 at 9:45 AM
🧵New paper out in Cognition

Why do people moralize harmless carnal sins (e.g. gluttony, masturbation)?

@danielnettle.bsky.social & I find that these behaviors activate reciprocity-based moral judgment—no need for a distinct "purity" module.

50 days free link: authors.elsevier.com/a/1l18D2Hx2-...
May 6, 2025 at 9:45 AM
Predictions of this account? We derive many of them and review psychological, anthropological, and historical evidence.

Check the pdf to find out more! drive.google.com/file/d/1NTv8...
February 11, 2025 at 6:20 PM
Because people can police with both selfish and prosocial interests, the policing framework explains why religions take both extractive forms ("God commands that women obey men!") and prosocial forms ("Stingy people will burn in hell!").
February 11, 2025 at 6:20 PM
Yet people have obvious interests in deterring others from cheating. So they communicate beliefs in moralizing gods to manipulate others into cooperating. Prosocial religions emerge from mutual policing, where each person, lacking trust in others, tries to incentivize others with supernatural belief
February 11, 2025 at 6:20 PM
Our solution: turn to folk-psychology and strategic interests.

While it’s not clear that beliefs in moralizing gods *actually* make people more cooperative, it’s clear that people *think* that they do.
February 11, 2025 at 6:20 PM
(1) Supernatural punishment isn't more common in large vs. small societies. While it covers fewer behaviours in smaller ones, the core idea—that supernatural forces punish free-riding—occurs even where large-scale cooperation is absent.

(see cool papers by @bgpurzycki.bsky.social & many others)
February 11, 2025 at 6:20 PM
Since the 2010’s, the standard account is that supernatural punishment evolved by cultural group selection to promote large-scale cooperation. But new data has accumulated since then, making—in our view—this hypothesis unlikely for several reasons.
February 11, 2025 at 6:20 PM
Across societies, people believe in moralistic supernatural punishment—gods or supernatural forces that punish antisocial behavior. Why do these religious beliefs develop so reliably?
February 11, 2025 at 6:20 PM
Where do moralizing religions come from? Useless cognitive by-products?Cultural group selection for complex societies?

Our Psych Review paper argues: neither. Let’s rethink their cognitive & evolutionary origins🧵
w/ @manvir.bsky.social @nbaumard @jbaptistandre.bsky.social

doi.org/10.1037/rev0...
February 11, 2025 at 6:20 PM
In this context, we defend a monist & cooperation-based theory of morality. The unique logic of reciprocal obligations, we argue, best explains the design-features of moral judgements across domains—not only fairness, but also purity, loyalty, authority, etc.
October 4, 2023 at 6:58 PM
2. The cooperation debate. Did moral cognition evolved exclusively for cooperation? Or did other adaptive challenges, such as pathogen avoidance, coordination for side-taking in conflicts, and self-serving use of moral principles, shape the moral mind in our evolutionary history?
October 4, 2023 at 6:57 PM
Commentaries nicely reflect the two central debates that purity raises for moral psych:

1. The monism-pluralism debate. Are all moral judgements, despite the diversity of their content (e.g., purity, fairness, authority), produced by a single calculator in the mind?
October 4, 2023 at 6:56 PM
Thanks so much to all commentators for their deep & sharp & productive arguments!
October 4, 2023 at 6:55 PM