Yesterday, at the Council on Foreign Relations, I presented insights on the Gen Z protests that have occurred across Africa, which have represented the most significant continent-wide mobilization since the post-Arab Spring era. 💫 I wrote about these issues in World Politics Review a few weeks back, so you can check it out ICYMI:  Top takeaways? 1️⃣ At least 9 African countries have experienced major Gen Z protests.

Experts say there’s a chance Congo faces an enduring fracture.

A few months ago, I wrote about the House bill on South Africa that went through markup and was voted out of Committee. Today, as Trump’s ambassadorial nominee to South Africa is being considered in a business meeting at SFRC this morning, I wrote a brief update about a Senate bill on South Africa and a brief assessment of the chances of either passing during the remaining time in the 119th Congress and signed into law. 🔗 Read my updated analysis here:

Today in Just Security, I wrote about the political theater behind Trump's threat to go into Nigeria "guns-a-blazing" to protect Christians, who he claims, are being persecuted. I unpack the country's longstanding, multifaceted security challenges, including some which are likely being conflated to fit the President's narrative. I provide background as to how this has played in U.S. domestic politics over the past two decades - and how it has evolved from a fringe issue in U.S.-Africa policy into something that is deeply important to the electoral base that won Trump the White House in 2016 and 2024.

President Donald Trump has become “coup curious” when it comes to the military-led governments of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Since Trump’s return to the White House in January, the National Security Council and State Department have resumed high-level diplomatic engagements that had been suspended under Trump’s predecessor, Joe Biden, while encouraging U.S. energy and mining companies to explore new contracts and 

From Antananarivo to Rabat, young demonstrators have taken to the streets carrying a message that the social contract has been broken and their patience has run out. Over the past 18 months, youth-led protests have rattled Morocco’s constitutional monarchy, forced Kenyan President William Ruto to withdraw a controversial tax hike, and toppled the government of Andry Rajoelina in Madagascar. Like their 

In life, Raila Amolo Odinga was both kingmaker and perennial challenger, as well as a practitioner of political dealmaking who repeatedly reshaped Kenya’s democratic landscape through strategic alliances. His death last week at the age of 80 complicates incumbent President William Ruto’s path to a second term in the 2027 elections due to Odinga’s key role in the ethnic and regional alignments necessary for Ruto—or any politician for that matter—to secure the country’s top office.

The Cote d’Ivoire president’s bid for controversial fourth term could backfire, with implications for the country and the region.

These pillars outline requirements to manage armed groups and integrate them into statutory military forces during a war-to-peace transition.

Efforts by the United States and Qatar to end the decades-long conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo have accelerated significantly since late June, building on earlier mediation initiatives led by the African Union, the East African Community, and the Luanda and Nairobi processes. The conflict originated in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and the current phase of diplomacy was catalyzed by a foundational U.S.-brokered DRC–Rwanda 

After months of playing coy, President Alassane Ouattara of Cote d’Ivoire announced earlier this week that he will run for a controversial fourth term in the country’s presidential election in October. In preparing the ground for his announcement, Ouattara has made Cote d’Ivoire’s economic performance central to his electoral strategy. Since he first came to power following the 2010-2011 post-election crisis that claimed over 3,000 lives, Cote d’Ivoire has experienced a remarkable economic recovery.

With recent popular protests in Kenya and Togo and election-like events on the docket in Cameroon and Uganda in the coming months, I wrote about how we used to tactically use the USG's moral and diplomatic support to 'defend the defenders' of democracy and human rights in Africa when I was on the Hill. It goes without saying that, in Africa and abroad, we are not at all consistent in deploying this support.

On a recent call, a client was asking about H.R.2633 (U.S.-South Africa Bilateral Relations Review Act of 2025), which is now scheduled to be marked up by the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) this morning. (Note: For those unfamiliar with Hill process, a markup is when Committee members debate, amend, and vote on legislation before it can advance to the full House floor.

While conflict isn’t inevitable, a convergence of familiar patterns in South Sudan has significantly increased the risk of renewed violence.

(Originally published in World Politics Review on June 20, 2025) In February, South Sudanese President Salva Kiir abruptly dismissed two of the country’s five vice presidents, and the following month, Vice President Riek Machar—Kiir’s longtime rival—was detained and placed under house arrest, where he has remained since then. The developments in Juba bear troubling similarities to the political dynamics that precipitated the country’s civil war from 2013 to 2018.

Earlier this week, I attended a very thought-provoking CFR panel on “The Geopolitics of Critical Minerals—Risks, Resilience, and Resource Control” moderated by Heidi Crebo-Rediker, with David Abraham, Gracelin Baskaran, PhD, Helaina Matza and Laura Taylor-Kale, PhD. Capitalizing on the expertise on stage, I asked their opinions on the value-add for U.S. companies as part of the anticipated DRC critical minerals deal, and asked them to look over-the-horizon and tell us what they thought the demand for critical minerals would be in three decades, based on the reality that we’re currently playing catch up.

If there were an administration in the U.S. next year that valued the UN - and multilateralism more broadly - the election of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia to the UN Security Council would be a strategic windfall. Why? Because all three African non-permanent members of the Security Council next year (DRC, Liberia, Somalia) are relatively pro-American countries (under normal circumstances).