Leo Ahrens
@leoahrens.bsky.social
PolSci researcher at the Varieties of Egalitarianism project @EXCInequality. Politics of inequality, tax & welfare policies, public opinion, voting behavior.
leoahrens.eu
leoahrens.eu
This is the first time I see one of my packages used in an actual journal article. Cool stuff! This is the fedistr Stata command for those wondering.
November 19, 2025 at 8:34 AM
This is the first time I see one of my packages used in an actual journal article. Cool stuff! This is the fedistr Stata command for those wondering.
I drafted a correlation heatmap package for Stata. Does something like this already exist? I want to make sure before I put more work into this.
November 2, 2025 at 12:49 PM
I drafted a correlation heatmap package for Stata. Does something like this already exist? I want to make sure before I put more work into this.
I have a new section on my website where I share Word/Powerpoint presets for articles and slides. Visit leoahrens.eu/formatting-p....
May 19, 2024 at 1:14 PM
I have a new section on my website where I share Word/Powerpoint presets for articles and slides. Visit leoahrens.eu/formatting-p....
For example, research shows that government quality increases voter turnout of the rich and voting across class lines. My study serves as a micro-level foundation for this.
@pavisuri.bsky.social
@pavisuri.bsky.social
May 17, 2024 at 8:10 AM
For example, research shows that government quality increases voter turnout of the rich and voting across class lines. My study serves as a micro-level foundation for this.
@pavisuri.bsky.social
@pavisuri.bsky.social
The results are robust to alternative specifications and a wide range of potential other country-level moderators, such as income inequality.
May 17, 2024 at 8:10 AM
The results are robust to alternative specifications and a wide range of potential other country-level moderators, such as income inequality.
Further evidence shows that this primarily results from those I theorize as opponents of income equalization (i.e. high income / low unfairness perceptions) having disproportionally lower redistribution demand under higher government quality.
May 17, 2024 at 8:09 AM
Further evidence shows that this primarily results from those I theorize as opponents of income equalization (i.e. high income / low unfairness perceptions) having disproportionally lower redistribution demand under higher government quality.
The results show that effect sizes vary with government quality. Under higher government quality, income and unfairness perceptions considerably shift policy preferences. Under lower government quality, income and unfairness perceptions barely make a difference.
May 17, 2024 at 8:09 AM
The results show that effect sizes vary with government quality. Under higher government quality, income and unfairness perceptions considerably shift policy preferences. Under lower government quality, income and unfairness perceptions barely make a difference.
On to regression-based evidence. I estimate interaction regression models with country fixed effects, modeling government quality as a moderator of income and unfairness perceptions.
May 17, 2024 at 8:09 AM
On to regression-based evidence. I estimate interaction regression models with country fixed effects, modeling government quality as a moderator of income and unfairness perceptions.
At the same time, within-country variance of attitudes increases. This offers first support for my theory – public opinion is more varied under higher government quality.
May 17, 2024 at 8:09 AM
At the same time, within-country variance of attitudes increases. This offers first support for my theory – public opinion is more varied under higher government quality.
I test my theory with 2009 ISSP data, using a country-level government quality indicator. It includes 40 quite diverse countries.
May 17, 2024 at 8:08 AM
I test my theory with 2009 ISSP data, using a country-level government quality indicator. It includes 40 quite diverse countries.
I have a new research note out in JEPOP. I argue that higher government quality leads to a stronger rift in public attitudes on redistribution. Here’s a thread summarizing my argument and findings.
doi.org/10.1080/1745...
polisky cpesky
doi.org/10.1080/1745...
polisky cpesky
May 17, 2024 at 8:07 AM
I have a new research note out in JEPOP. I argue that higher government quality leads to a stronger rift in public attitudes on redistribution. Here’s a thread summarizing my argument and findings.
doi.org/10.1080/1745...
polisky cpesky
doi.org/10.1080/1745...
polisky cpesky
We find consistent null effects, showing that our main results are not a byproduct of our specification. The results regarding tax revenues also contradict a lot of previous research relying on this indicator, which we see as much too blunt.
March 28, 2024 at 10:23 AM
We find consistent null effects, showing that our main results are not a byproduct of our specification. The results regarding tax revenues also contradict a lot of previous research relying on this indicator, which we see as much too blunt.
We enter tax changes for poorer and richer households into the same models and find that primarily tax increases for the poor are punished (and perhaps tax decreases for the rich rewarded, but the result is not significant).
March 28, 2024 at 10:22 AM
We enter tax changes for poorer and richer households into the same models and find that primarily tax increases for the poor are punished (and perhaps tax decreases for the rich rewarded, but the result is not significant).
Similar results for changes to tax rates. Increases (decreases) to the effective taxation of wages are estimated to be punished (rewarded). Unreliable results for VAT. The conditions largely return the same results.
March 28, 2024 at 10:22 AM
Similar results for changes to tax rates. Increases (decreases) to the effective taxation of wages are estimated to be punished (rewarded). Unreliable results for VAT. The conditions largely return the same results.
On to the regressions, first using the tax reform measures. We estimate that PIT increases are punished, but are unable to tease out under what conditions these effects are weaker/stronger (i.e. under different partisanship). Nothing for VAT.
March 28, 2024 at 10:21 AM
On to the regressions, first using the tax reform measures. We estimate that PIT increases are punished, but are unable to tease out under what conditions these effects are weaker/stronger (i.e. under different partisanship). Nothing for VAT.
Here is first descriptive evidence from scatterplots. The evidence suggests that PIT increases are punished by voters, with some evidence hinting at electoral reward for PIT decreases. Nothing reliable for VAT.
March 28, 2024 at 10:21 AM
Here is first descriptive evidence from scatterplots. The evidence suggests that PIT increases are punished by voters, with some evidence hinting at electoral reward for PIT decreases. Nothing reliable for VAT.
But back to the theory: we outline several conditional factors that should enhance/reduce electoral consequences, such as partisanship. The attached table gives an overview—it’s a bit too much to go into full details here.
March 28, 2024 at 10:21 AM
But back to the theory: we outline several conditional factors that should enhance/reduce electoral consequences, such as partisanship. The attached table gives an overview—it’s a bit too much to go into full details here.
Frank Bandau and I analyze whether governments experience electoral consequences after PIT and VAT tax reforms in a new Electoral Studies publication.
Below is a thread summarizing our findings.
Open access: doi.org/10.1016/j.el...
Below is a thread summarizing our findings.
Open access: doi.org/10.1016/j.el...
March 28, 2024 at 10:20 AM
Frank Bandau and I analyze whether governments experience electoral consequences after PIT and VAT tax reforms in a new Electoral Studies publication.
Below is a thread summarizing our findings.
Open access: doi.org/10.1016/j.el...
Below is a thread summarizing our findings.
Open access: doi.org/10.1016/j.el...
I formalize the alternative theory in this model, which I call the endogenous preferences perspective. It only explains voting behavior, but you could extend to model to include politics & policies as above.
March 22, 2024 at 9:25 AM
I formalize the alternative theory in this model, which I call the endogenous preferences perspective. It only explains voting behavior, but you could extend to model to include politics & policies as above.
This way of thinking about public opinion is widespread in CPE. Examples are the constrained partisanship model, literature on the implications of labor market risks, and the insider-outsider theory.
March 22, 2024 at 9:24 AM
This way of thinking about public opinion is widespread in CPE. Examples are the constrained partisanship model, literature on the implications of labor market risks, and the insider-outsider theory.
I first review the common CPE theory, which I call the exogenous preferences perspective. People form policy preferences based on material self-interest and sociotropic considerations and then decide who to vote for based on their preferences.
March 22, 2024 at 9:24 AM
I first review the common CPE theory, which I call the exogenous preferences perspective. People form policy preferences based on material self-interest and sociotropic considerations and then decide who to vote for based on their preferences.
I just published a lit review on the impact of public opinion on political behavior, politics, and policies. It focuses on CPE research. Here is a thread that summarizes the main points.
Open access: doi.org/10.1007/s413...
Open access: doi.org/10.1007/s413...
March 22, 2024 at 9:23 AM
I just published a lit review on the impact of public opinion on political behavior, politics, and policies. It focuses on CPE research. Here is a thread that summarizes the main points.
Open access: doi.org/10.1007/s413...
Open access: doi.org/10.1007/s413...
I sent a 1000DPI file to the journal but the figure ends up looking like this in the pub (ok but not great).
I only use pixelated images w/ opaque elements (eg the scatter points here). Why don't journal accept a vector file format that supports opacity, such as EMF?
I only use pixelated images w/ opaque elements (eg the scatter points here). Why don't journal accept a vector file format that supports opacity, such as EMF?
March 19, 2024 at 10:11 PM
I sent a 1000DPI file to the journal but the figure ends up looking like this in the pub (ok but not great).
I only use pixelated images w/ opaque elements (eg the scatter points here). Why don't journal accept a vector file format that supports opacity, such as EMF?
I only use pixelated images w/ opaque elements (eg the scatter points here). Why don't journal accept a vector file format that supports opacity, such as EMF?
Does this imply that the typical event study specifications (such as shown below) are ok even when there are causal dynamics? I am not sure how to understand "correct event-time function". @ruettenauer.bsky.social
February 1, 2024 at 6:48 PM
Does this imply that the typical event study specifications (such as shown below) are ok even when there are causal dynamics? I am not sure how to understand "correct event-time function". @ruettenauer.bsky.social
If you use “gen(iso3)”, i.e. create numeric country codes, the resulting numeric variable is nicely labeled. This is my baseline for merging data and it is basically everything you need.
December 13, 2023 at 8:48 AM
If you use “gen(iso3)”, i.e. create numeric country codes, the resulting numeric variable is nicely labeled. This is my baseline for merging data and it is basically everything you need.