Lennart Ackermans
@lennartack.bsky.social
Philosopher of science and formal ethicist @ MCMP Munich. Into causation, Bayesian epistemology, discrimination, economics, social science.
Paper by Andreas and Günther here: www.mario-guenther.com/_files/ugd/7....
www.mario-guenther.com
June 1, 2025 at 2:29 PM
Paper by Andreas and Günther here: www.mario-guenther.com/_files/ugd/7....
But we might ask what this tells us about science and scientists. This is just one example showing that scientists are spineless. Scientists in general are super concerned about their reputation. But this is to be expected given how science is organised.
May 9, 2025 at 2:30 PM
But we might ask what this tells us about science and scientists. This is just one example showing that scientists are spineless. Scientists in general are super concerned about their reputation. But this is to be expected given how science is organised.
I'm on the side of Zurich's ERB: small ethics violations are acceptable when conducting important research. The real ethics violation is not to publish the results (under their own name).
May 9, 2025 at 2:25 PM
I'm on the side of Zurich's ERB: small ethics violations are acceptable when conducting important research. The real ethics violation is not to publish the results (under their own name).
What's so special about experience attributions such that they are "different facts" under different representations (indexical/non-indexical), whereas a laptop's computing attributions are the same fact under different representations?
April 29, 2025 at 2:28 PM
What's so special about experience attributions such that they are "different facts" under different representations (indexical/non-indexical), whereas a laptop's computing attributions are the same fact under different representations?
Thanks for your thoughts. I share this account of consciousness. But I have trouble making sense of the irreducibility argument. I can't see why "I see red" is different from "Lennart sees red" any more than "I'm computing √2" for the laptop is different from "The laptop is computing √2".
April 29, 2025 at 2:17 PM
Thanks for your thoughts. I share this account of consciousness. But I have trouble making sense of the irreducibility argument. I can't see why "I see red" is different from "Lennart sees red" any more than "I'm computing √2" for the laptop is different from "The laptop is computing √2".
Does this mean that there are first-person facts from the perspective of laptops that are irreducible to third-person facts about laptops?
April 28, 2025 at 11:01 AM
Does this mean that there are first-person facts from the perspective of laptops that are irreducible to third-person facts about laptops?
This version of the "distinctness argument" seems to work for non-conscious entities too. My laptop can use a word like "I" to refer to itself – the physical processor doing its thinking. My laptop can be certain that *it* is calculating √2 while uncertain that *Lennart's laptop* is calculating √2.
April 28, 2025 at 11:00 AM
This version of the "distinctness argument" seems to work for non-conscious entities too. My laptop can use a word like "I" to refer to itself – the physical processor doing its thinking. My laptop can be certain that *it* is calculating √2 while uncertain that *Lennart's laptop* is calculating √2.
The distinctness argument seems to rely on uncertainty of what names refer to: I might be unsure that "I" and "Lennart" have the same referent. It does not seem to follow that facts about "me" and "Lennart" are different.
April 28, 2025 at 10:58 AM
The distinctness argument seems to rely on uncertainty of what names refer to: I might be unsure that "I" and "Lennart" have the same referent. It does not seem to follow that facts about "me" and "Lennart" are different.
Interesting! But I'm not convinced by your response to the objection. I think the fact "Lennart has experience X" *does* determine that I have experience X: It's clearly impossible for me to have experiences that Lennart does not have.
April 28, 2025 at 10:58 AM
Interesting! But I'm not convinced by your response to the objection. I think the fact "Lennart has experience X" *does* determine that I have experience X: It's clearly impossible for me to have experiences that Lennart does not have.
I don't quite understand why "separate books" are necessary. Isn't the proposition "I have experience X" the same proposition as "Lennart has experience X"? If so, all first-personal facts can be formulated as third-personal facts.
April 26, 2025 at 10:38 AM
I don't quite understand why "separate books" are necessary. Isn't the proposition "I have experience X" the same proposition as "Lennart has experience X"? If so, all first-personal facts can be formulated as third-personal facts.
At the same time, there is a rich methodological tradition in economics; in empirical economics, especially since the 1980s' credibility crisis and the subsequent debate on causal methodology. See my paper in EJPE: doi.org/10.23941/ejp....
Reflections on the 2021 Nobel Memorial Prize Awarded to David Card, Joshua Angrist, and Guido Imbens
| Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics
doi.org
April 21, 2025 at 3:26 PM
At the same time, there is a rich methodological tradition in economics; in empirical economics, especially since the 1980s' credibility crisis and the subsequent debate on causal methodology. See my paper in EJPE: doi.org/10.23941/ejp....
Lots of jabs taken at philosophers in this paper. Ouch...
February 23, 2025 at 11:11 PM
Lots of jabs taken at philosophers in this paper. Ouch...
I think this is also why pseudoscientific personality tests such as MBTI are still quite useful. People put them in their dating profile and it facilitates learning about each other's personality.
February 16, 2025 at 10:06 PM
I think this is also why pseudoscientific personality tests such as MBTI are still quite useful. People put them in their dating profile and it facilitates learning about each other's personality.
I appreciate the thoughts! But instead of the stated conclusion, I think it establishes that the three discussed accounts of temporally indexical belief are inadequate. (Since there are cases where Bayesian conditionalization on temporal evidence is possible and rational.)
February 12, 2025 at 9:25 PM
I appreciate the thoughts! But instead of the stated conclusion, I think it establishes that the three discussed accounts of temporally indexical belief are inadequate. (Since there are cases where Bayesian conditionalization on temporal evidence is possible and rational.)
Here's a good summary: www.youtube.com/watch?v=hpwo...
DeepSeek stole our tech... says OpenAI
YouTube video by Fireship
www.youtube.com
January 30, 2025 at 2:41 PM
Here's a good summary: www.youtube.com/watch?v=hpwo...
Could you add me? Thanks!
January 24, 2025 at 2:53 PM
Could you add me? Thanks!
I don't understand yet how causal variables and *causal* parameters are different. But there is an obvious sense in which causal variables are different from non-causal parameters (say, parameters for which interventions don't make sense). You're saying there is something in between these?
January 23, 2025 at 10:22 AM
I don't understand yet how causal variables and *causal* parameters are different. But there is an obvious sense in which causal variables are different from non-causal parameters (say, parameters for which interventions don't make sense). You're saying there is something in between these?
And never proof by contradiction if you can avoid it!
January 22, 2025 at 10:30 PM
And never proof by contradiction if you can avoid it!
My PhD thesis was about both causation and interpretation of probability, without really connecting the two. In the conclusion I announced my plans to do so, but I haven't got round to it.
January 20, 2025 at 7:16 PM
My PhD thesis was about both causation and interpretation of probability, without really connecting the two. In the conclusion I announced my plans to do so, but I haven't got round to it.
I'm not saying we need to retain this idea of objective accuracy. But it's an interesting corollary that we (probably) can't.
January 20, 2025 at 7:02 PM
I'm not saying we need to retain this idea of objective accuracy. But it's an interesting corollary that we (probably) can't.
Ah, but "learning from frequencies" (to create DAGs) is easy to retain on subjective interpretations. What we can't retain is the notion of accuracy. When two rational and informed agents create different DAGs describing the same situation, we can't say that at least one of them must be wrong.
January 20, 2025 at 7:00 PM
Ah, but "learning from frequencies" (to create DAGs) is easy to retain on subjective interpretations. What we can't retain is the notion of accuracy. When two rational and informed agents create different DAGs describing the same situation, we can't say that at least one of them must be wrong.