Kelly Grieco
@kellygrieco.bsky.social
Senior Fellow StimsonCenter, Adjunct GeorgetownCSS, Non-Res Fellow The Krulak Center
Foreign/defense policy, alliances, airpower, and mil ops. Proud Bostonian
Foreign/defense policy, alliances, airpower, and mil ops. Proud Bostonian
END/ Again, this type of analysis is meant to be illustrative.
The big takeaway isn’t a single number but rather the seriousness of the threat US air bases.
The big takeaway isn’t a single number but rather the seriousness of the threat US air bases.
December 13, 2024 at 1:33 AM
END/ Again, this type of analysis is meant to be illustrative.
The big takeaway isn’t a single number but rather the seriousness of the threat US air bases.
The big takeaway isn’t a single number but rather the seriousness of the threat US air bases.
20/ How should the United States counter the threat?
We recommend:
1) Allies/partners acquire air denial-based capabilities; 2) USAF invest in large numbers of attritable, mobile, and runway-independent platforms;
3) USAF prioritize logistics and sustainment
We recommend:
1) Allies/partners acquire air denial-based capabilities; 2) USAF invest in large numbers of attritable, mobile, and runway-independent platforms;
3) USAF prioritize logistics and sustainment
December 13, 2024 at 1:33 AM
20/ How should the United States counter the threat?
We recommend:
1) Allies/partners acquire air denial-based capabilities; 2) USAF invest in large numbers of attritable, mobile, and runway-independent platforms;
3) USAF prioritize logistics and sustainment
We recommend:
1) Allies/partners acquire air denial-based capabilities; 2) USAF invest in large numbers of attritable, mobile, and runway-independent platforms;
3) USAF prioritize logistics and sustainment
19/ We also looked at missile defense investments, shortened runway repair times and various Chinese counters (redeployment of brigades, larger DF-26 arsenal, smarter targeting strategy, etc.), plus conducting robustness checks.
Check out the report for more detailed results.
Check out the report for more detailed results.
December 13, 2024 at 1:33 AM
19/ We also looked at missile defense investments, shortened runway repair times and various Chinese counters (redeployment of brigades, larger DF-26 arsenal, smarter targeting strategy, etc.), plus conducting robustness checks.
Check out the report for more detailed results.
Check out the report for more detailed results.
18/ We also looked at the effect of still greater dispersal to Japanese civilian airfields (assuming US received such permission). Marginal benefits, esp. given costs and logistical complications.
Japan: fighters = 3 days; tankers = 9 days
Guam: 3.7 days
Japan: fighters = 3 days; tankers = 9 days
Guam: 3.7 days
December 13, 2024 at 1:33 AM
18/ We also looked at the effect of still greater dispersal to Japanese civilian airfields (assuming US received such permission). Marginal benefits, esp. given costs and logistical complications.
Japan: fighters = 3 days; tankers = 9 days
Guam: 3.7 days
Japan: fighters = 3 days; tankers = 9 days
Guam: 3.7 days
17/ How effective are these various countermeasures?
If US distributes to civilian runways in PIs and JSDF bases (+ support from JSDF PAC-3 batteries), closure times decline by ~ 70%.
Japan: fighters = 3.7 days; tankers = 9.7 days
Guam: tankers = 3.7 days
If US distributes to civilian runways in PIs and JSDF bases (+ support from JSDF PAC-3 batteries), closure times decline by ~ 70%.
Japan: fighters = 3.7 days; tankers = 9.7 days
Guam: tankers = 3.7 days
December 13, 2024 at 1:33 AM
17/ How effective are these various countermeasures?
If US distributes to civilian runways in PIs and JSDF bases (+ support from JSDF PAC-3 batteries), closure times decline by ~ 70%.
Japan: fighters = 3.7 days; tankers = 9.7 days
Guam: tankers = 3.7 days
If US distributes to civilian runways in PIs and JSDF bases (+ support from JSDF PAC-3 batteries), closure times decline by ~ 70%.
Japan: fighters = 3.7 days; tankers = 9.7 days
Guam: tankers = 3.7 days
16/ USAF is aware of the problem, and to its credit, has taken steps in recent years, incl:
-Agile Combat Employment (greater dispersal)
- Rapid Airfield Damage Recovery (new runway repair methods)
Multi-Capable Airmen (training more personnel in repair)
-Agile Combat Employment (greater dispersal)
- Rapid Airfield Damage Recovery (new runway repair methods)
Multi-Capable Airmen (training more personnel in repair)
December 13, 2024 at 1:33 AM
16/ USAF is aware of the problem, and to its credit, has taken steps in recent years, incl:
-Agile Combat Employment (greater dispersal)
- Rapid Airfield Damage Recovery (new runway repair methods)
Multi-Capable Airmen (training more personnel in repair)
-Agile Combat Employment (greater dispersal)
- Rapid Airfield Damage Recovery (new runway repair methods)
Multi-Capable Airmen (training more personnel in repair)
15/ With such advanced notice, the PLA could wait several hours, luring U.S. fighters into the air and beyond their combat ranges, before shooting down the tanker. The shootdown would result in the loss of the tanker ad also the fighter aircraft dependent on its onboard fuel.
December 13, 2024 at 1:33 AM
15/ With such advanced notice, the PLA could wait several hours, luring U.S. fighters into the air and beyond their combat ranges, before shooting down the tanker. The shootdown would result in the loss of the tanker ad also the fighter aircraft dependent on its onboard fuel.
14/ By operating from a small number of operating locations, China would not even need radar—it might only need an operative on the ground with a stopwatch to predict when tankers send forward would rendezvous with fighters launched from bases in Japan.
December 13, 2024 at 1:33 AM
14/ By operating from a small number of operating locations, China would not even need radar—it might only need an operative on the ground with a stopwatch to predict when tankers send forward would rendezvous with fighters launched from bases in Japan.
13/ US can operate tankers from Guam/Pacific by Day 5, but there are 2 problems:
Long distances drive up fuel requirements for tankers, reducing what can offload to fighters and other aircraft and thus increasing number of tankers required to support ops.
Long distances drive up fuel requirements for tankers, reducing what can offload to fighters and other aircraft and thus increasing number of tankers required to support ops.
December 13, 2024 at 1:33 AM
13/ US can operate tankers from Guam/Pacific by Day 5, but there are 2 problems:
Long distances drive up fuel requirements for tankers, reducing what can offload to fighters and other aircraft and thus increasing number of tankers required to support ops.
Long distances drive up fuel requirements for tankers, reducing what can offload to fighters and other aircraft and thus increasing number of tankers required to support ops.
12/ Those tanker closure times are the big story: Even fighters operating from Okinawa, Japan, would push their operational ranges and not have much loiter time w/out aerial refueling.
a fighter jet is being refueled by an alaska tank
ALT: a fighter jet is being refueled by an alaska tank
media.tenor.com
December 13, 2024 at 1:33 AM
12/ Those tanker closure times are the big story: Even fighters operating from Okinawa, Japan, would push their operational ranges and not have much loiter time w/out aerial refueling.
11/ Now… for the results… Closure times
US bases in Japan
Fighter ops: 11.7 days
Tankers ops: 33.3 days
Guam/Pacific Islands
Fighter ops: 1.7 days
Tanker ops: 4 days
US bases in Japan
Fighter ops: 11.7 days
Tankers ops: 33.3 days
Guam/Pacific Islands
Fighter ops: 1.7 days
Tanker ops: 4 days
December 13, 2024 at 1:33 AM
11/ Now… for the results… Closure times
US bases in Japan
Fighter ops: 11.7 days
Tankers ops: 33.3 days
Guam/Pacific Islands
Fighter ops: 1.7 days
Tanker ops: 4 days
US bases in Japan
Fighter ops: 11.7 days
Tankers ops: 33.3 days
Guam/Pacific Islands
Fighter ops: 1.7 days
Tanker ops: 4 days
10/ Some key assumptions
- 8-hr US repair times (all personnel, material available)
-PLARF uses brigade with the shortest-range missile capable of striking target
-China repeats attacks until exhausts missile stockpiles, or no targets left
- US Missile defense (Patriot, THAAD)
- 8-hr US repair times (all personnel, material available)
-PLARF uses brigade with the shortest-range missile capable of striking target
-China repeats attacks until exhausts missile stockpiles, or no targets left
- US Missile defense (Patriot, THAAD)
December 13, 2024 at 1:33 AM
10/ Some key assumptions
- 8-hr US repair times (all personnel, material available)
-PLARF uses brigade with the shortest-range missile capable of striking target
-China repeats attacks until exhausts missile stockpiles, or no targets left
- US Missile defense (Patriot, THAAD)
- 8-hr US repair times (all personnel, material available)
-PLARF uses brigade with the shortest-range missile capable of striking target
-China repeats attacks until exhausts missile stockpiles, or no targets left
- US Missile defense (Patriot, THAAD)
9/ We use Monte Carlo simulations to estimate Chinese missile requirements, accounting for various key variables, and a modeling script executes a series of simulations to determine the number of hours that Chinese missile attacks could keep air bases and airfields closed
December 13, 2024 at 1:33 AM
9/ We use Monte Carlo simulations to estimate Chinese missile requirements, accounting for various key variables, and a modeling script executes a series of simulations to determine the number of hours that Chinese missile attacks could keep air bases and airfields closed
8/ Now back to runways… We assume PLARF ballistic and cruise missiles armed with runway-penetrating submunitions seek to achieve at least a 90% chance of denying the minimum length/width required for a takeoff or landing, depending on aircraft type.
December 13, 2024 at 1:33 AM
8/ Now back to runways… We assume PLARF ballistic and cruise missiles armed with runway-penetrating submunitions seek to achieve at least a 90% chance of denying the minimum length/width required for a takeoff or landing, depending on aircraft type.
7/ The US recently gained additional rotational access to bases in the Philippines, but President Marcos has publicly ruled out the US stockpiling weapons or using these bases to conduct “offensive action” against China.
See his comments: t.co/afM8SaDkMR
See his comments: t.co/afM8SaDkMR
https://www.reuters.com/world/marcos-says-us-access-philippines-bases-not-meant-offensive-action-2023-05-04/
t.co
December 13, 2024 at 1:33 AM
7/ The US recently gained additional rotational access to bases in the Philippines, but President Marcos has publicly ruled out the US stockpiling weapons or using these bases to conduct “offensive action” against China.
See his comments: t.co/afM8SaDkMR
See his comments: t.co/afM8SaDkMR
6/ South Korea seems likely to restrict the use of U.S. bases on its territory out of concern about North Korean aggression and to avoid a rupture with Beijing,
For example, see the then-ROK defense minister’s comments: t.co/T4Zv7bPGSu
For example, see the then-ROK defense minister’s comments: t.co/T4Zv7bPGSu
https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/1138075.html
t.co
December 13, 2024 at 1:33 AM
6/ South Korea seems likely to restrict the use of U.S. bases on its territory out of concern about North Korean aggression and to avoid a rupture with Beijing,
For example, see the then-ROK defense minister’s comments: t.co/T4Zv7bPGSu
For example, see the then-ROK defense minister’s comments: t.co/T4Zv7bPGSu
5/ Our model simulates attacks on runways/taxiways at U.S. bases in Japan, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Pacific Freely Associated States
Why don’t we include other U.S. bases in 1st/2nd Island Chains? We opted to test the most likely scenario
Why don’t we include other U.S. bases in 1st/2nd Island Chains? We opted to test the most likely scenario
December 13, 2024 at 1:33 AM
5/ Our model simulates attacks on runways/taxiways at U.S. bases in Japan, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Pacific Freely Associated States
Why don’t we include other U.S. bases in 1st/2nd Island Chains? We opted to test the most likely scenario
Why don’t we include other U.S. bases in 1st/2nd Island Chains? We opted to test the most likely scenario
4/ Our analysis builds on two other great studies: A 2015
@rand.org report by @Eric Heginbotham et al that modeled missile attacks on Kadena Air Base in Japan, and a 2017 @cnas.bsky.social report by @tshugart3
and Javier Gonzalez that modeled attacks on U.S. air bases in Japan.
@rand.org report by @Eric Heginbotham et al that modeled missile attacks on Kadena Air Base in Japan, and a 2017 @cnas.bsky.social report by @tshugart3
and Javier Gonzalez that modeled attacks on U.S. air bases in Japan.
December 13, 2024 at 1:33 AM
4/ Our analysis builds on two other great studies: A 2015
@rand.org report by @Eric Heginbotham et al that modeled missile attacks on Kadena Air Base in Japan, and a 2017 @cnas.bsky.social report by @tshugart3
and Javier Gonzalez that modeled attacks on U.S. air bases in Japan.
@rand.org report by @Eric Heginbotham et al that modeled missile attacks on Kadena Air Base in Japan, and a 2017 @cnas.bsky.social report by @tshugart3
and Javier Gonzalez that modeled attacks on U.S. air bases in Japan.
3/ The model is illustrative and cannot predict with absolute certainty real-world outcomes, given the range of potential unknowns. Instead, it provides a closer look at the problem and helps to identify policy solutions.
December 13, 2024 at 1:33 AM
3/ The model is illustrative and cannot predict with absolute certainty real-world outcomes, given the range of potential unknowns. Instead, it provides a closer look at the problem and helps to identify policy solutions.
2/ Why does it matter? By denying the use of runways and taxiways, China could gain air superiority without ever defeating American aircraft in direct combat.
December 13, 2024 at 1:33 AM
2/ Why does it matter? By denying the use of runways and taxiways, China could gain air superiority without ever defeating American aircraft in direct combat.
1/ Our report models repeated Chinese missile attacks on U.S. air bases in Japan, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Pacific Freely Associated States to determine for how long China could keep the runways and taxiways closed to U.S. air operations.
December 13, 2024 at 1:33 AM
1/ Our report models repeated Chinese missile attacks on U.S. air bases in Japan, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Pacific Freely Associated States to determine for how long China could keep the runways and taxiways closed to U.S. air operations.