...and the relationship between individuals’ tendency to own games and the games’ average playtimes supports this assumption. We do a bunch of other stuff to explore robustness.

Second, using a model of game bundle choice, we measure the welfare gain from full information as the loss of money to bring consumers from full information down to their status quo choices. Full information would raise CS by 30 percent more than baseline expenditure.

We develop a two-part model for measuring the welfare gain with full information. First, full information would raise the size of the budget set by allowing consumers to buy the games yielding the most playtime first.

We have unusual data on post-purchase usage providing big hints about regret: Users could have achieved 90 percent of their status quo playtime with 60 percent less expenditure.

The EU's Digital Markets Act has outlawed self-preferencing by big platforms. Shortly after Amazon's designation as a "gatekeeper" in 9/23, the search rank advantage for Amazon-brand products fell a bunch. Working paper: www.nber.org/papers/w32299