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The Journal of Philosophy
@jrnlofphil.bsky.social
720 followers 510 following 43 posts
One of the world's top academic philosophy journals, JPhil is published monthly by the non-profit organization, Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
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Abstract (also in alt text)
Abstract: We argue that if there are laws of nature, then there must also be accidents. If the “laws” in a world suffice to determine the world’s entire history, then these “laws” cannot play various central roles characteristic of laws, and thus (we conclude) they are not laws at all. Many proposed accounts of lawhood (primitivist accounts, universals accounts, the Best System Account, the Package Deal Account, essentialist accounts) inappropriately permit worlds with laws but no accidents. We identify two otherwise dissimilar accounts that correctly (on our view) deem such worlds impossible; one is Humean and the other is non-Humean.
November 14, 2025 at 3:27 PM
jrnlofphil.bsky.social
Congratulations to Caspar Jacobs on the selection of his JP paper, "Comparativist Theories or Conspiracy Theories?," for the 2024 Philosopher's Annual!

doi.org/10.5840/jphi...
Abstract of the paper "Comparativist Theories or Conspiracy Theories?" by Caspar Jacobs: Comparativist Theories or Conspiracy Theories? Although physical theories routinely posit absolute quantities, such as absolute position or intrinsic mass, it seems that only comparative quantities such as distance and mass ratio are observable. But even if there are in fact only distances and mass ratios, the success of absolutist theories means that the world looks just as if there are absolute positions and intrinsic masses. If comparativism is nevertheless true, there is a sense in which this is a cosmic conspiracy: the comparative quantities satisfy certain relations that only absolutism can explain. I show that such cosmic conspiracies are a pervasive feature of comparativist theories. The argument is structurally similar to the well-known No Miracles Argument for scientific realism. Just as anti-realism cannot explain the empirical adequacy of our theories in general, so comparativism cannot explain the empirical adequacy of absolutist theories in particular.
August 19, 2025 at 3:43 PM
jrnlofphil.bsky.social
#newarticle "Alethic Pluralism and Kripkean Truth" by Andrea Iacona, Stefano Romeo, and Lorenzo Rossi

doi.org/10.5840/jphi...

#philosophy #philsky
Article Title: "Alethic Pluralism and Kripkean Truth"; Abstract: According to alethic pluralism, there are different ways of being true, that is, there is a plurality of truth properties, each of which pertains to a specific domain of discourse. This paper shows how such a plurality can be represented in a coherent formal framework by means of a Kripke-style construction that yields intuitively correct extensions for distinct truth predicates. The theory of truth we develop can handle at least three crucial problems that have been raised in connection with alethic pluralism: mixed compounds, mixed inferences, and semantic paradoxes.
August 1, 2025 at 7:01 PM
jrnlofphil.bsky.social
#newarticle "No Easy Road to PSR" by Mohammad Saleh Zarepour

doi.org/10.5840/jphi...

#philosophy #philsky
Abstract: Rehabilitating an argument originally proposed by Leibniz, Michael Della Rocca has offered a new argument for the Principle of Sufficient Reason. A crucial element of this argument is that, for every x, the fact that x does not brutely fail to exist is an untrivial requisite of x’s existence. Criticising this claim, I show that the new argument for PSR fails.
July 28, 2025 at 4:42 PM
jrnlofphil.bsky.social
#newarticle "What Does It Take to Make a Difference? A Reply to Andreas and Günther" by Sander Beckers

doi.org/10.5840/jphi...

#philosophy #philsky
Abstract: Andreas and Günther have recently proposed a difference-making definition of actual causation. In this paper I show that there exist conclusive counterexamples to their definition, by which I mean examples that are unacceptable to everyone, including Andreas and Günther. Concretely, I show that their definition allows c to cause e even when c is not a causal ancestor of e. I then proceed to identify their non-standard definition of causal models as the source of the problem, and argue that there is no viable strategy open to them to fixing it. I conclude that their definition of causation is damaged beyond repair.
July 28, 2025 at 4:39 PM
jrnlofphil.bsky.social
#newarticle "Idle Questions" by Jens Kipper, Alexander W. Kocurek, and Zeynep Soysal

doi.org/10.5840/jphi...
Abstract: In light of the problem of logical omniscience, some scholars have argued that belief is question-sensitive: agents don’t simply believe propositions but rather believe answers to questions. Hoek (2022) has recently developed a version of this approach on which a belief state is a “web” of questions and answers. Here, we present several challenges to Hoek’s question-sensitive account of belief. First, Hoek’s account is prone to very similar logical omniscience problems as those he claims to address. Second, the link between belief and action he proposes is too rigid. We close by sketching a generalization of the account that can meet these challenges.
July 28, 2025 at 4:37 PM
jrnlofphil.bsky.social
#newarticle "Resistant Beliefs, Responsive Believers" by Carolina Flores @floresophize.bsky.social

doi.org/10.5840/jphi...

#philosophy #philsky
Abstract: Beliefs can be resistant to evidence. Nonetheless, the orthodox view in epistemology analyzes beliefs as evidence-responsive attitudes. I address this tension by deploying analytical tools on capacities and masking to show that the cognitive science of evidence-resistance supports rather than undermines the orthodox view. In doing so, I argue for the claim that belief requires the capacity for evidence-responsiveness. More precisely, if a subject believes that p, then they have the capacity to rationally respond to evidence bearing on p. Because capacities for evidence-responsiveness are fallible and may be masked, beliefs can be held in the face of counter-evidence. Indeed, I will argue that our best science of belief supports the claim that evidence-resistant beliefs result from masks on evidence-responsiveness capacities. This account of belief not only allows for resistance to evidence, but provides us with a framework for describing and explaining actual cases of evidence-resistance.
July 28, 2025 at 4:19 PM