That’s kind of like the Flight of the Concords “most beautiful girl (in the room)”

Something kind of worked, from “difference-in-differences” standpoint (though the abstract doesn’t seem to report a DiD parameter estimate). Though it “worked” in a way that increased racial disparities which is concerning!

Exactly! And when insurers pass on the premiums they spread over all plan members, not just those with ESRD, so it is hard to see the effect (though I think @dmaanderson.bsky.social has done some work showing the size of the increase)

No, the vibe over there is more “and he woke up in a bathtub full of ice”

The IOTA Model tests the effects of financial incentives on increasing kidney transplants by randomly selecting half of transplant hospitals for mandatory participation #nephsky #medsky #healthpolicy

4) Adjusting the quality strategy to allow for additional time for measure identification and stakeholder input, including removing three quality measures from the quality domain.
5) Removing the health equity payment adjustment and allowing the health equity plans to be voluntary.

2) Removing the requirement for providers to review organ offers declined on behalf of the attributed patient.
3) Adjusting the transplant target to reflect the average number of deceased or living donor transplants during the baseline years rather than the highest count.

Key changes from the proposed rule: 1) Increasing the maximum amount a transplant hospital may receive from CMS based on its performance score (upside risk payment) from $8,000 to $15,000 per Medicare kidney transplant.