What the ruling doesn't do is address the underlying problem--namely, the antiquated, vague, and poorly drafted statutes that leave room for the president to claim such broad, legally dubious authority to use the military domestically in the first place. (22/22) www.brennancenter.org/outdated-and...

While this ruling is limited to California, and will undoubtedly be appealed, it nonetheless presents a path by which other states may push back against the Trump administration's unprecedented efforts to use the military for routine law enforcement inside the United States. (21/22)

Having concluded that the National Guard troops and Marines the Trump admin has deployed in California are subject to the PCA, and that the duties assigned to those troops violate the law, Judge Breyer granted California's request for an injunction which will go into force on Sept 12. (20/22)

"...in numbers that match or outnumber law enforcement agents pervade the activities of those civilian agents." What's more, the duties assigned to the troops in California are considered law enforcement under DoD's own policy guidance (see page 19). (19/22) www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/D...

That conclusion is consistent with established judicial tests for assessing whether the PCA has been violated. As Judge Breyer explained, the troops' conduct exercised "regulatory, proscriptive, and compulsory power on the surrounding public, and their participation in operations..." (18/22)

Accordingly, Judge Breyer ruled that the admin had not asserted a valid constitutional exception to the PCA. Furthermore, he found that the duties assigned to the troops in California (setting up perimeters, conducting crowd control, etc.) constituted "law enforcement" barred by the PCA. (17/22)

On the contrary, through the Calling Forth Clause, the Constitution expressly grants *Congress* authority to regulate when, where, and how the military is used domestically. No inherent authority of the president (assuming it exists) could override this explicit grant of congressional power. (16/22)

Indeed, Youngstown makes clear that the president may only act contrary to a law enacted by Congress if the Constitution grants the president "conclusive and preclusive" authority over the subject at issue. That is exceedingly rare, and as Judge Breyer observes, it is not the case here. (15/22)

As Judge Breyer explains, the Supreme Court's 1952 decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v. Sawyer is the lodestar for assessing these sorts of conflicts between the president and Congress. Under Youngstown, when the president and Congress disagree, the default rule is that Congress wins. (14/22)

That means one of two things must be true: either the protective power does not override the PCA, or it does, and the PCA exceeds Congress's constitutional authority. It is for the courts to resolve this question by deciding whether Congress or the president has overstepped their power. (13/22)

As he rightly points out, the PCA allows only for *express* exceptions. An inherent authority is by definition not express. Thus, the government's claimed constitutional exception does not satisfy the statutory requirements for a PCA exception. (12/22)

The Trump administration also argued that the Constitution's Take Care Clause gives the president inherent authority to protect federal functions and property, and that this power overrides the restriction imposed by the PCA. Judge Breyer rejected this argument, too. (11/22)

As he wrote, the government's interpretation of Section 12406 is entirely novel and has no basis in historical understandings of the statute (which is more than 100 years old). Moreover, he found that, if accepted, the government's argument would blow a gaping hole in the PCA. (10/22)

Turning to the law: The federal government argued that the statute Trump used to federalize the California National Guard, 10 USC 12406, is a statutory exception to the PCA. Judge Breyer rejected this argument. (9/22) www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/...

Second, that the troops in California accompanied federal civilian law enforcement personnel and set up perimeters, traffic control points, and engaged in crowd control in conjunction with federal civilian law enforcement operations. (8/22)

In reaching this conclusion, Judge Breyer made two key factual findings: First, that the troops in California were instructed that, based on a claimed constitutional exception to the PCA, they could engage in security patrols, traffic control, crowd control, and riot control. (7/22)

Judge Breyer's decision presents a path for enforcing this crucial guardrail against presidential overreach by granting California's request for an injunction that bars the federal government from violating the PCA within the state. (6/22)

In a few cases, criminal defendants alleging that military personnel participated in their arrests or the investigations into them in violation of the PCA have tried (and largely failed) to persuade courts to enforce the law by excluding evidence or throwing out tainted charges. (5/22)

Enacted in 1878, the PCA is a criminal statute. Yet no one has ever been convicted of violating it--not because there have been no violations, but because the Dept of Justice has little incentive to aggressively punish conduct by the Dept of Defense that the president may well have directed. (4/22)