Jon Hawkes
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jonhawkes.bsky.social
Jon Hawkes
@jonhawkes.bsky.social
Commenter with regular primers and threads on AFV & Tank technology and programmes. | Blog: https://jonhawkes.wixsite.com/tanknologyinstitute | Views are my own L/RT≠E
Moog showing off the production representative version of its RiWP turret at #IAV25 this week fitted an HMT Armoured Closed Cab and a Dingo 3

Both with Thales HVM/LMM missiles, one also with 30x113mm Bushmaster and 7.62mm machine gun. We saw it on a Ridgeback at #DVD24 last year
January 20, 2025 at 10:30 AM
A Boxer for every occasion
January 7, 2025 at 11:59 AM
2/3 Page 2 is the combat support gang - Argus, Atlas and Apollo. No sign of Ares in all this but Athena or Atlas minus the extra bits pretty much covers it for silhouette purposes.

@thinkdefence.bsky.social
January 6, 2025 at 2:00 PM
1/3 Some nice line drawings of how the Ajax family will look in the MCO and PSO fits. Page 1 - Ajax and Athena.

MCO is the conventional warfare fit (think TES for TELIC, sort of thing) and PSO is peace support (think TES for HERRICK)
January 6, 2025 at 2:00 PM
Not one you see every day - Challenger 2 with Track Width Mine Plough (TWMP) from Pearson Engineering, this one in Estonia being used for training on the TWMP capability with members of the AFV Schools Regiment from the RE group of the Combat Support Wing.
December 3, 2024 at 11:40 AM
An old animation of the BR90 systems, including AVLB (Titan) launched (No.10, 11 and 12) and the bigger CSB capabilities.

Both being replaced under Project TYRO.
December 3, 2024 at 11:24 AM
A nice British Army slide from a few years ago on what reliability growth trials are there to do. Figures quoted at the bottom relate to the acquisition of Warthog as a representative example.

Planning a longer primer on testing and trials, but still collecting info.
November 29, 2024 at 9:45 AM
More #AjaxUpdate from recent weeks - vehicle level static and mobile ballistic qualification trials of modular armour system, and Collective Protection (COLPRO) trials. Signing off that everything stops what it should and protects as it should, all part of the acceptance signoffs
November 26, 2024 at 8:59 AM
An end note that I am no combat engineering or logs expert, so the many learned people in that domain on twitter can fill in blanks and do some interesting threads on this stuff in more details. But hopefully this sets the broad scene with as few glaring errors as possible.
November 26, 2024 at 6:52 AM
What those models look like in the post-Ukraine UAS saturated landscape is unclear but will certainly only strengthen the case for having a good quantity of fast operating systems and a coherent doctrine for their use, or we have seen the consequences.
November 26, 2024 at 6:52 AM
As long as there have been bridges there have been tanks collapsing them. In Baltics & Eastern Europe infrastructure is notoriously low MLC capacity. Many reports from Ukraine of bridges collapsing when crossed by T-72/T-80, which it is worth noting are <60% of what CR3 weighs.
November 26, 2024 at 6:52 AM
Other global operating environments are similar, or worse. The Middle East is relatively good at around 2km average intervals, and more exotic locales like East Asia with lots of mountainous and tropical river basins can be between 500m and 1km.
November 26, 2024 at 6:52 AM
GAP DENSITY
There are loads of analyses out there on gap density in notional operating environments but suffice to say you encounter gaps way more often than you might think. In central Europe a gap can be expected every 2km. In the Baltics it increases to around every 1.25km.
November 26, 2024 at 6:52 AM
Sometimes the 'gap' is not overt at first look. There may be a bridge, but it isn't of a suitable capacity to allow your equipment to cross. These need to be bypassed, bridged over, or replaced.
November 26, 2024 at 6:52 AM
There are also inadvertent gaps caused by damage, such as destroyed or collapsed bridges, or collapsed substructures creating unforeseen ditches (collapsing car parks and basements are a pervasive peril for heavy AFV in urban areas, for discussion another time)
November 26, 2024 at 6:52 AM
Dry gaps can be natural ditches or gulleys, but also man-made anti-tank ditches and trench systems. Crossing them is a case of bridging the gap or filling it with dozers. Generally, the same bridge system as the wet gaps is used.
November 26, 2024 at 6:52 AM
Wading is its own challenge. Only suitable where river depth and bank construction is appropriate, and where all vehicles have deep or fully submerged capabilities to use. This can’t be done without a lot of forward planning and extensive vehicle preparation.
November 26, 2024 at 6:52 AM
Ferrying is another option, though used less frequently. Either a literal ferry that runs from bank to bank, or a pontoon bridge made from interlinked ferries either anchored or driving against the current. Both are specialist capabilities and take time.
November 26, 2024 at 6:52 AM
Bridging is what we care about in this series, specifically combat bridging. An opposed or contested crossing does not give room for the hours-long and largely manual construction of general support bridges, you need a vehicle to drop a bridge in a few minutes and get moving.
November 26, 2024 at 6:52 AM
Crossing a wet gap is generally one of three ways; (1) bridge it, (2) ferry it, or (3) wade it.
November 26, 2024 at 6:52 AM
Wet gaps, ranging from small tributaries to very large rivers, are what minds jump to first. When a AFV meets a river, it (barring a few amphibious outliers) needs to stop as 50-80 tonnes of steel rarely has a good relationship with deep water and steep muddy banks.
November 26, 2024 at 6:52 AM
TYPES OF GAP
Gaps come in many flavours. Wet or dry, natural or man-made, planned or accidental. All present obstacles to free movement of your forces and choke points where you become bunched, slow, vulnerable, and predictable, which is bad.
November 26, 2024 at 6:52 AM
So, Part 2 – Why is combat bridging important anyway?
November 26, 2024 at 6:52 AM
(Part 2) It started as a thread on the UK's Titan AVLB and Project TYRO, but got so unwieldy I’ve made it a mini series. What is Titan and TYRO; why is it one of, if not the, most important requirements in the British Army (or any army); and why is it a critical requirement?
November 26, 2024 at 6:52 AM
#AjaxUpdate: Over 150 Battlefield Missions (BFMs) now completed, with >41,000 km travelled and >53,000 rounds fired.

Live Firing and Observation Post BFMs including firing on the move done. ISTAR focused BFMs underway to close out Reliability Growth Confirmatory Testing (RGCT).
November 26, 2024 at 6:41 AM