Iván Ramírez de Arellano, The Jomini of the West
@jominiw.bsky.social
Polemologist, writer, and speaker on all things related to human conflict. Discussions on waging peace, surviving war, and the fate of Humankind.
Hello, thank you for your question. The other fronts have not stabilized. It is a common theme in news reports, but that is untrue. The fronts remain fluid. The ZSU used its strategic reserve in Kursk, hindering its ability to stem the advance of Russian forces in Donetsk Oblast and in the south.
March 21, 2025 at 4:16 PM
Hello, thank you for your question. The other fronts have not stabilized. It is a common theme in news reports, but that is untrue. The fronts remain fluid. The ZSU used its strategic reserve in Kursk, hindering its ability to stem the advance of Russian forces in Donetsk Oblast and in the south.
8/ This open-source operational summary of the Kursk OD is based on information from the ZSU and VSRF daily briefs, various Telegram channels, Western intelligence agencies' statements, military analysts, and my professional experience. Any errors in the information are strictly my own.
January 13, 2025 at 12:55 AM
8/ This open-source operational summary of the Kursk OD is based on information from the ZSU and VSRF daily briefs, various Telegram channels, Western intelligence agencies' statements, military analysts, and my professional experience. Any errors in the information are strictly my own.
7/ Ukraine clearly intends to hold its lodgment in Kursk; however, it is becoming apparent that the combat power needed to hold the lodgment is having a detrimental effect on other critical fronts.
January 13, 2025 at 12:55 AM
7/ Ukraine clearly intends to hold its lodgment in Kursk; however, it is becoming apparent that the combat power needed to hold the lodgment is having a detrimental effect on other critical fronts.
6/ Although media outlets and military bloggers have characterized recent Ukrainian combat actions in the Sudzha lodgment as offensive, they do not meet the criteria for such a classification. Combat actions were limited in scope and scale and remained at the small-unit level.
January 13, 2025 at 12:55 AM
6/ Although media outlets and military bloggers have characterized recent Ukrainian combat actions in the Sudzha lodgment as offensive, they do not meet the criteria for such a classification. Combat actions were limited in scope and scale and remained at the small-unit level.
5/ Southern Sudzha Lodgment: On January 5, Russian forces supported by DPRK infantry entered Makhnovka. Despite fierce Ukrainian resistance and heavy use of FPVs, Russian troops secured Makhnovka by January 8. Fighting remains fierce for control of the village.
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January 13, 2025 at 12:55 AM
5/ Southern Sudzha Lodgment: On January 5, Russian forces supported by DPRK infantry entered Makhnovka. Despite fierce Ukrainian resistance and heavy use of FPVs, Russian troops secured Makhnovka by January 8. Fighting remains fierce for control of the village.
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4/ Western Sudzha Lodgment: By January 06, the 76th Guards Air Assault Division had captured Leonidovo. Heavy ZSU mining of the area required Russian troops to assault in small detachments. ZSU forces advanced toward the critical choke point of Zelyonyi Shlyakh.
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January 13, 2025 at 12:55 AM
4/ Western Sudzha Lodgment: By January 06, the 76th Guards Air Assault Division had captured Leonidovo. Heavy ZSU mining of the area required Russian troops to assault in small detachments. ZSU forces advanced toward the critical choke point of Zelyonyi Shlyakh.
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3/ Northeast Sudzha Lodgement: On January 5, ZSU forces initiated a series of assaults along the 38K-04 Highway toward Bolshoe Soldatskoe. EWS and infantry supported armored columns led by tanks fitted with mine-rollers.
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January 13, 2025 at 12:55 AM
3/ Northeast Sudzha Lodgement: On January 5, ZSU forces initiated a series of assaults along the 38K-04 Highway toward Bolshoe Soldatskoe. EWS and infantry supported armored columns led by tanks fitted with mine-rollers.
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2/ Operational Terms. Here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions to help you understand the thread's graphics.
January 13, 2025 at 12:55 AM
2/ Operational Terms. Here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions to help you understand the thread's graphics.
20/ This open-source operational summary is based on information from the ZSU and VSRF daily briefs, Ukrainian and Russian Telegram channels, Western intelligence agencies' statements, military analysts, and my professional experience. Errors in information and translation presented here are my own.
December 22, 2024 at 3:35 PM
20/ This open-source operational summary is based on information from the ZSU and VSRF daily briefs, Ukrainian and Russian Telegram channels, Western intelligence agencies' statements, military analysts, and my professional experience. Errors in information and translation presented here are my own.
19/ Strategic Aerospace Operations (SVKO) in the TVD: VKS activity continues to focus on country-wide cruise missile/air strike attacks to severely damage the Ukrainian Power Grid, support civilian infrastructure, target key military points of communication, and degrade PSU air defenses.
December 22, 2024 at 3:35 PM
19/ Strategic Aerospace Operations (SVKO) in the TVD: VKS activity continues to focus on country-wide cruise missile/air strike attacks to severely damage the Ukrainian Power Grid, support civilian infrastructure, target key military points of communication, and degrade PSU air defenses.
18/ Black Sea Theater of Military Action (OTMO): No naval activity has changed. The Black Seas Fleet remains largely focused on force protection of vessels, facilities, and personnel rather than offensive operations or active patrolling of sea lanes in the Black Sea and its littoral.
December 22, 2024 at 3:35 PM
18/ Black Sea Theater of Military Action (OTMO): No naval activity has changed. The Black Seas Fleet remains largely focused on force protection of vessels, facilities, and personnel rather than offensive operations or active patrolling of sea lanes in the Black Sea and its littoral.
17/ Kherson Operational Direction: The SVRF and ZSU maintain a general defense along the Dnipro River. The SVRF offensive action aims to seize control of the Dnipro Delta, which is crucial to preventing the use of the Kherson port to bring vital economic, humanitarian, and military aid into Ukraine.
December 22, 2024 at 3:35 PM
17/ Kherson Operational Direction: The SVRF and ZSU maintain a general defense along the Dnipro River. The SVRF offensive action aims to seize control of the Dnipro Delta, which is crucial to preventing the use of the Kherson port to bring vital economic, humanitarian, and military aid into Ukraine.
16/ Orikhiv Operational Direction: Activity in Orikhiv has been static throughout 2024, with positional engagements and artillery barrages characterizing the bulk of Russian and Ukrainian actions. Since September 2024, the 58GCAA has increased offensive action south and west of Orikhiv.
December 22, 2024 at 3:35 PM
16/ Orikhiv Operational Direction: Activity in Orikhiv has been static throughout 2024, with positional engagements and artillery barrages characterizing the bulk of Russian and Ukrainian actions. Since September 2024, the 58GCAA has increased offensive action south and west of Orikhiv.
15/ Velyka Novosilka Operational Direction: OSUV Tavriva's situation continues to deteriorate. OTU Krasnohorivka failed to halt recent Russian advances. The 29GCAA has secured the south bank of the Sukhi Yaly River from Uspenivka to Zelenivka, threatening ZSU's withdrawal from Kurakhove.
December 22, 2024 at 3:35 PM
15/ Velyka Novosilka Operational Direction: OSUV Tavriva's situation continues to deteriorate. OTU Krasnohorivka failed to halt recent Russian advances. The 29GCAA has secured the south bank of the Sukhi Yaly River from Uspenivka to Zelenivka, threatening ZSU's withdrawal from Kurakhove.
14/ Southern Strategic Direction: VSRF activity throughout this SD is defensive and primarily focused on continuing to strengthen the Surovikin Line. Ukrainian Intelligence (HUR) and Open-Source reporting indicate that the SOGRV-Ukraine is preparing to conduct an offensive in this SD.
December 22, 2024 at 3:35 PM
14/ Southern Strategic Direction: VSRF activity throughout this SD is defensive and primarily focused on continuing to strengthen the Surovikin Line. Ukrainian Intelligence (HUR) and Open-Source reporting indicate that the SOGRV-Ukraine is preparing to conduct an offensive in this SD.
13/ Pokrovsk-Kurakhove Operational Direction: OTU Donetsk struggles to manage delaying operations effectively. The 90th Guards Tank Division continues progressing toward the T05-15 HWY. OTU Donetsk is trading space for time to slow down Russian momentum without becoming decisively engaged.
December 22, 2024 at 3:35 PM
13/ Pokrovsk-Kurakhove Operational Direction: OTU Donetsk struggles to manage delaying operations effectively. The 90th Guards Tank Division continues progressing toward the T05-15 HWY. OTU Donetsk is trading space for time to slow down Russian momentum without becoming decisively engaged.
12/ Toretsk/Nui-York Operational Direction: Although the SVRF has intensely assaulted Toretsk, the ZSU has prevented deep penetration of its defensive lines. Even though the 41GCAA has resumed major operations, it is unlikely to seize all of Toretsk during the 2024-25 winter season.
December 22, 2024 at 3:35 PM
12/ Toretsk/Nui-York Operational Direction: Although the SVRF has intensely assaulted Toretsk, the ZSU has prevented deep penetration of its defensive lines. Even though the 41GCAA has resumed major operations, it is unlikely to seize all of Toretsk during the 2024-25 winter season.
11/ Operational Direction Chasiv Yar: The Chasiv Yar Operational Direction has yielded little gain for the SVRF. OTU Luhansk(?) has managed to operationally block OSV Yug from advancing towards Kostyantynivka. The Siverskyi-Donets Canal has been an effective barrier inhibiting Russian maneuver.
December 22, 2024 at 3:35 PM
11/ Operational Direction Chasiv Yar: The Chasiv Yar Operational Direction has yielded little gain for the SVRF. OTU Luhansk(?) has managed to operationally block OSV Yug from advancing towards Kostyantynivka. The Siverskyi-Donets Canal has been an effective barrier inhibiting Russian maneuver.
10/ Operational Direction Siversk: Siversk is a central position within the OSUV Khortytsia Area of Responsibility and a coordination point between OTU Lyman and OTU Luhansk for defending the Slovyansk / Kramatorsk urban conglomerate, the decisive strategic point of the Donbas SD.
December 22, 2024 at 3:35 PM
10/ Operational Direction Siversk: Siversk is a central position within the OSUV Khortytsia Area of Responsibility and a coordination point between OTU Lyman and OTU Luhansk for defending the Slovyansk / Kramatorsk urban conglomerate, the decisive strategic point of the Donbas SD.
9/ Operational Direction Donetsk: OUGRV-Ukraine's main effort is to conquer southern Donetsk Oblast, setting conditions for an advance into western and central Donetsk Oblast. OSUV Tavriya will likely complete its delayed withdrawal from the Kurakhove area to establish a new western defensive line.
December 22, 2024 at 3:35 PM
9/ Operational Direction Donetsk: OUGRV-Ukraine's main effort is to conquer southern Donetsk Oblast, setting conditions for an advance into western and central Donetsk Oblast. OSUV Tavriya will likely complete its delayed withdrawal from the Kurakhove area to establish a new western defensive line.