Open Source backend in 1 file with realtime database, authentication, file storage and admin dashboard

Breaking free from the shackles of interface-imposed performance limitations

There is nothing wrong with questioning the mighty cost of the lockdowns, but we can’t let hardline libertarians rewrite Britain’s pandemic history, says Guardian columnist Polly Toynbee

A clone of the strace command for macOS. Contribute to Mic92/strace-macos development by creating an account on GitHub.

Cloudflare suffered a service outage on November 18, 2025. The outage was triggered by a bug in generation logic for a Bot Management feature file causing many Cloudflare services to be affected.

WIRED's Andy Greenberg discusses a revelation that turned his decades-long reporting on its head: Bitcoin became a criminal's worst nightmare.

A vector search SQLite extension that runs anywhere! - asg017/sqlite-vec

MMseqs2: ultra fast and sensitive search and clustering suite - soedinglab/MMseqs2

In my opinion the root cause of the recent AWS outage is their architectural decision to have everything depend on the same instance of DynamoDB, including operation of DynamoDB itself. This is a circular dependency, and the ability to observe and fix the failure as it happened also failed. The ability of customers to file service reports failed. So the engineers trying to figure out what was happening were completely blind. It took them an hour to figure out what had broken and another hour to fix it, then the pent up demand rushing in broke other key services for another 12 hours or so. This happened before, years ago when Khawaja Shams was running DynamoDB, and a new feature was added to DynamoDB, secondary indexes, which ended up breaking everything in a similar way to the recent outage. That was when I became aware that many of the services that run AWS had migrated to DynamoDB as a backend, and they were using the same endpoint and service capacity as customers were using. I thought then that this was a bad thing to do. I’m not sure if there was internal discussion about this at the time. If DNS had been misconfigured on a different non-critical service, I think it would have been obvious to detect and quick and easy to fix. However, anything going wrong that also takes out the ability to see it going wrong and fix it, is a liability. To break the circular dependency, I think there needs to be a separate, internal only, set of services and data stores that the most critical AWS services use, and which are designed to come up without dependencies on public interfaces. Maybe an internal region, inside each public region, but with a simpler implementation that has few carefully managed dependencies. Otherwise, it’s just a matter of time until this happens again. https://lnkd.in/gbhiv7XQ