This ABM deepens theoretical understanding of the classical competitive process and equilibrium formation, and showcases some of the advantages of this modeling approach. There are also 50 free e-prints of the article available at the following link: www.tandfonline.com/eprint/TNJST... (n/n)

As the simulation unfolds over many time periods, profit rates on each parcel of land come to oscillate around an equilibrium value that is known from the corresponding analytical model, yet none of the agents in the simulation know this equilibrium. (8/n)

capitalists and landlords based on whether or not expectations of produced output are realized. Expectations can differ from reality depending on how many (few) capitalists decide to produce on a piece of land from the advertised rents they receive. (7/n)

with key distributive variables oscillating around their equilibrium values. Specifically, capitalists allocate productive capacity (labor) to parcels of land of varying quality based on advertised rents, production takes place, and then surplus is distributed between (6/n)

decentralized competitive mechanisms that can generate the "Classical Competitive Equilibrium" (CCE) found in the canonical model. We show that simple competitive interactions between bounded rational agents with localized knowledge generate classical gravitational dynamics (5/n)

described equilibrium as a center of gravity for short-term fluctuations (similar to an emergent property) rather than a static state, gaps exist between the parsimonious canonical classical model and the mechanisms underlying it. This paper builds an ABM of the (4/n)

for each type of land. Thus, distribution between workers, capitalists, and landlords is clear. However, the actual competitive mechanisms underlying these macroeconomic outcomes are, by comparison, not so well understood. Similarly, because the Classicals (and Marx) often (3/n)

what many consider the "canonical classical model", as formulated by Pasinetti. The analytical properties of the canonical model are well-known: it is determinate in all its macroeconomic features; and competitive forces ensure unique wage and profit rates, and unique rents (2/n)

Yes, it was.

a sustained & lively correspondence between Scarf, Shapley, & Shubik (as well as Debreu, leading to the eventual co-authored Debreu-Scarf paper in 1963). (n/n)

because he found the core & general equilibrium fell short in explaining important institutional aspects of real economies & were incapable of adequately capturing crucial economic processes (being restricted to more static-type analyses). There is more in the paper, including discussion of (7/n)

think that approaches based on the core (or cooperative games) could truly address big questions about increasing returns to scale (or non-convex production) in modern economies. In fact, Scarf wound up having a rather negative outlook on game theory in general. Shubik moved on from the idea (6/n)

moved on from the core (as well as cooperative game theory, more generally) & general equilibrium (by & large, not entirely). However, as Scarf's and Shubik's careers evolved, they moved on from the idea for very different reasons from much of the profession. Scarf moved on because he didn't (5/n)

but eventually take separate paths in working on the core and general equilibrium. Importantly, this is an early instance of the meeting of game theory & economics, & one where game theory was used to tackle a "big question" in economic theory. As with many ideas, the economics profession has (4/n)