UAE's overall imports of gold are down around 18%, meaning that the overall share of questionable/conflict-linked gold is even higher

A few days later the 2024 UAE import data was mysteriously removed from the UN Comtrade platform... I am still waiting on UAE's MoFA for comment

- Burkina Faso: 162%
- Uganda (hub for gold from DRC): 120%
- Armenia (hub for Russian gold): 92%
- Sudan: 70%
- Egypt (transit point for Sudanese gold): 69%
- Russia: 63%
- Rwanda (hub for gold from DRC): 38%
- Mali: 9.7%

"It is the police who create chaos. They come with dozens of cans, and afterwards, we find them selling the fuel," according to one tax driver.

Meanwhile, two days ago Malian authorities reportedly arrested at least 30 people accused of involvement in a petroleum theft network in Bamako

Neither JNIM nor accounts which tend to amplify AQ propaganda have reported the attack. And some local media are saying the perpetrators are linked with Ansaru, not JNIM

Yes, there is some supposed evidence of JNIM's presence in Nigeria, bordering Benin. But previous attacks have been further north in Benin's Alibori region

Interesting how al-Zallaqa is only gradually beginning to acknowledgement these attacks on fuel tankers, which previously have largely been documented through videos and announcements circulated through local chats and groups

Meanwhile, Russia's well-timed offer of monthly shipments of fuel and other supplies won't be felt immediately... and still needs to reach Bamako via the ports of neighbouring countries and key roads that are being targeted by JNIM

It also makes the govt hostage to fortune. If it is unable to resolve the crisis (through negotiation or force) within the deadline it has set itself, public patience may start to wear thing pretty quickly

This attack claim from 17 October appears to be one of the first - if not the first - times the group has claimed an attack on fuel tankers through al-Zallaqa. Will be interesting to see if there is growing inclusion of these attacks in JNIM's centralised media output

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In terms of propaganda, IS released four feature videos about its #Africa branches during the quarter - a notable increase in the frequency of this type of long-form propaganda

These showcased the activities of the #Sahel, ISWAP, ISCAP and Mozambique branches.

Meanwhile, IS's #Mozambique branch almost doubled activities compared to the previous quarter, whilst also widening attacks northwards and southwards, including into Nampula province, south of #CaboDelgado

In #DRC, ISCAP stepped up violence against Christian civilians in September, possibly exploiting ongoing instability as the #Rwanda-backed M23 rebels continued their insurgency

#Nigeria-focused ISWAP attacks dropped in Q3, as assaults on well-fortified military positions – a hallmark of its activity earlier this year – became highly infrequent.

ISWAP attacks this quarter are on a par with Central Africa branch (ISCAP) and Mozambique branch

IS Sahel claimed an especially large clash with #JNIM, allegedly killing 70 JNIM fighters. Alongside other reported clashes, this points to continuing tensions between the jihadist rivals, especially in northern Burkina Faso

In the Sahel, AQ's JNIM re-focused its attacks on #Mali, with more incidents in the country in September than in #BurkinaFaso.

JNIM is increasingly focusing on commercial targets, announcing a blockade on the south-western Kayes town and international commercial routes in early September