Jared Moore
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jaredlcm.bsky.social
Jared Moore
@jaredlcm.bsky.social
AI Researcher, Writer
Stanford
jaredmoore.org
Our conclusion: "LLMs’ apparent ToM abilities may be fundamentally different from humans' and might not extend to complex interactive tasks like planning."

Preprint: arxiv.org/abs/2507.16196
Code: github.com/jlcmoore/mindgames
Demo: mindgames.camrobjones.com

/end 🧵
Do Large Language Models Have a Planning Theory of Mind? Evidence from MindGames: a Multi-Step Persuasion Task
Recent evidence suggests Large Language Models (LLMs) display Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities. Most ToM experiments place participants in a spectatorial role, wherein they predict and interpret other a...
arxiv.org
July 29, 2025 at 7:22 PM
This work began at ‪@divintelligence.bsky.social and is in collaboration w/ @nedcpr.bsky.social , Rasmus Overmark, Beba Cibralic, Nick Haber, and ‪@camrobjones.bsky.social‬ .
July 29, 2025 at 7:22 PM
I'll be talking about this in SF at #CogSci2025 this Friday at 4pm.

I'll also be presenting it at the PragLM workshop at COLM in Montreal this October.
July 29, 2025 at 7:22 PM
This matters because LLMs are already deployed as educators, therapists, and companions. In our discrete-game variant (HIDDEN condition), o1-preview jumped to 80% success when forced to choose between asking vs telling. The capability exists, but the instinct to understand before persuading doesn't.
July 29, 2025 at 7:22 PM
These findings suggest distinct ToM capabilities:

* Spectatorial ToM: Observing and predicting mental states.
* Planning ToM: Actively intervening to change mental states through interaction.

Current LLMs excel at the first but fail at the second.
July 29, 2025 at 7:22 PM
Why do LLMs fail in the HIDDEN condition? They don't ask the right questions. Human participants appeal to the target's mental states ~40% of the time ("What do you know?" "What do you want?") LLMs? At most 23%. They start disclosing info without interacting with the target.
July 29, 2025 at 7:22 PM
Key findings:

In REVEALED condition (mental states given to persuader): Humans: 22% success ❌ o1-preview: 78% success ✅

In HIDDEN condition (persuader must infer mental states): Humans: 29% success ✅ o1-preview: 18% success ❌

Complete reversal!
July 29, 2025 at 7:22 PM
Setup: You must convince someone* to choose your preferred proposal among 3 options. But, they have less information and different preferences than you. To win, you must figure out what they know, what they want, and strategically reveal the right info to persuade them.
*a bot
July 29, 2025 at 7:22 PM
This is work done with...

Declan Grabb
@wagnew.dair-community.social
@klyman.bsky.social
@schancellor.bsky.social
Nick Haber
@desmond-ong.bsky.social

Thanks ❤️
April 28, 2025 at 3:26 PM
📝Read our pre-print on why "Expressing stigma and inappropriate responses prevents LLMs from safely replacing mental health providers" here:

arxiv.org/abs/2504.18412
Expressing stigma and inappropriate responses prevents LLMs from safely replacing mental health providers
Should a large language model (LLM) be used as a therapist? In this paper, we investigate the use of LLMs to *replace* mental health providers, a use case promoted in the tech startup and research spa...
arxiv.org
April 28, 2025 at 3:26 PM
📋We further identify **fundamental** reasons not to use LLMs as therapists, e.g., therapy involves a human relationship: LLMs cannot fully allow a client to practice what it means to be in a human relationship. (LLMs also can't provide in person therapy, such as OCD exposures.)
April 28, 2025 at 3:26 PM
🔎We came up with these experiments by conducting a mapping review of what constitutes good therapy, and identify **practical** reasons that LLM-powered therapy chatbots fail (e.g. they express stigma and respond inappropriately
April 28, 2025 at 3:26 PM
📈Bigger and newer LLMs exhibit similar amounts of stigma as smaller and older LLMs do toward different mental health conditions.
April 28, 2025 at 3:26 PM
📉Large language models (LLMs) in general struggle to respond appropriately to questions about delusions, suicidal ideation, and OCD and perform significantly worse than N=16 human therapists.
April 28, 2025 at 3:26 PM
🚨Commercial therapy bots make dangerous responses to prompts that indicate crisis, as well as other inappropriate responses. (The APA has been trying to regulate these bots.)
April 28, 2025 at 3:26 PM
Thanks! I got them to respond to me and it looks like they just posted it here: www.apaservices.org/advocacy/gen...
www.apaservices.org
January 10, 2025 at 11:34 PM
Great scoop! I'm at Stanford working on a paper about why LLMs are ill suited for these therapeutic settings. Do you know of where to find that open letter? I'd like to cite it. Thanks!
January 10, 2025 at 7:37 PM
I just landed in Miami to present at @emnlpmeeting the work I did with @Diyi_Yang from @stanfordnlp.

Please reach out if you'd like to meet!

And read @StanfordHAI's post about our work here:

https://t.co/h3CaBVnX7g
Can AI Hold Consistent Values? Stanford Researchers Probe LLM Consistency and Bias
New research tests large language models for consistency across diverse topics, revealing that while they handle neutral topics reliably, controversial issues lead to varied answers.
hai.stanford.edu
November 19, 2024 at 3:01 PM
We're indebted to helpful feedback from @xave_rg; @baileyflan; @fierycushman; @PReaulx; @maxhkw; Matthew Cashman; @TobyNewberry; Hilary Greaves; @Ronan_LeBras; @JenaHwang2; @sanmikoyejo, @sangttruong, and Stanford Class of 329H; attendees of @cogsci_soc and SPP 2024; and more.
November 19, 2024 at 3:00 PM
TLDR; We randomly generated scenarios to probe at people’s intuitions of how to aggregate preferences.

We found that people supported the contractualist Nash Product over the Utilitarian Sum.

Preprint here:

https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.05496
Intuitions of Compromise: Utilitarianism vs. Contractualism
What is the best compromise in a situation where different people value different things? The most commonly accepted method for answering this question -- in fields across the behavioral and social sciences, decision theory, philosophy, and artificial intelligence development -- is simply to add up utilities associated with the different options and pick the solution with the largest sum. This ``utilitarian'' approach seems like the obvious, theory-neutral way of approaching the problem. But there is an important, though often-ignored, alternative: a ``contractualist'' approach, which advocates for an agreement-driven method of deciding. Remarkably, no research has presented empirical evidence directly comparing the intuitive plausibility of these two approaches. In this paper, we systematically explore the proposals suggested by each algorithm (the ``Utilitarian Sum'' and the contractualist ''Nash Product''), using a paradigm that applies those algorithms to aggregating preferences across groups in a social decision-making context. While the dominant approach to value aggregation up to now has been utilitarian, we find that people strongly prefer the aggregations recommended by the contractualist algorithm. Finally, we compare the judgments of large language models (LLMs) to that of our (human) participants, finding important misalignment between model and human preferences.
arxiv.org
November 19, 2024 at 3:00 PM