Naja... Unten die politisch motivierten Angriffe auf Parteirepräsentant*innen pro Mitglied nach demokratischer Partei 2023. Ohne Haltung wäre man bei jeder anderen Partei besser aufgehoben. Absolut führen sie auch.

...shows how researchers have become creative in anayzing international activity that people do not want you to see or study but that lead to unexpected statistical facts like the top 10 fpi/capita countries worldwide being the ones you see below. (2/5)

The growth rate is declining but you would need a negative growth rate for any kind of collapse. This is EU population, not EA, but it's probably similar. From: ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web...

Here is one:

Sicher, dass das das richtige framing ist, SPON?

found the solution to our Overleaf problems!

source: www.nigeltyas.co.uk/nigel-tyas-n...

It's always reassuring that the EU has basically solved the tax haven issue... Luxembourg? Guernsey? Cayman Islands? Nothing to see here, move along please. Palau is the problem.

If you see this post, quote-post a bridge

Works now. I'm currently not using the BibTeX Key generation prompts at the bottom but it also works. What helped was using Claude itself to debug my prompts. It finds contradictory prompts itself and anticipates problems and points out vagueness.

Here is my attempt at a preamble having claude sort all my bibtex files, the result isn't bad, isn't great either. It's simply ignoring some of my instructions unfortunately and iterations take time because I have a lot of bibfiles

Aber was genau? Die Karte zeigt Firmen mit mehr als 250 Mitarbeitenden, die auf ihrer Website das Wort "Familienunternehmen" nutzen. Also eher Aldi. Die Definition von "Mittelstand" wechselt von Unterkapitel zu Unterkapitel (Übersicht 1), unüblich für Definitionen. Hier sind wir in Kapitel 4.2.

It matters who is looking though. We build a new dataset of tax administration characteristics and run a model averaging routine to let the data tell us which characteristics of tax administrations matter most. Result: highly digitized countries have much stronger CRS effects. 6/8

And the receiving side matters as well. We turn to a global sample of tax haven bank accounts and, improving on existing identification, find a pretty clean CRS effect. When both the tax haven and the home country implement, tax haven deposits decline. 5/8

When tax havens start to collect information, transfers from such accounts increase, consistent with legalization. But this effect is entirely driven by tax havens that implement the CRS well. We codify the OECD peer review process and find a null effect if implementation is weak. 4/8

A popular way to structure offshore evasion pre CRS (see the work of @gabrielzucman.bsky.social) was to add layers of secrecy: A tax haven shell company holding a bank account in another tax haven from which funds are transferred. Our Norwegian bank transfer data identifies such accounts. 3/8