Thanks, Line! :)

I am always happy to use SELECTS; it's a really great data source.

Regarding 1): Yes, indeed, at least in rural places. It is also worth noting that political parties have large incentives to mobilize rural voters due to the particularity of the Swiss electoral districts (rural cantons over-represented and cantonal Veto in direct democracy).

We partly empirically account for 2) in the paper by controlling for moving patterns (results are robust to this) and also discuss this. We cannot fully rule out that this drives some of the effects (also given findings from Maxwell on Switzerland: journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10....).

Thanks Twan - this nicely complements your recently published paper with @jvanslageren.bsky.social, I think :)

We are grateful for the feedback we received on earlier versions, particularly from @ehernandez.bsky.social, @twanhuijsmans.bsky.social, @matthiasenggist.bsky.social and @malte-who.bsky.social. (10/10)

We are happy that the paper has found a great home at EJPR (@ejprjournal.bsky.social).

The paper can be found here: www.cambridge.org/core/journal... (9/10)

These results show: As urban-rural divides are stronger among newer generations, generational replacement may make urban-rural differences a durable feature of European political systems. (8/10)

Our results are robust to different specifications of age, period and cohort, as well as various other measurements of urbanity. Importantly, cohorts are not becoming uniformly more progressive, as newer cohorts in rural areas do not seem to be more progressive than their predecessors. (7/10)

Turning to voting behavior, cohort effects for left-wing parties are stronger in more urban municipalities. Conversely, a mirror image emerges for the far-right, with more recently socialized urbanites being less likely to vote for the far-right than their earlier socialized ‘neighbors’. (6/10)

We find a growing urban-rural divide among newer generations. In urban places, newer generations are more strongly in favour of immigration, whereas these newer generations in rural places are not becoming more progressive. For environmental issues, we do not find such a difference. (5/10)

Empirically, we focus on Switzerland and combine post-election survey data spanning 28 years with municipality-level population density.

We construct a novel generational scheme (tailored to the Swiss context) and run APC regressions to disentangle cohort from age and period effects. (4/10)

We argue that urban and rural context effects during their socialization period were relatively similar for members of earlier cohorts but differed more strongly for newer cohorts. Crucial for this argument is the urban transformation to the knowledge economy, as we also show empirically. (3/10)

The urban-rural divide has increased over the past decades: Across Europe, far-right parties have become stronger in rural areas, whereas left-progressive parties are now dominating cities. We study generational replacement as an important driver of these changes. (2/10)

Are you aware of an article about SF's policy stances on immigration?

Compared to other Green parties (source: CHES data, 2024), they indeed seem to hold less progressive positions on immigration.

Yep, "nominally green" would probably be more fitting, I guess