## Program Timeline * **Sept. 23, 2024 – Quick Start authority contracts awarded:** Under the Department of Defense’s “Quick Start” rapid acquisition authority, Space Systems Command awarded concept‑design contracts to Astranis, Axient, L3Harris and Sierra Space to begin developing a Resilient Global Positioning System of small satellites to augment the existing GPS constellation (Space Force awards four ‘Quick Start’ Resilient GPS …). * **March 2025 – Funding reprogrammed:** A March 2025 continuing resolution allowed the U.S. Space Force to transfer $30 million from the Protected Tactical Satellite program to finance initial R‑GPS procurement (Space Force awards four ‘Quick Start’ Resilient GPS …). * **July 15, 2025 – GPS Resiliency Report Act:** Congress introduced the GPS Resiliency Report Act, directing the Secretary of Defense to assess risks to GPS and report on R‑GPS’s ability to achieve full resilience within ten years (S.2277 - GPS Resiliency Report Act). ## Operational Vulnerabilities * Adversaries can jam radio‑frequency signals or spoof counterfeit signals, degrading or misleading GPS receivers and creating risks for military and civilian users. ## Proposed Architecture * Early concept envisions a ~20‑satellite “proliferated fleet” to augment existing GPS constellations. * Design contracts have been awarded to **L3Harris** , **Sierra Space** , **Astranis** , and **Axient** ; other firms such as **Apex** , **K2** , **York** , and major primes could bid. * Uncertainty remains over whether this architecture will meet resilience goals, especially under jamming/spoofing scenarios. ## Governance & Congressional Oversight * Program planning is influenced by **Force Design** and the **Space Warfighting Analysis Center (SWAC)**. * The **House Appropriations Committee–Defense** has expressed skepticism and cut FY 2025 funding; FY 2026 funding could be near zero pending review of the full PNT architecture. ## Quantitative Milestones * **Late 2025:** Initial threat and capability assessment completion. * **2035:** Completion of space‑based resilience enhancements (e.g., hardened satellites). * **2040:** Development of terrestrial GPS redundancy system to provide alternate PNT signals. * **Beyond 2040:** Integration of space and ground systems for full resilient PNT service. ## Predictive Commentary * There is uncertainty about whether the ~20‑satellite fleet can truly deliver resilience against jamming and spoofing. * Congress is not moving quickly and industry remains in concept‑development mode; the program’s future hinges on the final defense appropriations bill and overall PNT architecture review. ## Budget * Implementation demands significant R&D and procurement investment; budgetary and contractual hurdles are highlighted in the AI report. * Success depends on appropriations. ## What's next * Industry remains at the concept‑development stage. * Congressional decisions in the final defense appropriations bill will determine the program’s pace and scope.

## Covert vs. Clandestine: Understanding the Difference > “Covert activity hides the true affiliation or relationship of the primary person or organization behind the action … [while] clandestine activity hides the activity itself (that is, the existence of the operation).” — Joint Force Quarterly, 2019 A covert action disguises the sponsor. U.S. law defines it as an operation “to influence political, economic or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.” The activity itself may be visible, but Washington denies involvement. Clandestine operations conceal the activity – its timing, methods or location – but if discovered, the U.S. accepts attribution. Both use tradecraft to remain unseen; the difference is legal and doctrinal, not technical. ## Not a Technical Term It’s tempting to call any secret activity covert, but the term carries a specific legal meaning. Encryption, classified sensors and stealth technology are routine across military operations and do not automatically make an operation clandestine or covert. The dividing line is whether the government’s sponsorship must be deniable and the authorities process itself, and mission. ## Rarely Used, Tight Control Covert action represents a tiny fraction of national‑security activities. It is almost exclusively the domain of the CIA and select partners operating under a Presidential Finding and subject to oversight by the House and Senate intelligence committees. The military services have no independent covert‑action authority and are generally not read into such operations unless they are supporting the intelligence community under Title 50. Most uniformed personnel will never encounter a true covert action in their careers. > “Covert action is an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.” — 50 U.S.C. §3093 ## Why It Matters Understanding the distinction between covert and clandestine helps clarify debates about oversight and accountability. Covert actions require additional legal safeguards because they conceal the actor and are subject to strict reporting requirements under Title 50. Clandestine operations fall under Title 10 and the law of armed conflict; they hide the activity but not the sponsor and are governed by routine congressional oversight. Recognizing this difference ensures transparency where it is required and preserves the integrity of sensitive missions.

Alaska Sen. Dan Sullivan champions Arctic security, pushing for a robust U.S. presence in the region, investing in icebreakers, shipyards and energy projects, and positioning Anchorage as America's Arctic beachhead.

> Original LinkedIn post: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/us-dot-awards-5-complementary-pnt-rapid-development-goward-frin-dz9pe On 27 October 2025, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) announced five rapid development contracts to further demonstrate complementary positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) technologies. The contracts, which total about $5 million, are intended to keep the government engaged in complementary PNT while supporting small companies with promising PNT solutions. The article notes that “rapid development” is somewhat of a misnomer because all of the technologies being funded are already mature and ready to use. Each awardee brings a different approach to providing resilient and GPS‑independent PNT: * The National Association of Broadcasters has developed the Broadcast Positioning Service, which delivers timing signals over new ATSC 3.0 television broadcasts and has the potential to provide location information. * Iridium Satellite LLC (which last year acquired Satelles) uses its low‑Earth‑orbit communication satellites to deliver a satellite‑based timing service. * UrsaNav LLC provides terrestrial eLoran PNT technology and is working with the U.S. Department of Defense and Department of the Navy on similar projects. * Viavi Solutions offers two resilient satellite timing services, one operating in low‑Earth orbit and another in geostationary orbit, that are independent of GPS/GNSS. * MerlinTPS Corp has developed its own proprietary terrestrial PNT system that does not rely on GPS. All of the awardees except Iridium are members of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation, which seeks to raise awareness of GPS vulnerabilities. While these contracts do not amount to a full nationwide complementary PNT system, they help maintain momentum and ensure that alternative technologies remain ready for adoption. Original LinkedIn post: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/us-dot-awards-5-complementary-pnt-rapid-development-goward-frin-dz9pe