Daniele
@hartreefock.bsky.social
Process and manufacturing engineer. Lvl 1 Certified Amateur Rocketeer 🚀. #NAFO fella. Casual OSINT. All opinions are my own. Member of @tochnyi.info
End. This preliminary release aims to underscore the enduring importance of long-range strikes, whether through missiles, drones, or sabotage operations. Ukraine has demonstrated that even when facing a theoretically superior opponent, airspace can remain highly vulnerable.
October 12, 2025 at 8:41 PM
End. This preliminary release aims to underscore the enduring importance of long-range strikes, whether through missiles, drones, or sabotage operations. Ukraine has demonstrated that even when facing a theoretically superior opponent, airspace can remain highly vulnerable.
4/4 Investigating the aftermath of long-range strikes or sabotage is very challenging because a large fireball in footage does not always lead to conclusive evidence from satellites. In some cases, despite the fire and explosion, the damage remains limited.
October 12, 2025 at 8:41 PM
4/4 Investigating the aftermath of long-range strikes or sabotage is very challenging because a large fireball in footage does not always lead to conclusive evidence from satellites. In some cases, despite the fire and explosion, the damage remains limited.
3/4 The team analysed most of the operations, focusing on those more relevant, such as air defence attrition, particularly in the Occupied Ukrainian Territories. From an initial analysis, we have strong evidence of a correlation between AD destruction and LRS.
October 12, 2025 at 8:41 PM
3/4 The team analysed most of the operations, focusing on those more relevant, such as air defence attrition, particularly in the Occupied Ukrainian Territories. From an initial analysis, we have strong evidence of a correlation between AD destruction and LRS.
2/4 We have been analysing reports from various sources, including Telegram, VK, Russian news outlets, and Ukrainian channels. The data collection is mostly manual, but processing uses coding to filter relevant statistics for our analysis.
October 12, 2025 at 8:41 PM
2/4 We have been analysing reports from various sources, including Telegram, VK, Russian news outlets, and Ukrainian channels. The data collection is mostly manual, but processing uses coding to filter relevant statistics for our analysis.
End. Finally, a big thank you to the entire @tochnyi.info team for their support.
August 31, 2025 at 11:39 AM
End. Finally, a big thank you to the entire @tochnyi.info team for their support.
6. Disrupting nodes like Alabuga is not simple. But understanding its ecosystem and the vulnerabilities hidden within it is essential to countering Russia’s drone surge. Especially when one of the key components of Shaed is still hand-made.
August 31, 2025 at 11:39 AM
6. Disrupting nodes like Alabuga is not simple. But understanding its ecosystem and the vulnerabilities hidden within it is essential to countering Russia’s drone surge. Especially when one of the key components of Shaed is still hand-made.
5. But here’s the paradox: Alabuga’s “self-sufficient” war industry depends on fragile supply chains.
Carbon fibre production is impossible without an adequate flux of oxygen & nitrogen, once supplied by Air Liquide’s infrastructure.
Carbon fibre production is impossible without an adequate flux of oxygen & nitrogen, once supplied by Air Liquide’s infrastructure.
August 31, 2025 at 11:39 AM
5. But here’s the paradox: Alabuga’s “self-sufficient” war industry depends on fragile supply chains.
Carbon fibre production is impossible without an adequate flux of oxygen & nitrogen, once supplied by Air Liquide’s infrastructure.
Carbon fibre production is impossible without an adequate flux of oxygen & nitrogen, once supplied by Air Liquide’s infrastructure.
4. Inside the plant, workers hand-layer carbon fibre for Shahed airframes. That carbon fibre comes from Alabuga-Fibre (UMATEX), acquired by Rosatom, aiming to hit 10,000 tonnes per year by 2030.
August 31, 2025 at 11:39 AM
4. Inside the plant, workers hand-layer carbon fibre for Shahed airframes. That carbon fibre comes from Alabuga-Fibre (UMATEX), acquired by Rosatom, aiming to hit 10,000 tonnes per year by 2030.
3. Alabuga has expanded quickly: new production halls, dormitories, and workshops. Thanks to tax breaks, customs benefits, and state investment, it has turned it into one of Russia’s most important industrial clusters.
August 31, 2025 at 11:39 AM
3. Alabuga has expanded quickly: new production halls, dormitories, and workshops. Thanks to tax breaks, customs benefits, and state investment, it has turned it into one of Russia’s most important industrial clusters.
2. Over the past 5 months, Russia has tripled its use of Shahed-type drones, now averaging 103 launches per day. Ukraine hasn’t had a single day without attacks. In April 2025, Russia launched 2,485 Shaheds. By July, 6,297. That’s a 1,378% increase compared to July 2024.
August 31, 2025 at 11:39 AM
2. Over the past 5 months, Russia has tripled its use of Shahed-type drones, now averaging 103 launches per day. Ukraine hasn’t had a single day without attacks. In April 2025, Russia launched 2,485 Shaheds. By July, 6,297. That’s a 1,378% increase compared to July 2024.
1. If you’d like to dive straight into the full investigation, you’ll find the link below. But for those following along here, this thread offers a summary of our main findings. tochnyi.info/2025/08/alab...
Alabuga plant – No Chain is stronger than its weakest link – Tochnyi.info
tochnyi.info
August 31, 2025 at 11:39 AM
1. If you’d like to dive straight into the full investigation, you’ll find the link below. But for those following along here, this thread offers a summary of our main findings. tochnyi.info/2025/08/alab...
End. Due to its importance, we encourage others to investigate more: @rusi.bsky.social @csis.org
As always, big thanks to @tochnyi.info team for supporting this and to Jonathan for peer review and to Chris for the graphics.
As always, big thanks to @tochnyi.info team for supporting this and to Jonathan for peer review and to Chris for the graphics.
August 15, 2025 at 12:19 PM
End. Due to its importance, we encourage others to investigate more: @rusi.bsky.social @csis.org
As always, big thanks to @tochnyi.info team for supporting this and to Jonathan for peer review and to Chris for the graphics.
As always, big thanks to @tochnyi.info team for supporting this and to Jonathan for peer review and to Chris for the graphics.
5. When completed, it could intercept radio signals thousands of km away, track NATO comms, and talk to subs deep under the Baltic. A relic of Soviet “Krug” tech… updated for modern electronic warfare.
And it’s rising right on NATO’s doorstep.
And it’s rising right on NATO’s doorstep.
August 15, 2025 at 12:19 PM
5. When completed, it could intercept radio signals thousands of km away, track NATO comms, and talk to subs deep under the Baltic. A relic of Soviet “Krug” tech… updated for modern electronic warfare.
And it’s rising right on NATO’s doorstep.
And it’s rising right on NATO’s doorstep.
4. 🚧 Construction timeline:
• Mar 2023, first new roadwork spotted
• May 2023, two outer rings defined
• Jul 2023, forest cleared, perimeter walls rise
• Jul 2024, all rings visible from space
• Jul 2025, central hub taking shape
Source: Sentinel-2
• Mar 2023, first new roadwork spotted
• May 2023, two outer rings defined
• Jul 2023, forest cleared, perimeter walls rise
• Jul 2024, all rings visible from space
• Jul 2025, central hub taking shape
Source: Sentinel-2
August 15, 2025 at 12:19 PM
4. 🚧 Construction timeline:
• Mar 2023, first new roadwork spotted
• May 2023, two outer rings defined
• Jul 2023, forest cleared, perimeter walls rise
• Jul 2024, all rings visible from space
• Jul 2025, central hub taking shape
Source: Sentinel-2
• Mar 2023, first new roadwork spotted
• May 2023, two outer rings defined
• Jul 2023, forest cleared, perimeter walls rise
• Jul 2024, all rings visible from space
• Jul 2025, central hub taking shape
Source: Sentinel-2
3. The site spans up to 1.6 km in diameter, far larger than most known military antenna arrays. Six concentric rings. 180 evenly spaced points are likely for vertical antennas. This isn’t a radar. It’s something bigger: a CDAA a Cold War–era listening giant reborn. 🎯
August 15, 2025 at 12:19 PM
3. The site spans up to 1.6 km in diameter, far larger than most known military antenna arrays. Six concentric rings. 180 evenly spaced points are likely for vertical antennas. This isn’t a radar. It’s something bigger: a CDAA a Cold War–era listening giant reborn. 🎯
2.📍 Hidden in the forests of Kaliningrad, just 25 km from Poland’s border, using satellite imagery we noticed: a massive, perfectly circular construction. Huge size. Strategic location.
We decided to investigate. 🛰️
We decided to investigate. 🛰️
August 15, 2025 at 12:19 PM
2.📍 Hidden in the forests of Kaliningrad, just 25 km from Poland’s border, using satellite imagery we noticed: a massive, perfectly circular construction. Huge size. Strategic location.
We decided to investigate. 🛰️
We decided to investigate. 🛰️
1. The full article can be found here: tochnyi.info/2025/08/puti...
Putin’s ears within Europe: Uncovering Kaliningrad’s Hidden Antenna Array – Tochnyi.info
tochnyi.info
August 15, 2025 at 12:19 PM
1. The full article can be found here: tochnyi.info/2025/08/puti...
New day new challenge! Let’s do this!
August 8, 2025 at 6:51 AM
New day new challenge! Let’s do this!
I think this is a general rule someone in their high command came up to, and they need to obey. But since they cannot cover each plane they use of useless tire they ended up covering only those they do not use.
June 9, 2025 at 6:58 PM
I think this is a general rule someone in their high command came up to, and they need to obey. But since they cannot cover each plane they use of useless tire they ended up covering only those they do not use.