So well deserved!! You are brilliant 💫

Thank you so much for sharing 😊

Many thanks to @geraldschneider.bsky.social, @cvonsoest.bsky.social, @leuffen.bsky.social, @grauvogelj.bsky.social, Jordan Tama, Andrew Blinkensop, Cliff Morgan, Aiganym Valikhanova, and others for their super helpful comments and feedback on earlier drafts of this article. (7/7)

I complement my statistical results with material from interviews with US sanctions practitioners and anecdotal evidence from sanctions cases such as Iran and Russia. Check it out: doi.org/10.1093/fpa/... (6/7)

2. Sanctions that include mechanisms of congressional oversight last longer and are less likely to be lifted by the president before achieving their goals. (5/7)

1. Presidents with stronger party power in Congress and higher public approval ratings are more likely to end sanctions, particularly by capitulation. (4/7)

and argue that a president's political capital vis-à-vis the public and Congress, as well as Congress's anticipated responses, influences when and how presidents lift sanctions. To test my argument, I analyze original sanctions data using competing risks and uncover two key findings: (3/7)

In this article, I ask whether domestic factors influence US presidents’ decisions to lift sanctions. I draw on work emphasizing the domestic costs related to leaders’ foreign policy decisions (2/7)

Many thanks to @geraldschneider.bsky.social, @cvonsoest.bsky.social, @leuffen.bsky.social, @grauvogelj.bsky.social, Jordan Tama, Andrew Blinkensop, Cliff Morgan, Aiganym Valikhanova, and others for their super helpful comments and feedback on earlier drafts of this article.

I complement my statistical results with material from interviews with US sanctions practitioners and anecdotal evidence from sanctions cases such as Iran and Russia. Check it out: doi.org/10.1093/fpa/... (6/7)

2. Sanctions that include mechanisms of congressional oversight last longer and are less likely to be lifted by the president before achieving their goals. (5/7)

1. Presidents with stronger party power in Congress and higher public approval ratings are more likely to end sanctions, particularly by capitulation. (4/7)

and argue that a president's political capital vis-à-vis the public and Congress, as well as Congress's anticipated responses, influences when and how presidents lift sanctions. To test my argument, I analyze original sanctions data using competing risks and uncover two key findings (3/7)

In this article, I ask whether domestic factors influence US presidents’ decisions to lift sanctions. I draw on work emphasizing the domestic costs related to leaders’ foreign policy decisions (2/7)