Drop me a line if you want to read the paper. We’re currently looking at cabinet-level appointments globally post-revolution and have a detailed analysis of Egypt post-1952, when 300 junior officers seized power with no prior experience in state administration

Holdovers bring expertise but are a counter-revolutionary risk. Promotees, junior officials from the old regime, can be converted to the cause. Returners, elites who broke with the regime, are skilled but rare. Outsiders, often exiles, have competences but are unknown entities

But the new elite will still face constraints in terms of competence in key areas. In these situations, we theorize four other types of officials who they can turn to: holdovers, outsiders, promotees, and returners. Reports already suggest such outreach is taking place in Syria

We argue that the new state elite is shaped by the characteristics of the mobilization that brought it to power. A low-participation but long-duration one that involves forms of rebel governance (as in Syria) generates know-how that is directly transferable to governing

The new authorities in Syria are facing a familiar dilemma: who should staff the bureaucratic elite after capturing the state? In a new paper, Neil Ketchley and I look at this aspect of post-revolutionary state-building