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Our insights are relevant in cases like US interventions in oil-rich Middle Eastern countries and China’s engagement in mineral-rich African nations. As the value of resources change, third-party involvement will be a factor in determining conflicts.

This result holds true also if the third-party can choose whether to back the resource-holder or the predator, to pursue its interest. Indeed, third parties are more likely to side with the resource holder as the resource value rises, creating a stabilizing effect.

A key insight is that conflict likelihood depends on resource value. When this is low, predators are unlikely to attack because the rewards aren’t worth the risk. For high value, a likely third-party intervention deters conflict. Moderate value maximizes conflict probability.

The paper models resource conflict as a game involving a resource holder, a predator, and a powerful third party. Predators attack when they can steal highly valuable resources and third-party intervention as unlikely.

Resource wealth creates two opposing forces. On one side, high-value resources invite predation, increasing the risk of conflict. On the other, valuable resources attract powerful third parties like superpowers, who intervene to stabilize the region and secure access.