We're not sell side, but we did :).

mailchi.mp/verdadcap/th...

Hit send too early... Which looked at the discounts available in European equities.

But this has also resulted in credit metrics that are anomolous. Debt to EBITDA by traditional measures is 6.0x which is high for a BB credit. But EV to debt is 3.6x which is very good. Debt to Sales (not a normal debt metric) is 3x! All of this rests on their very high margins.

While they's consumed about $15 billion of capital since 2011 (mostly debt), they've returned $13 billion to shareholders (my estimates) while growing the asset base significantly. This podcast is terrific overview of how they do this and the business model.

www.50xpodcast.com/episodes/tra...

As Dorsey points out, they are an acquisition powerhouse and every time they do a debt funded acquisition, they manage to grow the EBITDA. Profits to assets have fallen, but they are still high.

That's an evergreen strategy, not a market timing strategy. And that's where the rapidly evolving quant credit world has an advantage at using shorts to isolate the long factors that are attractive. You can read our full piece here.
mailchi.mp/verdadcap/sh...

Long BBBs are also long duration but have meh returns. So shorting BBBs to get long Fallen Angels can help you build a portfolio with modest duration and more exposure to historically good credit risk.

So outright shorts or low net portfolios don't make of sense. You want to be long credit. But shorting credit to allow to you to get long other credits can work. For example, fallen angels (credit that has fallen from investment grade) have terrific historical returns. But they are long duration.

And the stuff that loses the most, low rated credit, is also the hardest to short because of the carry.

But your base rate of success is much worse than equities. You win 15% of the time versus 40% for equities.