Thanks also to my colleagues in the arms control and new tech research team at @ifshhamburg.bsky.social and to participants of the Nuclear Knowledges seminar at Sciences Po for their helpful feedback. 🙏

10/🧵

I’m happy to have published my first peer-reviewed article! Huge thanks to my PhD supervisors @profonderco.bsky.social & Matthew Rendall for world-class support. I’ll be raising a glass to both tonight! 🥂

9/🧵

That’s why tackling intergenerational nuclear injustice is so challenging. In the article’s conclusions, I argue that its distinct nature invites both inaction and insufficient policy responses.

8/🧵

Hence, from the perspective of future generations, time is neither neutral nor forgiving. It works against them. In the nuclear sphere, though, it does so in subtler, less obvious ways than in the climate sphere.

7/🧵

However, if nuclear risk levels remain consistently elevated, the overall probability that *some* future generation will experience nuclear war cumulates over time. A grim numbers game—full explanation in the article.

6/🧵

We’re pretty sure our kids will face climate disruption—and our grandkids even more. With nuclear war, though, we can’t know. Bad luck could strike in the next decade, next century, or much later. The danger is rather abstract.

5/🧵

The crux: different risk trajectories and temporalities.

While climate risks cumulate AND intensify across generations, nuclear risks do not necessarily follow the same pattern. The likelihood of nuclear war does not inherently increase for future generations.

4/🧵

So far, so similar.
But intergenerational *nuclear* injustice is distinct. It stands out for...

👉 its unpredictable timeline,
👉 its resilient incentive systems, and
👉 its stagnating salience in public scrutiny.

3/🧵

The climate–nuclear nexus is getting lots of attention recently. And rightly so!

I examine both issues through an intergenerational ethics lens. Both tempt us into “intergenerational buck passing” – short-term gains today, long-term risks dumped on our descendants.

2/🧵

I see… Thank you!

I get it - no doubts about the de facto net benefit (though I’d still be genuinely curious how much difference a year makes concretely in your assessment). I just think an imperfect/last chance to negotiate a follow-on should be taken. Framing it as a gift to the adversary usually makes that harder

Personally, I’m not sure that framing a (however imperfect) extension as ‘breathing space’ for Russia is helpful... But I’m curious how you see the extra year making a difference in planning, upload capacities, R&D, or whatever you had in mind?

Also: There’s a bit of an unofficial social with the 'nuclear folks' happening on Thursday, 19th, at 8 PM at The Northern Whig.

Come by and join us for a beer!