Franziska Lesigang
@franzilesi.bsky.social
This result is remarkable for two reasons. First, it offers a sufficient condition for when individuals can afford to remember less than their opponent. Second, it helps identify equilibria among reactive-n strategies more efficiently, as it reduces the number of deviations that need to be checked.
April 6, 2025 at 12:25 PM
This result is remarkable for two reasons. First, it offers a sufficient condition for when individuals can afford to remember less than their opponent. Second, it helps identify equilibria among reactive-n strategies more efficiently, as it reduces the number of deviations that need to be checked.
We prove that in this setting there always exists a best response that only depends on the last n-1 events, thus allowing a player to remember less than their opponent without any harm to their payoff.
April 6, 2025 at 12:24 PM
We prove that in this setting there always exists a best response that only depends on the last n-1 events, thus allowing a player to remember less than their opponent without any harm to their payoff.
We consider additive games, where each player’s payoff is the sum of two components, and each component only depends on the action of a single player. Further we suppose that the opponent plays a reactive-n strategy, i.e. their moves depend on the opposing player's last n moves.
April 6, 2025 at 12:24 PM
We consider additive games, where each player’s payoff is the sum of two components, and each component only depends on the action of a single player. Further we suppose that the opponent plays a reactive-n strategy, i.e. their moves depend on the opposing player's last n moves.