Link to the full piece here: lawfaremedia.org/article/on-subsea-cables--europe-should-avoid-the-traps-of-the-5g-debate

To close, Europeans have understandably been focused in recent months on physical threats to cables. Now, given the FCC’s moves on cable cybersecurity, Europe cannot sit idly by and should not wait for U.S. pressure to act (9/9)

The New York Statement was launched nearly one year ago on the sidelines of UNGA: but not much has been publicly undertaken by the group since. Another topic of discussion should be cyber threats posed by untrusted cable repair vessels (8/9)

Internationally, the EU, United States, and other signatories of the “New York Joint Statement” should collectively ensure that all components of the subsea cable supply chain can be sources and produced at scale by trusted companies (7/9)

This can take form at multiple levels: the EU should prioritize the immediate rollout of its announced “Cable Security Toolbox.” National governments, and especially France, should require domestic companies to investigate whether they procure untrusted cable components (6/9)

Doing so would enhance the security of European critical digital infrastructure, benefit European firms, and help avoid another unnecessary transatlantic dispute—like that on 5G—over a threat perception now largely shared across the Atlantic (5/9)

Unlike the early days of the 5G debate, many European officials share U.S. concerns regarding untrusted vendors in their critical digital infrastructure. Rather than wait for Washington’s encouragement (or coercion), they should adopt similar measures on subsea cables (4/9)

This move mirrors steps taken under the first Trump admin on 5G to exclude firms like Huawei and ZTE from U.S. networks. Yet attempts to convince allies to do the same initially fell on deaf ears. Debates over 5G were a major transatlantic tension point during Trump 1.0 (3/9)

Last month, the FCC updated its U.S. subsea cable licensing rules for the first time since 2001—prohibiting the use of components on the FCC’s “Covered List” in any subsea cable systems that land in or connect to the United States (2/9)

These initiatives are in their early stages, and many details are yet to come. In particular, it remains unclear (at least publicly) and will be worth watching what the U.S. government expects from its allies and partners in all these strategies, especially in Europe. (7/7)

Finally, the Senate’s draft NDAA for FY26 includes a proposal for a “Working Group, Strategy, and Report on Ensuring the Security, Resilience, and Integrity of Undersea Cables.” (6/7)

Among the information requested is a detailed description of any PRC-owned equipment in cables operated by the firms, a history of cable maintenance or other services conducted by Russian or Chinese companies, and existing protocols for cable damage. (5/7)

Yesterday, two House Representatives and a DHS official sent a letter to the heads of Google, Microsoft, Meta, and AWS requesting significant levels of information related to the security of their subsea cable systems (4/7) homeland.house.gov/wp-content/u...

The rule, once adopted, will prevent entities that utilize PRC components from receiving licenses to build or operate cables landing in the United States or leasing capacity on U.S.-connected cables. (3/7)

Last week, the FCC announced that it will vote on a rule in early August prohibiting the use of Chinese technologies and equipment in subsea cables landing in the United States. (2/7) docs.fcc.gov/public/attac...

...If vessels fail to fly a valid flag in the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, we will take appropriate action within international law. "

Time to act is now! More roving environmental catastrophes will continue to come, unless we put the foot down.