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en3k.bsky.social
D3hydrate
@en3k.bsky.social
86 followers 690 following 5 posts
FG's, art, compassion for all
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en3k.bsky.social
Barcade St. Mark's is a nice chill place, during the week🫠 gets a bit crowded about now
March 28, 2025 at 10:07 PM
en3k.bsky.social
Existence and living is pain, but the opposite is not existing. Been coming to terms with it too. Leave this up, it's good.
March 16, 2025 at 12:36 AM
en3k.bsky.social
Test it in different gears, might have something to do with gear alignment/grinding. Same thing with me and braking my car.
March 2, 2025 at 3:23 AM
Reposted by D3hydrate
ragingspirit.bsky.social
Somewhat related fresh horror. This has layers on top of layers of infosec dysfunction.

samcurry.net/hacking-subaru
Introduction On November 20, 2024, Shubham Shah and I discovered a security vulnerability in Subaru’s STARLINK connected vehicle service that gave us unrestricted targeted access to all vehicles and customer accounts in the United States, Canada, and Japan. Using the access provided by the vulnerability, an attacker who only knew the victim’s last name and ZIP code, email address, phone number, or license plate could have done the following: Remotely start, stop, lock, unlock, and retrieve the current location of any vehicle. Retrieve any vehicle’s complete location history from the past year, accurate to within 5 meters and updated each time the engine starts. Query and retrieve the personally identifiable information (PII) of any customer, including emergency contacts, authorized users, physical address, billing information (e.g., last 4 digits of credit card, excluding full card number), and vehicle PIN. Access miscellaneous user data including support call history, previous owners, odometer reading, sales history, and more. After reporting the vulnerability, the affected system was patched within 24 hours and never exploited maliciously. Enumerating Employee Emails Using LinkedIn, we did a quick search for “Subaru STARLINK” and found a few employees who appeared to be software engineers. After getting their names, we Googled and found that Subaru emails are in the following format: [first_initial][last]@subaru.com We tossed the few emails that we’d pieced together into the “getSecurityQuestion.json” endpoint and hit send. On the fourth attempt, we got a response back! <label for="securityQuestionId"> <span class="securityQuestionText">What city were you born in?</span> </label> The jdoe@subaru.com (redacted) email was valid! We went back to the reset password endpoint and hit send. HTTP Request POST /forgotPassword/resetPassword.json HTTP/1.1 Host: portal.prod.subarucs.com { "email": "jdoe@subaru.com", "password": "Example123!", "passwordConfirmation": "Example123!" } HTTP Response HTTP/1.1 200 Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2024 03:02:31 GMT Content-Type: application/json Connection: close X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN Content-Length: 9 "success" It worked! We tried logging in. We had successfully taken over an employee’s account, but there was now a 2FA prompt to actually use the website. It was custom, so we tried to see if there was anything to do to bypass it. Bypassing 2FA We tried the simplest thing that we could think of: removing the client-side overlay from the UI. Match $('#securityQuestionModal').modal('show'); Replace //$('#securityQuestionModal').modal('show'); After removing the client-side overlay, we clicked around and the whole app seemed to function normally. All of the buttons worked, and were returning server-side data.
January 23, 2025 at 10:23 PM
en3k.bsky.social
Same boat man. Looking anywhere else as well, you're not alone.
November 8, 2024 at 1:47 PM
Reposted by D3hydrate
sharpiepls.com
teaching the elderly to click every phishing link in their emails TO OWN THE CONSERVATIVES 😭
November 7, 2024 at 7:38 PM