Elodie Douarin
@elodiedouarin.bsky.social
Professor of Economics at UCL SSEES
Institutions | Social norms | Violence
Friday Association for Institutional Studies and UCL Center for New Economic Transitions
elodiedouarin.co.uk
Institutions | Social norms | Violence
Friday Association for Institutional Studies and UCL Center for New Economic Transitions
elodiedouarin.co.uk
And a short blog entry here:
blogs.ucl.ac.uk/ssees/2025/0...
blogs.ucl.ac.uk/ssees/2025/0...
Bringing actors back in: The key take-away from a symposium on crisis and institutional change | UCL SSEES Research Blog
UCL Homepage
blogs.ucl.ac.uk
April 8, 2025 at 8:16 AM
And a short blog entry here:
blogs.ucl.ac.uk/ssees/2025/0...
blogs.ucl.ac.uk/ssees/2025/0...
You can read our introduction here:
www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
Introduction to the symposium on ‘crisis and persistence: dynamics of institutional changes at the interface between formal and informal institutions’ | Journal of Institutional Economics | Cambridge ...
Introduction to the symposium on ‘crisis and persistence: dynamics of institutional changes at the interface between formal and informal institutions’ - Volume 21
www.cambridge.org
April 8, 2025 at 8:16 AM
You can read our introduction here:
www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
Rayamajhee et al. (2024) finds that Hurricane Katrina reduced state involvement in economic affairs but did not affect social capital in Louisiana, suggesting that informal institutions are more resilient. www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
Shock me like a Hurricane: how Hurricane Katrina changed Louisiana's formal and informal institutions | Journal of Institutional Economics | Cambridge Core
Shock me like a Hurricane: how Hurricane Katrina changed Louisiana's formal and informal institutions - Volume 20
www.cambridge.org
April 8, 2025 at 8:16 AM
Rayamajhee et al. (2024) finds that Hurricane Katrina reduced state involvement in economic affairs but did not affect social capital in Louisiana, suggesting that informal institutions are more resilient. www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
Choutagunta et al. (2024) discuss constitutional compliance (CC), which is higher when de jure and de facto rules align. They show that external shocks, such as civil conflicts and coups, decrease CC, while banking crises and natural disasters have no sign. impact. www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
Shocking resilience? Effects of extreme events on constitutional compliance | Journal of Institutional Economics | Cambridge Core
Shocking resilience? Effects of extreme events on constitutional compliance - Volume 20
www.cambridge.org
April 8, 2025 at 8:16 AM
Choutagunta et al. (2024) discuss constitutional compliance (CC), which is higher when de jure and de facto rules align. They show that external shocks, such as civil conflicts and coups, decrease CC, while banking crises and natural disasters have no sign. impact. www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
Buchen (2024) shows with a coordination game that formal institutions promote resilience during external shocks. The paper contrasts formal institutions (legal context) with informal institutions (observed practices) and their roles in maintaining cooperation. www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
Institutional resilience: how the formal legal system sustains informal cooperation | Journal of Institutional Economics | Cambridge Core
Institutional resilience: how the formal legal system sustains informal cooperation - Volume 20
www.cambridge.org
April 8, 2025 at 8:16 AM
Buchen (2024) shows with a coordination game that formal institutions promote resilience during external shocks. The paper contrasts formal institutions (legal context) with informal institutions (observed practices) and their roles in maintaining cooperation. www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
Arvanitidis and Papagiannitsis (2024) explore local water governance in Greece, highlighting the tension between local communities and top-down formalisation. They discuss how citizens resist and adapt to changing rules that conflict with customary practices. www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
Community and informal institutions in reforms under crises: the odyssey of a 350-year-old functionally credible water commons | Journal of Institutional Economics | Cambridge Core
Community and informal institutions in reforms under crises: the odyssey of a 350-year-old functionally credible water commons - Volume 20
www.cambridge.org
April 8, 2025 at 8:16 AM
Arvanitidis and Papagiannitsis (2024) explore local water governance in Greece, highlighting the tension between local communities and top-down formalisation. They discuss how citizens resist and adapt to changing rules that conflict with customary practices. www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
Congratulations!
March 28, 2025 at 6:52 PM
Congratulations!
