@zachpeck.bsky.social and @tonychemero.bsky.social argue that radical embodiment has implications for ethics - if embodiment erodes the boundaries of the self, does it also erode the boundaries of moral agency? Happily, feminist philosophers have thought carefully about this

doi.org/10.1007/s112...

Andrea Gambarotto and Thomas van Es argue that in order to adequately incorporate social processes into its theory, enactivism needs to become more dialectical, and more Hegelian

doi.org/10.1007/s112...

Luis Favela discusses an important problem for radical embodiment - how to conduct empirical science while insisting that the system under study is non-decomposable. He thinks emergence provides the answer doi.org/10.1007/s112...

Harry Heft argues that radical embodiment can benefit from adopting Mead's social pragmatism, which is, he thinks, compatible with Bourdieu's concept of habitus and with Barker's behavior settings theory

link.springer.com/article/10.1...

Luke Kersten raises an old distinction from Andy Clark between two views of embodied cognition: one view gives the body a privileged role in explanations of mind, the other holds that the body is just one resource among many. Can mechanistic explanation resolve the tension?

doi.org/10.1007/s112...

No, the deadline for proposals was in July

Radical embodied cognitive science does not have a settled view on what mental states are. Alexander Hölken argues for understanding mental states as components of larger scale coordinative structures doi.org/10.1007/s112...

Marta Pérez-Verdugo and @xabibaran.bsky.social discuss whether Piagetian sensorimotor schemes can be extended beyond the body into artifacts. They argue that conventional use of a teapot is shaped as much by the teapot itself as by our bodily action schemes

link.springer.com/article/10.1...

@melinagastelum.bsky.social‬ proposes the Dynamic Affordance Trajectory Framework, which aims to explain how affordances operate across different time scales: action control, learning, and culture

link.springer.com/article/10.1...

@moritz-bammel.bsky.social and @guicogsci.bsky.social discuss the possibility of extending radical embodiment to human social collectives. They compare two established approaches: behavior settings theory and the extended cognition notion of cognitive institutions

link.springer.com/article/10.1...

Andrea Hiott discusses the role of mental representations in cognitive neuroscience studies of memory and navigation, proposing that representations are really a part of the way we talk about brains, not something findable in brains themselves

link.springer.com/article/10.1...

Wouter van Hooydonk worries that radical embodied cognitive science may assume that able white men's bodies are a universal representation of human bodies. He thinks RECS should reject the universalizing attitude and pay more attention to particular cases. doi.org/10.1007/s112...

Sarah Trasmundi discusses whether reading can be reconciled with Gibson’s account of direct perception, and whether imagination can be thought of as an extension of perception.

link.springer.com/article/10.1...

Marco Facchin, Zuzanna Rucińska, and Thomas Fondelli ask whether there is such a thing as radical embodied introspection. They think that there is. Through examples, they argue that introspection routinely involves embodied processes

link.springer.com/article/10.1...