Anyone approaching the study of the English law of trusts comes across “the rule in Saunders v Vautier”, named after the 1841 decision of the Court of Chancery in which it is currently assumed that it was laid down. In its narrowest form, the rule provides that the beneficiary of a trust of shares and their dividends, which is to take effect “when” the beneficiary reaches the age of majority, with no gift over, is entitled to have the shares transferred to him as soon as he comes of age. The effect of the implementation of the rule is to terminate the trust, notwithstanding the settlor's contrary intention, which is simply overridden. In this article we intend to show that a distinction between two meanings of “when” in testamentary dispositions underpinned the rule: a conditional meaning and a dispositive meaning. That distinction was taken from the jurisprudence of the spiritual courts in England, based on a development of Roman law sources in the European ius commune which then found its way into the French and other civil law codes. Academic writings have ignored this side of the story, which is highly relevant from a comparative law perspective.

This article examines error in the law of contract. For centuries it has been said to be one of the most complex parts of contract law. In the mid twentieth century the Scots law of error was described as being in a “state bordering on chaos” and more recent judicial statements continue to recognise the difficulties. Given the problems with error it is rarely used as a basis to challenge the validity of a contract. As a result, few cases are heard in court and the law of error fails to develop, such that our understanding of the area remains limited There has been some important academic commentary on the law of error. However, most of that discussion sought to challenge developments that had taken place, especially the influence of English law in this area, or to develop an underlying rationale for decisions that appear difficult to reconcile. It may be said that given the problems of simply understanding what the Scots law of error actually is most of the focus to date has been on that alone. As such, no significant attention has been given to what the law of error ought to be