Endre Borbáth
@eborbath.bsky.social
💼 Assistant Prof. for Participation Research @uniheidelberg.bsky.social
🧐 PI, The New Climate Divide (Emmy Noether)
🧳 Guest @wzb.bsky.social
🔬 Parties • Movements • Participation • Climate Politics
📈 Quant Methods
🇪🇺 Western, Central & Eastern EU
⛰️🚴♀️🏃
🧐 PI, The New Climate Divide (Emmy Noether)
🧳 Guest @wzb.bsky.social
🔬 Parties • Movements • Participation • Climate Politics
📈 Quant Methods
🇪🇺 Western, Central & Eastern EU
⛰️🚴♀️🏃
Congrats Nena!! I am very happy for you!
November 6, 2025 at 8:14 AM
Congrats Nena!! I am very happy for you!
This is very useful, thanks a lot! It's a small thing, but perhaps you could invert the scale for GAL/TAN so the TAN parties have smaller values. I am so used to seeing radical right parties at the bottom of the figure, rather than at the top, that it always takes me a minute to adjust.
November 4, 2025 at 9:50 AM
This is very useful, thanks a lot! It's a small thing, but perhaps you could invert the scale for GAL/TAN so the TAN parties have smaller values. I am so used to seeing radical right parties at the bottom of the figure, rather than at the top, that it always takes me a minute to adjust.
❗Takeaway for movements in hybrid/ non-democracies:
overt party alignment and nationalized conflict frames can backfire if they sap efficacy beliefs and signal thin public backing. Strategies that build solidarity and increase perceived efficacy may counteract this.
overt party alignment and nationalized conflict frames can backfire if they sap efficacy beliefs and signal thin public backing. Strategies that build solidarity and increase perceived efficacy may counteract this.
October 23, 2025 at 8:07 AM
❗Takeaway for movements in hybrid/ non-democracies:
overt party alignment and nationalized conflict frames can backfire if they sap efficacy beliefs and signal thin public backing. Strategies that build solidarity and increase perceived efficacy may counteract this.
overt party alignment and nationalized conflict frames can backfire if they sap efficacy beliefs and signal thin public backing. Strategies that build solidarity and increase perceived efficacy may counteract this.
Why? 🤔
🔎 We examine this question with a causal mediation model.
⛔ It is not because people feel much riskier joining.
➡️ The demobilizing path runs mainly through lower perceived efficacy, especially identity-building/solidarity efficacy, and lower expected public support.
🔎 We examine this question with a causal mediation model.
⛔ It is not because people feel much riskier joining.
➡️ The demobilizing path runs mainly through lower perceived efficacy, especially identity-building/solidarity efficacy, and lower expected public support.
October 23, 2025 at 8:07 AM
Why? 🤔
🔎 We examine this question with a causal mediation model.
⛔ It is not because people feel much riskier joining.
➡️ The demobilizing path runs mainly through lower perceived efficacy, especially identity-building/solidarity efficacy, and lower expected public support.
🔎 We examine this question with a causal mediation model.
⛔ It is not because people feel much riskier joining.
➡️ The demobilizing path runs mainly through lower perceived efficacy, especially identity-building/solidarity efficacy, and lower expected public support.
We find that more politicization 𝐥𝐨𝐰𝐞𝐫𝐬 the willingness to protest.
👉 In the “highly politicized” condition, 48.0% were above the participation midpoint vs 57.8% under moderate politicization (−9.8 pp).
So, ramping up party cues and conflict can demobilize. 
👉 In the “highly politicized” condition, 48.0% were above the participation midpoint vs 57.8% under moderate politicization (−9.8 pp).
So, ramping up party cues and conflict can demobilize. 
October 23, 2025 at 8:07 AM
We find that more politicization 𝐥𝐨𝐰𝐞𝐫𝐬 the willingness to protest.
👉 In the “highly politicized” condition, 48.0% were above the participation midpoint vs 57.8% under moderate politicization (−9.8 pp).
So, ramping up party cues and conflict can demobilize. 
👉 In the “highly politicized” condition, 48.0% were above the participation midpoint vs 57.8% under moderate politicization (−9.8 pp).
So, ramping up party cues and conflict can demobilize. 
We ran a pre-registered survey experiment (Aug 2024, N=1,004).
We vary protest politicization along three levers:
1️⃣ salience,
2️⃣ polarization, and
3️⃣ actors involved (parties/leaders).
Our outcome is the willingness to take part in protest actions.
We vary protest politicization along three levers:
1️⃣ salience,
2️⃣ polarization, and
3️⃣ actors involved (parties/leaders).
Our outcome is the willingness to take part in protest actions.
October 23, 2025 at 8:07 AM
We ran a pre-registered survey experiment (Aug 2024, N=1,004).
We vary protest politicization along three levers:
1️⃣ salience,
2️⃣ polarization, and
3️⃣ actors involved (parties/leaders).
Our outcome is the willingness to take part in protest actions.
We vary protest politicization along three levers:
1️⃣ salience,
2️⃣ polarization, and
3️⃣ actors involved (parties/leaders).
Our outcome is the willingness to take part in protest actions.
Congratulations!!! Very happy for you! :)
October 15, 2025 at 8:39 AM
Congratulations!!! Very happy for you! :)