Dylan Primakoff
@dylanmp.bsky.social
Senior Manager for Eurasia Programs at the National Endowment for Democracy. Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council Eurasia Center. Posting mostly about Russia.
"You won’t find reports on this in the New York Times" I dunno, seems like maybe a skill issue?
November 6, 2025 at 8:12 PM
"You won’t find reports on this in the New York Times" I dunno, seems like maybe a skill issue?
Eleven months ago, Chivvis was calling for the outgoing Biden admin to impose tighter sanctions on Russian oil and gas, to create leverage for the incoming Trump admin to use in negotiations. I'm curious what he thinks has changed. www.theguardian.com/commentisfre...
October 24, 2025 at 1:48 AM
Eleven months ago, Chivvis was calling for the outgoing Biden admin to impose tighter sanctions on Russian oil and gas, to create leverage for the incoming Trump admin to use in negotiations. I'm curious what he thinks has changed. www.theguardian.com/commentisfre...
Chivvis dances around the point a bit, but the actual policy argument seems to be that ceding to Russia parts of Ukrainian territory that the Russian military has failed to take to by force is a better alternative than applying further economic or military pressure to Russia.
October 24, 2025 at 1:48 AM
Chivvis dances around the point a bit, but the actual policy argument seems to be that ceding to Russia parts of Ukrainian territory that the Russian military has failed to take to by force is a better alternative than applying further economic or military pressure to Russia.
You know who looked cooler? Paul Newman at the March on Washington
October 23, 2025 at 1:46 AM
You know who looked cooler? Paul Newman at the March on Washington
Great article from @szakonyi.bsky.social on what is being lost with the closure of Russian election monitor Golos: www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/07/11/w...
July 14, 2025 at 12:54 PM
Great article from @szakonyi.bsky.social on what is being lost with the closure of Russian election monitor Golos: www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/07/11/w...
Understandable why Russia didn't want to publish its "peace memorandum" before today's talks. This document yet again makes clear that Russia remains uninterested in a diplomatic solution (short of Ukrainian and Western capitulation), as it has repeatedly demonstrated going back to summer 2021.
June 2, 2025 at 9:19 PM
Understandable why Russia didn't want to publish its "peace memorandum" before today's talks. This document yet again makes clear that Russia remains uninterested in a diplomatic solution (short of Ukrainian and Western capitulation), as it has repeatedly demonstrated going back to summer 2021.
A jaw-dropping paragraph. responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-ukrain...
April 24, 2025 at 1:13 PM
A jaw-dropping paragraph. responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-ukrain...
This @clingendael.bsky.social report does an excellent job laying out clearly the fundamental issues at stake in a diplomatic resolution of the Russia-Ukraine war. Importantly, it also lays out the risks of a "quick fix" – risks often ignored by those arguing to prioritize peace as soon as possible.
January 16, 2025 at 9:09 PM
This @clingendael.bsky.social report does an excellent job laying out clearly the fundamental issues at stake in a diplomatic resolution of the Russia-Ukraine war. Importantly, it also lays out the risks of a "quick fix" – risks often ignored by those arguing to prioritize peace as soon as possible.
Person's argument is also strengthened by a realistic assessment of Russia's diplomatic track-record on Ukraine and the challenges created by Russia's long history of breaking agreements and other acts of diplomatic bad faith. I haven't seen a case for negotiations addressing these issues.
January 2, 2025 at 6:45 PM
Person's argument is also strengthened by a realistic assessment of Russia's diplomatic track-record on Ukraine and the challenges created by Russia's long history of breaking agreements and other acts of diplomatic bad faith. I haven't seen a case for negotiations addressing these issues.
In @jodemocracy.bsky.social, @rtperson3.bsky.social warns of the obstacles to a negotiated solution to Russia's war on Ukraine. In contrast to most arguments calling for rapid diplomacy, Person's case looks at the underlying political motivations for Russia's behavior. muse.jhu.edu/article/947881
January 2, 2025 at 6:45 PM
In @jodemocracy.bsky.social, @rtperson3.bsky.social warns of the obstacles to a negotiated solution to Russia's war on Ukraine. In contrast to most arguments calling for rapid diplomacy, Person's case looks at the underlying political motivations for Russia's behavior. muse.jhu.edu/article/947881
I was very moved reading the excerpts of Navalny's prison diaries published in the New Yorker www.newyorker.com/magazine/202...
October 14, 2024 at 1:31 PM
I was very moved reading the excerpts of Navalny's prison diaries published in the New Yorker www.newyorker.com/magazine/202...
Most puzzlingly, The Intercept quotes "former CIA Russia analyst George Beebe" saying that Ukraine "is on a path toward becoming a failed state" without mentioning Beebe's new gig since 2022 – Director of the Grand Strategy Program at the Quincy Institute. 14/
quincyinst.org/author/georg...
quincyinst.org/author/georg...
September 12, 2024 at 1:45 AM
Most puzzlingly, The Intercept quotes "former CIA Russia analyst George Beebe" saying that Ukraine "is on a path toward becoming a failed state" without mentioning Beebe's new gig since 2022 – Director of the Grand Strategy Program at the Quincy Institute. 14/
quincyinst.org/author/georg...
quincyinst.org/author/georg...
The Intercept article also discusses in detail a letter urging diplomacy sent by the CPC to the WH in Oct 2022 (immediately following significant Ukrainian military success), but without any mention of Quincy's role in that episode. 13/
www.semafor.com/article/10/2...
www.vox.com/policy-and-p...
www.semafor.com/article/10/2...
www.vox.com/policy-and-p...
September 12, 2024 at 1:36 AM
The Intercept article also discusses in detail a letter urging diplomacy sent by the CPC to the WH in Oct 2022 (immediately following significant Ukrainian military success), but without any mention of Quincy's role in that episode. 13/
www.semafor.com/article/10/2...
www.vox.com/policy-and-p...
www.semafor.com/article/10/2...
www.vox.com/policy-and-p...
Quincy is mentioned once in the Intercept piece, where it claims that Joe Cirincione left the org "over [its] call for diplomatic talks." In fact, Cirincione left over a more nuanced and deeper critique of Quincy's positions, which he made public at the time. 12/
www.politico.com/newsletters/...
www.politico.com/newsletters/...
September 12, 2024 at 1:30 AM
Quincy is mentioned once in the Intercept piece, where it claims that Joe Cirincione left the org "over [its] call for diplomatic talks." In fact, Cirincione left over a more nuanced and deeper critique of Quincy's positions, which he made public at the time. 12/
www.politico.com/newsletters/...
www.politico.com/newsletters/...
The most common approach advanced by those arguing for the US to more actively "pursue diplomacy" has been for the US to make ongoing aid contingent on Ukraine pursuing negotiations. A strong version of this argument by Charap and Priebe can be read here: www.rand.org/pubs/perspec... /8
September 12, 2024 at 12:24 AM
The most common approach advanced by those arguing for the US to more actively "pursue diplomacy" has been for the US to make ongoing aid contingent on Ukraine pursuing negotiations. A strong version of this argument by Charap and Priebe can be read here: www.rand.org/pubs/perspec... /8
The terms on offer in the Istanbul talks of spring 2022 would have included one-sided caps on Ukrainian military personnel and weapons, while giving Russia a veto over any future Western defense assistance to Ukraine. Should Ukraine really have taken this deal? 6/
www.nytimes.com/interactive/...
www.nytimes.com/interactive/...
September 11, 2024 at 10:10 PM
The terms on offer in the Istanbul talks of spring 2022 would have included one-sided caps on Ukrainian military personnel and weapons, while giving Russia a veto over any future Western defense assistance to Ukraine. Should Ukraine really have taken this deal? 6/
www.nytimes.com/interactive/...
www.nytimes.com/interactive/...
On the policy analysis – the author makes consistent reference to the loves lost in Ukraine since 2022, with Ukraine liberating only minimal territory over that time. On the other hand, there is zero consideration of the cost of leaving these territories under Russian occupation. 2/
September 11, 2024 at 9:41 PM
On the policy analysis – the author makes consistent reference to the loves lost in Ukraine since 2022, with Ukraine liberating only minimal territory over that time. On the other hand, there is zero consideration of the cost of leaving these territories under Russian occupation. 2/
I am thrilled and relieved by today's incredible news. At the same time, I'm very conscious that those released today represent only a small proportion of the political prisoners held by the Putin regime. They must all be freed.
August 1, 2024 at 6:52 PM
I am thrilled and relieved by today's incredible news. At the same time, I'm very conscious that those released today represent only a small proportion of the political prisoners held by the Putin regime. They must all be freed.
Тук-тук: федеральный розыск, сука
May 9, 2024 at 12:57 PM
Тук-тук: федеральный розыск, сука
The Quincy Institute has not really come so far from its early days of publishing Scott Ritter.
April 7, 2024 at 11:34 PM
The Quincy Institute has not really come so far from its early days of publishing Scott Ritter.
Why people continue even after Navalny's death to lie about his position on the annexation of Crimea I do not know. Already under house arrest, he took the real personal risk of condemning it as it happened, including in the NYT.
foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/01/n...
newlinesmag.com/spotlight/na...
foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/01/n...
newlinesmag.com/spotlight/na...
March 3, 2024 at 1:39 AM
Why people continue even after Navalny's death to lie about his position on the annexation of Crimea I do not know. Already under house arrest, he took the real personal risk of condemning it as it happened, including in the NYT.
foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/01/n...
newlinesmag.com/spotlight/na...
foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/01/n...
newlinesmag.com/spotlight/na...
March 2, 2024 at 1:44 AM
Pretty remarkable to write a "10 years on from the Maidan, how did we get here" piece that *literally does not mention the annexation of Crimea.* We go straight from Febaruary 2014 to April 2014. Laughably dishonest analysis. responsiblestatecraft.org/maidan-ukrai...
February 23, 2024 at 2:08 PM
Pretty remarkable to write a "10 years on from the Maidan, how did we get here" piece that *literally does not mention the annexation of Crimea.* We go straight from Febaruary 2014 to April 2014. Laughably dishonest analysis. responsiblestatecraft.org/maidan-ukrai...
From Putin's year-end call-in show/press conference today: www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/1...
A reality check for those calling on Ukraine to negotiate peace terms: Putin still seeks Ukrainian capitulation.
A reality check for those calling on Ukraine to negotiate peace terms: Putin still seeks Ukrainian capitulation.
December 14, 2023 at 5:36 PM
From Putin's year-end call-in show/press conference today: www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/1...
A reality check for those calling on Ukraine to negotiate peace terms: Putin still seeks Ukrainian capitulation.
A reality check for those calling on Ukraine to negotiate peace terms: Putin still seeks Ukrainian capitulation.